The recent press conference held in Damascus by attorney Yasser al-Farhan and Judge Jumaa al-Enezi, announcing the findings of the Syrian National Commission of Inquiry into the coastal massacres of March 2025, demands urgent scrutiny. While presented as a step toward truth and accountability, the commission’s report raises profound questions about its independence, legitimacy, and the deeper motives behind its formation and conclusions.
- A Commission Lacking Credibility
First and foremost, the commission cannot be considered impartial or credible. It was not established by international bodies such as the International Criminal Court, Amnesty International, or reputable Syrian and global human rights organisations. Nor was it formed in collaboration with civil society actors committed to transitional justice, reparation, and accountability. Rather, the commission was created by decree of Interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa—the very figure at the centre of the allegations, alongside his Defence Minister Marhaf Abu Qasra, Interior Minister Anas Khattab, and key figures from Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (formerly Jabhat al-Nusra) and other militias who formally joined the new Syrian Ministry of Defence during the so-called “Victory Conference” at the Presidential Palace on 29 January 2025.
- A Manufactured Narrative
The events of 6–11 March 2025—now infamously dubbed “Black Friday”—in Latakia, Jableh, Tartus, and the al-Ghab Plain were not random outbreaks of violence. Rather, they represent the continuation of a systematic campaign to obscure atrocities through the manipulation of narratives. Pro-government voices have scrambled to portray these massacres as isolated incidents or as acts of revenge by remnants of the Assad regime. Yet the facts suggest a convergence of perpetrators from multiple camps:
- a) Assad Regime Loyalists
These include figures like:
- Miqdad Fattouha (Abu Jaafar): A notorious war criminal from Jableh known for appearing in videos mutilating opposition detainees.
- Ghiath Suleiman Dalla: Former head of the 42nd Brigade of the 4th Division, with a brutal legacy in Damascus suburbs like Darayya and Qaboun.
- Mohammed Mahrez Jaber: Former Desert Hawks commander and ally of Russian interests, who openly supported attacks on new internal security forces.
- “The Men of Might”: A newly emerged militia rooted in sectarian ideology, linked to Iranian-backed groups and allegedly behind the bombing of the Mar Elias Church in June.
- b) The Interim Authorities and Their Islamist Allies
Despite claims of state unification, the Ministry of Defence and its affiliated “New Syrian Army” have been heavily infiltrated by foreign jihadists and former al-Qaeda affiliates, including:
- Abu Dujana al-Turkistani: Known for inciting sectarian violence and appearing in videos celebrating civilian deaths in Latakia.
- Abu Ahmad al-Jaza’iri: An extremist propagandist who declared Syrian Alawites and Christians to be “microbes.”
- Abu Azzam al-Souri and Abu al-Mish al-Sarawi: Fighters celebrated by official media even as videos show them engaging in looting and torture.
- c) Pro-Turkish Militias and Irregulars
Units from the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army—namely the Sultan Suleiman Shah Brigade, the Hamza Division, and Ahrar al-Sharqiya—played a documented role in killings, torture, home burnings, and mass displacement, despite their leaders’ televised denials.
- d) Civilian Volunteers and Sectarian Mobilisers
Thousands of civilians answered informal calls for jihad issued from mosques and social media. Prominent among them:
- Sheikh Mohsen Ghosn, Imam of Zain al-Abidin Mosque in Damascus, and others who publicly incited sectarian violence.
- Activists such as Abu Mahmoud al-Sous and Shazar al-Zoubi, who encouraged abuses against minorities while cautioning against documentation.
- Individuals like Abu Aqab and Abu Jaber al-Khattabi, who bragged about demographic engineering in Alawite-majority towns like Baniyas and Arza.
- The President’s Troubling Appearances
President Ahmad al-Sharaa made at least three public appearances during the bloodshed. His first was a dawn prayer at the Akram Mosque in Damascus, where he spoke of civil peace—a performance eerily reminiscent of Bashar al-Assad’s photo-ops during earlier massacres. In subsequent speeches, al-Sharaa claimed he sought to avoid bloodshed and blamed “former regime remnants and foreign actors” for provoking civil war. His creation of an investigative committee was framed as a gesture of reconciliation, yet no meaningful justice followed.
- Silencing the Whistleblowers
Perhaps most damning is the campaign to discredit voices from within the transitional government’s own ranks. Most notably, Mohammad Haji Abu Ubaida, a fighter in the New Syrian Army, publicly confessed to witnessing war crimes committed by his own comrades. The response was swift and brutal: he was smeared as a regime loyalist, a Kurdish separatist, and even as a homosexual—based on old photos and his appearance. Days later, he resurfaced in a video alleging he had been kidnapped, raising serious concerns that his retraction was coerced.
- Evasion and Incoherence in the Commission’s Report
The investigative committee’s report carefully avoided naming key perpetrators or acknowledging the sectarian nature of the massacres. Even in listing victims, it identified Sunni Muslim civilians by name while referring vaguely to “other civilian deaths,” only admitting they were Alawites after pressure from reporters. The report’s focus on “preventing the establishment of an Alawite mini-state” reveals its underlying political motive: justifying a campaign of counter-violence under the pretext of national unity.
It also offered contradictory remarks on the fate of abducted Alawite women and recommended bureaucratic reviews rather than real justice. Meanwhile, it praised the Ministry of Defence for working to regulate weapons and uniforms—despite those same ministries being directly implicated in the killings.
- Selective Disarmament and Exclusion
Despite official claims that all factions have been integrated into the national military since January 2025, the commission explicitly excluded Druze self-defence groups in Suweida and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) from this arrangement. It also ignored the rise of tribal militias acting as parallel forces outside the control of Damascus—an omission that speaks volumes.
- The International Dimension
The international community—particularly the United States under President Donald Trump and his envoy Thomas Barak, as well as the European Union—has shown minimal concern for the fate of Syria’s Alawites, Druze, or other minorities. Instead, there are signs that some powers may view the massacres as an opportunity to accelerate Syria’s fragmentation along the lines of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, or post-Saddam Iraq.
The disastrous assault on Suweida appears to have been greenlit, or at least misunderstood, as part of a tacit approval from Washington and Tel Aviv during recent meetings in Azerbaijan. If so, it was a catastrophic misreading with far-reaching consequences.
Conclusion: A Road to Nowhere
The Syrian transitional authorities, now more than seven months into their mandate, have demonstrated not only poor judgment but a deep disconnect from the foundational ideals of the revolution they claim to represent. Their internal policies have veered into authoritarianism, sectarianism, and militarised impunity. Without genuine accountability, inclusive governance, and a commitment to justice that transcends old vendettas, Syria risks plunging further into a dark and irreversible abyss.
As the saying goes: a wise man speaks softly but carries a big stick. Unfortunately, Syria today is ruled by men who shout empty platitudes while swinging the stick blindly—even against their own.
