Since the Baath Party seized power in Syria in 1963, the country’s economy took a markedly different course. What had previously functioned as an institutional framework gradually gave way to a system governed by personal networks and individual authority. This transformation deepened under Hafez al-Assad following his ascent in 1970, when a small circle of family members, relatives and close allies came to dominate Syria’s economic life—from major investments to import contracts and exclusive agency rights for Arab and foreign companies. The same model persisted under Bashar al-Assad after 2000.
With the collapse of Assad’s regime in late 2024, Syria now confronts fundamental questions one year into its post-regime era. Has the economy genuinely transitioned from personal rule to institutional governance? Or does the legacy of five decades of individual dominance continue under new guises? What dangers arise when personal power overshadows institutional order? And how should the country’s economy be assessed after a year of political transition?
Presidential Decrees
President Ahmad al-Shar‘a has issued a series of economic directives over the past year. Chief among them was the establishment of the National Committee for Import and Export, tasked with approving or prohibiting trade in goods. According to the decree, the committee operates under the General Secretariat of the Presidency, led by Dr Maher al-Shar‘a. It is chaired by the director of the newly created General Authority for Ports and Customs, which oversees all border crossings, seaports and customs activity, and is directly affiliated with the presidency.
Another decree launched a Sovereign Fund aimed at initiating developmental and productive projects, enhancing the use of human and material resources and converting idle state assets into growth instruments. This fund is also linked to the presidency.
In parallel, a Development Fund was introduced to support reconstruction and finance projects through interest-free loans—again, under direct presidential oversight.
Emerging Yet Fragile Structures
Economic researcher Mohammed Albi observed that Syria’s current economic management “is not conducted through formal institutions so much as through a narrow network of power centres clustered around the presidency.” He argued that ministries and government bodies are “not genuine decision-makers but mere executors,” largely excluded from policymaking and strategic planning.
According to Albi, real decisions are taken by a closed circle led by the president’s brothers, Maher and Hazem, along with former officials from Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham. This group has “produced new businessmen who serve as instruments for restructuring the market, directing investments and negotiating settlements with older capital.” In his assessment, the network operates outside state institutions, maintaining control over key portfolios such as resource management, border control and strategic contracts.
Economist Mulham al-Jazmati of Karam Shaar Consulting described the current phase as “a complex transitional period that defies clear classification.” He noted that while the government has begun constructing new structures—such as the Development Fund, the Sovereign Fund and the Supreme Council for Economic Development—these entities remain fragile and lack the strength to evolve into genuine institutions capable of shaping and implementing policy.
Al-Jazmati stressed that these bodies are “directly linked to the presidency without oversight,” and that strategic sectors—particularly investment and energy—“continue to be managed through narrow channels within the president’s inner circle.” What emerges is a hybrid model in which emerging institutions coexist with entrenched personal authority.
He added that this overlap is indicative of the transitional nature of the period. Institutions are gradually taking shape, yet the lack of an experienced administrative base and the weakness of ministerial capacity leave room for personal interventions that substitute for institutional robustness. Nevertheless, he acknowledged early signs of progress, pointing to “a growing interest in setting clearer rules for economic management, although the effects remain modest in the short term.”
Risks of a Personal Economy
Albi warned that continued reliance on individuals or informal networks carries structural risks, particularly unpredictability. Investors—both domestic and foreign—“require clear rules, not decisions that fluctuate with the moods of powerbrokers or internal disputes.” He argued that a privilege-based economy, in which proximity to power matters more than merit or productivity, stifles the development of a genuine private sector and entrenches a rentier model at a time when the country desperately needs to revive its productive capacity.
He further cautioned that weak institutions undermine transparency and hinder Syria’s reintegration into the global financial system, as international partners are “reluctant to engage with environments dominated by unaccountable networks.”
Albi concluded that the Syrian economy remains “managed outside institutional frameworks,” with ministries and even the central bank relegated to “executive tools for directives issued by small circles surrounding the presidency.” With three separate economic systems currently coexisting, he argued, Syria is far from achieving a unified model of state governance—leaving any reform programme vulnerable to collapse and the economy hostage to individual control.
One Year On: An Assessment
Al-Jazmati characterised the state of the economy after one year of transition as “movement without real progress.” While post-war Syria has achieved superficial stability, this has not been matched by productive growth or tangible economic expansion. The relative improvement in the exchange rate, he said, “reflects a shortage of liquidity rather than a surge in productive or commercial activity.”
He pointed to the continued absence of effective banking services and the state’s inability to finance the private sector, which has kept economic momentum sluggish. This fragility is exacerbated by a new energy policy that has gradually rolled back electricity subsidies—a shift he sees as a cautious move towards a market-based model and away from protectionism.
Many of the investment announcements made in the early months remain only memoranda of understanding, never advancing to implementation. Al-Jazmati attributed this to an economic environment “not yet ready to absorb large-scale investments,” not due to lack of political will but because of the institutional and administrative deficiencies preventing the translation of commitments into projects.
Economist Amer Shhada insisted that any credible assessment of Syria’s economy must rely on fundamentals such as the balance of payments, the trade deficit, the budget shortfall and the disentangling of overlapping state finances. “The presence of new cars or a rise in imports means little when the trade and payments balances remain in deficit,” he said, noting that these indicators, along with public living conditions, form the real basis of evaluation.
Shhada argued that many initiatives presented as economic are, in reality, political. He rejected the IMF’s recent projection of 1 percent growth as “inaccurate and inconsistent with its earlier findings,” dismissing it as mere diplomatic courtesy. Genuine recovery, he said, requires indicators that have yet to materialise. Government bodies, he added, “speak only of costs without identifying resources,” while customs records “list weights but omit revenues.” All of this, he concluded, reflects a lack of transparency that prevents the construction of a reliable economic framework.
This article was translated and edited by The Syrian Observer. The Syrian Observer has not verified the content of this story. Responsibility for the information and views set out in this article lies entirely with the author.
