The fragile understandings between the Syrian government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are facing renewed uncertainty, as Damascus abandons its earlier conciliatory tone in favour of more confrontational rhetoric.
Since the start of negotiations in early 2025 aimed at integrating the SDF into Syria’s state institutions, official discourse from the Assad government had maintained a cautious diplomatic posture. That approach appears to be shifting.
During a press conference following the June 22 suicide bombing of the Mar Elias Church near Damascus, the spokesperson for the Ministry of Interior explicitly linked the attack to a cell originating from al-Hol camp in northeast Syria—a facility under SDF control known to house Islamic State (ISIS) affiliates. The official added that the leader of the group had since been apprehended. Semi-official media outlets later leaked documents listing aid recipients at the camp, allegedly including the names of those involved in the attack, raising further suspicions about SDF’s control over the site.
The SDF, for its part, categorically rejected the accusations, dismissing them as baseless and politically motivated.
Tensions escalated further on June 28, when the SDF dispatched reinforcements to frontlines in Deir ez-Zor, prompting limited clashes with government forces.
Governance Deadlock Persists
At the heart of the standoff is a deep disagreement over the future governance structure of Syria’s northeast. The SDF continues to advocate for a quasi-federal model that guarantees political autonomy in Kurdish-majority areas. Damascus, however, insists on a form of decentralisation that would empower local councils but keep ultimate political and security authority centralized in the capital.
To strengthen its negotiating hand, the SDF has intensified its diplomatic engagement with Washington, Paris, and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq. SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi is expected to visit Erbil in early July to discuss hosting a new Kurdish dialogue conference—an effort that also seeks to leverage Erbil’s current favour with the Trump administration.
U.S. Position Emboldens Damascus
The shift in tone from Damascus comes as the United States increasingly signals support for the Syrian government. In a recent statement, U.S. Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack described Damascus as the “sole legitimate interlocutor” and urged the SDF to integrate into the Syrian state.
Washington’s overtures appear designed to reward the Assad government, which has shown neutrality during the latest Israel–Iran flare-up in June. Damascus notably refrained from engaging Israeli forces during multiple incursions into southern Syria targeting Iran-linked cells—signalling a new calculus aimed at avoiding confrontation with Israel.
That posture may discourage Tel Aviv from supporting the SDF as a counterweight to Damascus, despite past Israeli interest in backing the group following the regime’s collapse.
SDF Plays the ISIS Card
Amid shifting dynamics that seem to favour Damascus, the SDF has returned to a familiar strategy: positioning itself as the frontline bulwark against ISIS. The group has refused to hand over ISIS detainees to the Syrian government and on June 29 launched military exercises across Raqqa and parts of Deir ez-Zor, citing preparations for anti-ISIS operations.
Observers suggest these maneuvers may be aimed at drawing renewed international attention to the SDF’s role in regional security, particularly in the wake of the church bombing near Damascus, which reverberated beyond Syria’s borders.
There is growing speculation that the SDF may seek to expand its reach into Syria’s central desert region under the pretext of combating ISIS remnants, with the strategic aim of linking its territories to Suweida in the south. Reports indicate the SDF has established close ties with Druze religious leader Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri, who commands significant loyalty from the Suweida Military Council—an entity that shares the SDF’s support for decentralization and opposition to Damascus.
If such a territorial link is achieved, the SDF’s political leverage would significantly increase, potentially attracting Israeli support for the emerging SDF–Suweida alliance as a means to pressure—or bolster—Damascus.
This article was translated and edited by The Syrian Observer. The Syrian Observer has not verified the content of this story. Responsibility for the information and views set out in this article lies entirely with the author.
