The late American economist Milton Friedman often repeated an adage: “There’s no such thing as a free lunch.” The phrase harks back to a golden era in American history when bars lured patrons with the promise of a “free lunch”—only to compel them to buy drinks. The lesson was clear: the illusion of “free” is a mirage, and the bill inevitably arrives.
This wisdom may well apply to Syria and the emerging rapport between U.S. President Donald Trump and Syria’s transitional president, Ahmad al-Sharaa. In a marked departure from over a decade of American policy aimed at isolating the Syrian regime, Trump has adopted a new approach towards Damascus: “conditional containment” in place of total isolation or forced regime change. This pivot was encapsulated in Trump’s public meeting with Sharaa, the issuance of General License No. 25, and the temporary suspension of Caesar Act sanctions. Yet this raises a critical question: will U.S. patronage bolster Sharaa’s authority, or render him beholden to foreign approval—at the cost of domestic legitimacy?
What Prompted Washington’s Recalibration on Syria?
The simplest explanation is that Trump, in characteristically unpredictable fashion, remains opaque in his true intentions. Yet a deeper, more strategic rationale underpins America’s shift, based on three core pillars:
- Curbing Iranian Influence Without War: Washington aims to diminish Tehran’s hold in Syria by supporting a more moderate figure in Damascus capable of reshaping the regional balance.
- Low-Cost Reengagement: The easing of sanctions offers a way for the U.S. to re-enter the Syrian theatre without military entanglement or hefty financial commitments—securing influence at minimal cost.
- Alignment with Gulf-Israeli Interests: Trump recognises that Israel and key Gulf states view Sharaa as a more pragmatic interlocutor than Bashar al-Assad, especially given his cautious overtures towards normalisation.
Sanctions Relief: Opportunity or Straitjacket?
The devil lies in the detail. General License No. 25 is not a full lifting of sanctions, as some in Damascus and Washington have suggested, but a temporary suspension—conditional on strict adherence to political and humanitarian benchmarks. While it grants Sharaa some room for manoeuvre, it also places him under intense scrutiny for the next six months, tying him to stringent U.S. conditions.
Legally, the licence merely suspends certain restrictions imposed by presidential executive orders. It does not override congressionally mandated sanctions such as the Caesar Act or Syria’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism. Its effect is time-limited and politically fragile—subject to swift reversal if Washington deems Sharaa’s administration non-compliant.
These conditions serve not just as leverage but as an ongoing test of Sharaa’s ability to consolidate authority, implement reforms, and manage key dossiers—particularly aid delivery, accountability, and civilian protection. While selective sanctions relief offers flexibility, it also places immense pressure on Sharaa before both domestic and international observers. Worse, any misstep could weaponise these measures against him internally.
Vice President JD Vance’s recent remarks exposed the condescending undercurrent of this strategy. He dismissed efforts at democracy-building in the region as futile and implied its people were unfit for self-governance—a colonial logic that risks recasting “conditional containment” as veiled imperialism masquerading as realism.
Old Policy, New Wrapper: The Carrot and the Stick
Western policy towards Syria’s new regime blends incentives with discipline—a “diplomacy of conditionalities.” While European powers such as France and the UK signal readiness for economic re-engagement, their offers are contingent on demonstrable progress in humanitarian access and human rights.
This does not represent a rupture from previous policy, but rather an evolution of “pressure through engagement”—a framework used when interests are entwined, yet full legitimacy is withheld. Engagement here is not a vote of confidence, but a flexible mechanism to measure compliance.
Western caution stems from deep scepticism about Syria’s transition. Even the promise of political or financial support is tethered to conditions that reassure domestic electorates and affirm to allies that re-engagement with Damascus does not compromise justice or accountability.
A central dilemma looms: will this conditional backing empower Sharaa by granting him institutional legitimacy and reconstruction pathways, or will it bind him to foreign dictates—depriving him of momentum and sovereign agency? General License No. 25 thus inaugurates a precarious transition, tethering Syria’s future to a dual test: national commitment and international endorsement.
American Patronage: Boon or Burden?
At first glance, U.S. support elevates Sharaa’s stature, lending him emergent international recognition. His public encounter with Trump and incremental Western acknowledgment cast him as a “realistic alternative” to Assad. Partial sanctions relief offers a vital economic lifeline—facilitating essential services and enticing repatriated capital. Domestically, this resonates with civil factions long opposed to Assad, who view it as a sign of Sharaa’s political credibility.
Yet such patronage carries a cost. Jihadist elements, including factions within Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, have seized upon his U.S. overtures to portray him as a “traitor to the revolution,” undermining his grassroots credibility. Moreover, U.S. support ties his political survival to foreign sentiment, restricting his independent manoeuvrability. Most critically, his lack of an electoral mandate remains a structural vulnerability—no amount of foreign backing can compensate for this deficit.
Sharaa now faces a precarious balancing act: appeasing Washington without appearing beholden, maintaining public support in a fractured society, and accommodating the interests of regional actors like Turkey, Israel, the Gulf, and Russia. U.S. patronage may stave off collapse, but absent substantive gains, it risks becoming a liability.
The Road Ahead: Thorny Paths and Empty Promises
Sharaa’s government is likely to leverage this sanctions reprieve to court investment from the U.S., Turkey, and Gulf states, stabilise security, and project a reformist image—perhaps by naturalising foreign fighters and excluding them from military leadership.
But the journey is fraught. Hardline factions and widespread scepticism continue to hinder his outreach, while nascent dialogue with the Syrian Democratic Forces remains tentative. Security fragmentation persists, with Syria’s map carved into rival enclaves. (One need only recall the recent scandal involving a security official in Aleppo who assaulted a judge—only to be pardoned and reinstated.)
The most critical challenge? Investment requires legal certainty—and Syria sorely lacks it. Capital avoids environments marred by corruption, patronage networks, and weak rule of law, a legacy exemplified by Asma al-Assad’s expropriation of the country’s telecom sector. In the absence of an elected legislature, laws will be enacted by presidential decree—hardly reassuring for investors.
Economic recovery cannot proceed without fundamental legal reforms and sustained stability. Otherwise, this episode of “conditional easing” will remain a fleeting respite—far from a blueprint for sovereignty or democratic renewal.
The Ultimate Question: Whose Legitimacy Matters?
Amidst the cold calculus questioning the region’s “fitness for self-rule” and Syria’s ongoing disarray, one pivotal question arises: can Sharaa transform this conditional moment into a national foundation? Will he settle for being “internationally acceptable” within imposed boundaries, or will he gamble on building grassroots legitimacy?
The answer—not General License No. 25—will determine whether the next chapter in Syria’s story is a genuine rebirth or merely old fragilities, repackaged.
