Vietnam’s land area exceeds 331,000 square kilometres—more than twice that of Syria—and its population of roughly 102 million is nearly five times larger. The country encompasses 54 officially recognised ethnic groups and seven religious or non-religious classifications.
Although the last American soldier departed Vietnam in March 1973, North Vietnamese forces pressed on with the goal of reunification. The conflict continued until December 1975, culminating in the fall of Saigon on 30 April. Yet the end of the war did not immediately bring prosperity. Economic hardship persisted, and the Vietnamese people endured years of poverty and deprivation long after the guns fell silent.
Vietnam adopted isolationist policies, while the United States worked to deepen its economic isolation. The consequences were severe—echoing, in many respects, the impact of Western and American sanctions on the Syrian economy. In 1976, the Fourth National Congress announced that Vietnam would complete its socialist transition within twenty years. Reality proved far more difficult. The country moved from one economic crisis to the next.
The Second Five-Year Plan collapsed. By 1980, 10,000 of the country’s 13,246 socialist cooperatives had failed. Average monthly per-capita income in the north fell from 82 dollars in 1976 to 58 dollars in 1980—a figure strikingly close to Syria’s current per-capita income, estimated between 25 and 50 dollars.
Once Vietnam opened to the world—after sanctions were lifted, agreements were signed with the United States, and the country joined global institutions such as the World Trade Organization—its economic trajectory changed dramatically. GDP rose from 14 billion dollars in 1985 to 261 billion in 2019. In local currency, output surged 214-fold, from 28 trillion dong to 6 quadrillion dong.
Growth accelerated from 3.85 percent in 1985 to 7 percent in 2019, peaking at 9.54 percent in 1995. Per-capita GDP multiplied twenty-one times, from 377 dollars in 1985 to 8,041 dollars in 2019. Exports reached 248 billion dollars in 2019, and foreign-exchange reserves climbed to 49.5 billion dollars in 2017.
Agricultural recovery was equally striking. Vietnam became one of the world’s leading rice exporters, while tea and coffee exports expanded significantly. New factories in major cities began producing shoes, clothing, and computers for global markets. By 2001, the economy was growing at an annual rate of around 8 percent.
The turning point came in 1986, when Vietnam launched its market-oriented reforms—Đổi Mới—and abandoned rigid central planning. The government ended compulsory collectivisation, opened rural markets to supply-and-demand dynamics, and allowed farmers to keep and sell their produce freely.
Today, the depth of economic ties between the United States and Vietnam is remarkable, given the painful legacy of war. Yet political interests often open new chapters in history. Normalisation began in the early 1990s under President Bill Clinton. In 1994, Washington lifted its trade embargo, and by 1995, a gradual process of confidence-building was underway. The parallel with Syria is notable: lifting the Caesar Act required nearly a full year.
Vietnam joined the WTO in 2001 and, six years later, signed a bilateral trade agreement with the United States. Under this agreement, Washington granted Vietnam Most Favored Nation status, reducing tariffs from 40 percent to 3 percent. By comparison, current US tariffs on Syrian exports stand at 41 percent, with efforts underway to reduce them to 3 percent.
Vietnam restructured its trade and investment regime by opening service markets. As a result, bilateral trade with the United States soared to 451 billion dollars, with Vietnamese exports reaching 123 billion in 2022—up from just 1.5 billion in 2001. Vietnam is now Washington’s second-largest trading partner in the region.
The Vietnamese market has become a magnet for investors. US investments now range between 10 and 12 billion dollars annually in a country of 100 million people. Vietnam has emerged as a major manufacturing base for American companies such as Nike, Apple, Amkor Technology, and Intel.
The most important lessons from Vietnam’s experience lie in its commitment to resolving disputes, prioritising national revival, and embracing global openness—especially toward the United States, which proved essential for attracting investment and transferring technology. This reconciliatory approach transformed Vietnam into a central hub in global advanced-technology supply chains.
For Syria, the priority must be to prepare its workforce for advanced industries and technologies, ensuring a pool of skilled labour at competitive costs. Vietnam’s average labour cost, after decades of development, remains under two dollars per hour.
Vietnam plans to train 50,000 semiconductor engineers, despite its already substantial expertise. How many thousands of engineers must Syria train to host companies in semiconductors, clean energy, artificial intelligence, and digital infrastructure? In the first six months of 2025 alone, more than 152,700 new enterprises were established in Vietnam—a 26.5 percent increase from the same period in 2024.
According to government data, Vietnam’s accumulated foreign direct investment exceeded 322 billion dollars by the end of 2024—equivalent to nearly two-thirds of its GDP. The government continues to adopt policies that attract FDI, particularly for export-oriented manufacturing.
Syria must entrench eight essential pillars to attract domestic and foreign investment: political stability, investment-friendly legislation, strong economic growth, a qualified young workforce, competitive labour costs, expanded trade agreements, a rehabilitated banking sector, and modern digital and technological infrastructure.
If Syria works diligently over the next decade to develop its workforce, open to the world, attract global companies, and maintain competitive labour costs, it can—God willing—position itself to draw international corporations and become the “Vietnam of the Middle East.”
This article was translated and edited by The Syrian Observer. The Syrian Observer has not verified the content of this story. Responsibility for the information and views set out in this article lies entirely with the author.
