The fall of the Assad regime on December 8, 2024, has not only reshaped Syria’s internal power structures but also altered the geopolitical landscape of the entire region. What follows is not a seamless transition to stability but a complex and precarious restructuring of authority, legitimacy, and regional influence. While Syria’s new leadership, dominated by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) under Ahmad al-Sharaa, presents itself as a unifying force, deep-rooted factionalism, social mistrust, and regional power realignments suggest that the country’s future remains highly uncertain.
At the heart of this transition is the question of power centralization and factional dynamics, as Al-Modon’s columnist Iyad al-Jaafari details. The new governing bloc is structured like a pyramid, with HTS leaders monopolizing the most strategic ministries—Defense, Intelligence, and Foreign Affairs—while allied factions such as Ahrar al-Sham, the Levantine Front, and Suqour al-Sham hold secondary roles. This apparent consolidation of power, however, masks a history of rivalry and ideological divergence. The forced alignment of these factions under HTS’s authority raises concerns about long-term stability. Many of these groups had fought bloody conflicts against HTS in the past, and their newfound allegiance appears more as a tactical necessity than a genuine merger.
The Legitimacy Crisis: Can HTS Overcome Its Past?
But factional politics alone do not define Syria’s challenges. The deeper crisis is one of legitimacy and public trust, as columnist Sawsan Jameel Hassan argues. The fall of Assad was met with initial celebrations, but this enthusiasm has quickly been replaced by scepticism. For decades, Syrians lived under a regime that controlled every aspect of governance, and while Assad’s fall ended that authoritarian grip, it did not immediately provide a credible alternative. HTS’s past as Jabhat al-Nusra, with its history of extremism, remains fresh in the minds of many. Can a group that once thrived on ideological exclusivism now present itself as the legitimate representative of all Syrians?
Hassan highlights the critical need for a political framework that fosters national inclusivity. The absence of a functioning constitution, the dissolution of political parties, and the lack of independent institutions create a void that could quickly lead to further discontent. The new leadership must address fears of exclusion, particularly among Syria’s diverse ethnic and sectarian communities. Without tangible steps toward reconciliation, the fragile peace could quickly unravel.
Regional Integration or Fragmentation
This internal fragility is compounded by Syria’s complex geopolitical positioning, which Ahmet Davutoğlu, former Turkish Prime Minister, analyzes through a broader strategic lens. He argues that Syria’s future depends not only on domestic legitimacy but also on its ability to reintegrate into the regional and global order. The country’s geostrategic importance—as a bridge between the Levant, Mesopotamia, and the Mediterranean—makes it a critical player in regional stability. However, to harness this potential, Syria must first address its fundamental governance and security dilemmas.
Davutoğlu proposes a seven-pillar approach for rebuilding Syria, covering reconciliation, security reform, economic revitalization, and international diplomacy. A core concern is whether Syria can move beyond the militancy that has defined its leadership transition and establish a state apparatus that is both functional and widely accepted. He warns that failure to do so could lead to fragmentation, further complicating regional dynamics.
This brings us to the broader shifts in Middle Eastern power dynamics, which Marwan Kabalan examines in relation to Assad’s fall. The most immediate consequence is the collapse of Iran’s regional strategy. For decades, Iran relied on Assad’s Syria as a corridor to Hezbollah and as a key node in its “axis of resistance.” With the regime’s downfall, Tehran faces a stark choice: either escalate its nuclear ambitions to compensate for this strategic loss or retreat from its aggressive regional posture.
The Unfinished Battle for Stability
Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia and Turkey have emerged as the new dominant actors in shaping Syria’s future. Kabalan suggests that Riyadh, no longer burdened by the need to counterbalance Iranian expansion, is in a stronger strategic position. Turkey, which played a key role in supporting factions opposed to Assad, now holds considerable leverage in shaping Syria’s political and economic direction. If Ankara succeeds in defining new maritime borders with Syria, it could disrupt existing regional alliances, particularly the Greek-Egyptian-Cypriot energy agreements.
These geopolitical shifts are directly tied to Syria’s economic and infrastructural revival, which remains one of the most pressing concerns for both the new leadership and its regional allies. Davutoğlu emphasizes that Syria’s reconstruction must be driven by a clear economic vision, leveraging its historical role as a trade hub between Europe, the Gulf, and the Levant. However, the country remains burdened by sanctions, destroyed infrastructure, and a lack of investment. Unless these issues are addressed, any political stability achieved will be short-lived.
Yet, even if Syria successfully navigates these economic and political hurdles, the fundamental question remains: can HTS truly transform into a governing authority? Hassan raises doubts about whether its leadership, despite its recent pragmatism, can genuinely foster an inclusive Syrian identity. This concern is echoed in Jaafari’s assessment of HTS’s factional dominance, which suggests that its control is maintained not through organic legitimacy but through strategic coercion. The dissolution of smaller factions and their absorption into HTS’s hierarchy does not guarantee long-term loyalty or stability.
Moreover, the risk of new power struggles cannot be ignored. As Kabalan notes, political vacuums in the Middle East rarely remain unoccupied for long. While Iranian-backed forces have been pushed to the margins, there is no guarantee that new rivalries—whether among Syria’s new ruling elite, between Turkey and Russia or within the broader regional landscape—will not emerge.
A Precarious Future
What unites all these perspectives is the recognition that Syria’s transition is far from secure. Jaafari’s analysis of internal factionalism, Hassan’s exploration of legitimacy challenges, Davutoğlu’s strategic reconstruction framework, and Kabalan’s geopolitical evaluation all point to the same reality: Syria is still in a state of flux.
For Ahmad al-Sharaa’s leadership to succeed, it must achieve more than just military dominance; it must build a state that Syrians believe in. This means addressing the deep-seated fears of exclusion, implementing a functional political system, engaging in meaningful economic reconstruction, and navigating the shifting tides of regional diplomacy.
If the new leadership fails to address these core issues, the post-Assad era may not be remembered as the beginning of Syria’s stability but rather as another chapter in its ongoing cycle of conflict and fragmentation. The country stands at a crossroads, and the decisions made in the coming months will determine whether it moves toward sustainable governance or falls back into the turbulence that has defined its recent history.
