In a discussion of an earlier essay by the Lebanese writer and journalist Jihad al-Zein, published on the “Nahār Issues” page that he edited under the title “A Difficult Question and a Perplexing One” (6 June 2006), which addressed the arrest of a group of intellectuals who had signed the Beirut–Damascus / Damascus–Beirut Declaration—among them the late Michel Kilo, widely regarded as a symbol of moderation and flexibility within the Syrian opposition—I wrote a response in the same forum (27 June 2006) entitled “Democracy Is Not a Concern for Many Segments of Syrian Society.”
In that piece, I attributed what al-Zein had described as the “isolation of democracy and the intellectuals” in Syria to the fact that the overwhelming majority of Syrians were consumed by the struggle to secure their daily bread and basic necessities. I added that a significant segment of society also displayed sympathy toward Islamist currents, including the most extreme among them. The result was that democracy did not constitute a genuine concern for these groups; indeed, many stood openly opposed to it for a range of doctrinal and political reasons.
I further observed that the expression of opinion at the time resembled an unequal duel between unarmed intellectuals and political activists on one side and the regime’s colossal security and political apparatus on the other, while the broader public either watched passively or remained absorbed in its private anxieties and hardships.
Has anything changed since then?
Undoubtedly, even raising this question today—and reflecting on the state of democracy and the extent of Syrian engagement with it—will provoke deep pain and bitterness among the country’s democratic opposition. For if we summon the courage to answer honestly, we must conclude that the condition of democracy has deteriorated even further, and that engagement with it continues to decline not only among the public at large but even among intellectuals themselves.
Between Abstract Theory and Harsh Reality
In purely theoretical terms, one may rightly argue that the cause of freedoms and democracy should concern Syrian society in its entirety, across all its strata and identities, and that it ought to occupy a central place in public consciousness. In practice, however, it has yet to receive the attention it deserves. This judgment may sound harsh, but it is the closest approximation to reality, supported by abundant evidence.
This is particularly true if we move beyond a narrow focus on political, cultural, economic, or social elites and instead consider the active forces within Syrian society: their relationship to the question of democracy and freedoms, and their concrete willingness to participate in a serious political and civic movement committed to a clear programme of reform and democratic transformation, regardless of the regime’s position or the intensity of its resistance.
Numerous afflictions burden our societies and their political, civic, and syndical representations. The issue arguably constitutes a genuine dilemma that would require extensive research to trace its causes and explore future prospects—an undertaking that lies beyond the scope of this essay. Still, several core points warrant careful reflection.
Foremost among them is the entrenched climate of fear and submission cultivated over decades of despotism. That long tyranny destroyed nearly all popular or class-based political representation across social strata. It devastated political life, imposed ruinous costs on those who dared engage in public affairs, and prompted entire generations to withdraw from collective concerns. Politics thus came to be perceived as a luxury that large segments of the population simply could not afford.
If the struggle for daily sustenance once diverted broad sectors of society from democratic concerns, the situation has since grown immeasurably worse as a result of the catastrophic war Syria has endured. Economically and existentially, its consequences have driven more than ninety percent of Syrians below the poverty line, leaving vast segments in desperate need of food and financial assistance. When conditions reach such extremes, it is both obstinate and plainly misguided to demand that people concern themselves with anything beyond securing their next meal and sustaining their families.
As for sympathy toward Islamist currents—moderate or militant—and their doctrinal and political posture toward democracy, the reality is no longer disputed. The majority of Syrians have not merely acquiesced to the emergence of the current authority, with its well-known Islamist roots and historical hostility to democracy; they have extended to it near-unanimous endorsement and support. We now witness crowds competing to demonstrate that allegiance through every available channel.
The Clash of Identities and Separatist Tendencies
Compounding these dynamics is the intensifying identitarian conflict rooted in sub-national affiliations, or more precisely, in tribal and communal loyalties accompanied by anti-national impulses that seek autonomy or separation, whatever their stated justifications. Such forces display little to no interest in broader national demands or in struggles for freedoms and democracy. Their rise not only marginalises advocates of democracy but also confronts society with entirely different anxieties and priorities, far removed from concern with national or democratic questions. This is evident in Suweida, along the coast, and in north-eastern Syria.
To these internal burdens must be added the negative role of external powers. Major international capitals appear largely indifferent to the nature of Syria’s authority, its ideological orientation, or its commitment to citizenship, justice, freedoms, and democracy. Their overriding concern lies in securing strategic interests in Syria and the wider region. Accordingly, they pursue a pragmatic agenda centred on economic and security calculations: maintaining a minimum level of internal stability, cooperation against terrorism, curbing migration flows, securing borders, managing regional dossiers of concern—chief among them Israel’s security—advancing normalisation with it, and consolidating a regional order that prevents the return of Iranian influence.
Does acknowledging these grim realities imply abandoning the demand for democracy?
By no means.
On the contrary, we must cling to it tenaciously and continue to summon others to its cause, while shedding any grand illusions about the immediacy of its realisation. Democracy remains the indispensable foundation of any sound political order—one that safeguards the interests of the people, enables them to develop their capacities and talents, and guarantees all citizens the exercise of their natural rights: life, liberty, justice, equality before the law, freedom of thought without coercion, and freedom of expression by every lawful means.
In such an order, no opinion—however misguided it may appear to others—may be suppressed. Dialogue and persuasion replace repression and silencing; the ballot box replaces bullets and the whip.
Will we remain forever bewildered and estranged from the only system capable of securing all this: the democratic order?
This article was translated and edited by The Syrian Observer. The Syrian Observer has not verified the content of this story. Responsibility for the information and views set out in this article lies entirely with the author.
