The assault on al Ashrafiyya and Sheikh Maqsoud in Aleppo by the terror-driven authority in Damascus—by which we mean an apparatus that represents no one but itself, neither sect nor faith—is neither surprising nor new. It is merely the latest expression of a consistent and long-standing pattern: from the regime’s suppression of national dialogue and transitional justice, to its failure in economic reform, and the subsequent massacres along the coast, in Sweida, and now in Aleppo against the Kurds. And it will not stop tomorrow.
Why? Because such actions stem from a structure that fundamentally rejects the Other—a structure built on exclusion and sustained by killing and condemnation. This is evident in the regime’s refusal to take even symbolic steps to deter daily violations and killings in areas such as the Syrian coast, Homs, and Hama—particularly against Alawites. It is equally clear in its persistent sectarian incitement against the Druze and Syrian Kurds, and against anyone who opposes it, regardless of identity. No sect or faith offers protection.
This is why the massacres will continue—another occurred in Homs today—and why the fighting will persist for as long as this authority remains. It is the antithesis of the very concept of a state, of citizenship, of freedom, and of democracy—all of which reflect the true aspirations of Syrians. The assault on Sheikh Maqsoud and al Ashrafiyya must be understood within this framework of domination—an attempt to subjugate the Kurdish community without recognising the rights it has pursued since the founding of Syria, and even before. Once again, a regime of terror yields only more terror. What unfolded in Aleppo will not be the last, for the killings in Sweida, on the coast, and in Homs continue unabated.
This assault also lays bare the regime’s complete subservience to Turkey—as though Syria has merely shifted from the squalor of “Guardianship of the Jurist” to the squalor of “Guardianship of the Imam.” The colours may differ, but the substance remains unchanged. What is tragic is that Turkey now behaves with the same imperial arrogance once exhibited by Iran, blending nationalist conceit with a sense of entitlement. Syrians had no desire to fall under Iran’s control, and they harbour no wish today to fall under Turkey’s.
Such dependency can only generate internal conflicts that will persist until either all who resist are crushed, or until the regime of terror collapses. This battle against the Kurds was not waged by the regime alone, nor solely because of its internal logic—it is also Turkey’s war. Many more such battles will follow unless political solutions are found. Crucially, without Turkish backing, the regime would never have dared confront a well-armed and capable community. This mirrors what occurred in Sweida, where the regime was forced to withdraw due to the Israeli presence—a factor absent on the coast, where the unarmed population remains vulnerable. All of this reaffirms that the regime’s essence is rooted in terror, killing, and domination.
Further evidence lies in the regime’s ongoing, calculated killings along the coast and in the outskirts of Sweida—executed slowly to avoid international reaction or even attention. The outside world chooses to look away, intervening only when the violence becomes too overt to ignore.
The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are, in essence, a de facto authority born of revolutionary and wartime conditions—conditions that are still ongoing. Their existence is tied, firstly, to the unquestionable rights of Syrian Kurds. Secondly, they are entangled in a complex web of regional and international influences—Russian, American, Turkish, Iranian, and the broader anti ISIS coalition. Thirdly, the SDF’s internal structure is itself authoritarian, marked by abuses including underage recruitment, arbitrary detention, and violations that often target Kurds before others. Finally, there is the economic dimension—control over resources such as oil, wheat, and cotton.
The only viable path forward is dialogue, however prolonged. The language of violence should have vanished with the fall of the Assad regime, giving way to negotiation. Yet under a regime that continues to practise extermination, that hope feels more distant than ever.
The principle of a state’s monopoly on arms is, in theory, legitimate. Any state has the right to the exclusive use of force. Yet this right becomes void when it serves as a pretext for mass killings. Alawites were massacred after surrendering their weapons—and the killings continue. Most victims are civilians and innocents, not remnants who may still be armed. Massacres have taken place in Sweida, and battles have broken out in Sheikh Maqsoud.
Trust between the regime and these communities has been irreparably damaged. They feel their very existence is under threat. Addressing these painful issues demands dialogue and a gradual rebuilding of trust—not violence, which has only deepened the rifts between Syrians. For many, separation now seems easier than remaining within this state. It is telling that the SDF has not, to date, called for secession—though another confrontation may well push them towards it, unless Syria takes a radically different course.
The question of the state’s monopoly on arms is inseparable from the nature of the Syrian army currently taking shape. What has emerged so far is not reassuring—it is alarming: the integration of foreign fighters, the adoption of jihadist religious ideology, and the involvement of military, security, and public-sector personnel in massacres. This renders the army anything but national.
If an army is meant to safeguard the nation and instil public confidence, this one has instead become a source of fear. Consequently, people will not relinquish their arms, because they do not feel protected. Responsibility lies squarely with the regime. If it were to establish a truly national army, the people would disarm voluntarily. By doing the opposite, it only reinforces their dependence on weapons.
The core of the problem lies elsewhere. Syria has become the battleground for regional and international power struggles. Aleppo and the northwest are under Turkish influence; the south under Israeli sway; the east of the Euphrates under American control; and Russian bases remain entrenched along the coast. No local actor possesses genuine autonomy. The internal conflicts are mere extensions of these broader rivalries—fought on the bodies and souls of Syrians.
In this context, the most significant player is Israel, which seeks to absorb the Syrian south and pressure the regime into a normalisation agreement. No transitional authority has the right or the mandate to sign such an accord. This is the root of Western and American complicity with the regime of terror, which, like the Assad regime before it, trades its survival for the satisfaction of external powers—at the expense of its own people. It is as though the Syrian revolution has been reduced to political nothingness: no state, no democracy, no freedoms.
This article was translated and edited by The Syrian Observer. The Syrian Observer has not verified the content of this story. Responsibility for the information and views set out in this article lies entirely with the author.
