The fall of the regime in Syria occurred amid significant shifts in international theory, fostering new paradigms within the global order. These emerging concepts are grounded in greater objectivity than the traditional doctrines that have historically guided inter-state relations. The international environment in which Syria now finds itself can no longer be interpreted through static frameworks of intervention or the longstanding supremacy of norms and institutions. Instead, the global system has entered a new phase marked by “hard pragmatism”—a political approach centred on outcomes and national interests, divorced from rigid ideologies or idealistic principles.
Accordingly, Syria’s foreign relations under the new government are no longer merely the result of shifting alliances or historical positions. Rather, they exemplify this new pragmatism, reflecting a recalibration of international engagement driven by necessity and interest. Although these relations appear aligned with the aspirations of the Syrian people, they are also shaped by pressing regional and global concerns. Notably, the swift re-establishment of Arab and regional ties with Damascus following the fall of the Assad regime, and the opening of Arab and Western diplomatic channels after years of isolation, were not solely the result of regime change. They were equally motivated by a pressing need for a cooperative and stabilised Syria—particularly in regard to critical issues such as the trafficking of Captagon and other narcotics.
The former regime had turned Syria into a major hub for Captagon production, destabilising neighbouring states. For many regional actors, change in Damascus became imperative to curtail this threat. The same logic applies to the issue of migration, which has placed enormous pressure on host countries and the European Union, forcing thousands of Syrians into perilous sea journeys. Within this context, it is unsurprising that Germany’s foreign minister and several EU envoys were among the first to visit Damascus after the country’s liberation.
States engaged with the Syrian file have since moved to lift sanctions and explore investment opportunities—contingent on assurances such as Damascus’s ability to control its borders. The international community’s post-regime strategy has focused on de-escalation, mutual security, and cooperation tied to economic relief and engagement packages.
Relations Anchored in Realism
Reports by the International Crisis Group describe the regional “normalisation” with Syria not as a return to Arab solidarity, but as a pragmatic response to shared threats—chiefly narcotics trafficking and the refugee crisis. Traditional demands for political transition were set aside in favour of more immediate security arrangements.
The Carnegie Middle East Center echoed this shift, noting a revival of “political realism” in Arab diplomacy, wherein statecraft is increasingly determined by strategic and security calculations. Even the European Union has embraced “principled pragmatism”, prioritising stability over process.
In this redefined landscape, Syrian foreign policy is increasingly shaped internally—grounded not in democratic idealism or adherence to UN Resolution 2254, but in the state’s capacity to establish control and deliver stability. The question of legitimacy has thus become less about international recognition and more about the tangible consolidation of authority at home, balanced with minimal thresholds of regional and global acceptance.
Interests Overturn Normative Frameworks
By 2025, Syria’s transformation was less about institutional design and more about the recalibration of priorities. Foreign policy now pivots on economic cooperation and de-escalation, replacing former adherence to abstract norms. This shift has restructured Syria’s external engagements, transforming them into platforms for achieving domestic stability and recovery.
Following the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, Syria experienced a rapid diplomatic re-engagement. President Ahmad Al-Shara’s administration restored ties with international and regional actors long estranged from Damascus. These renewed relations, founded on mutual benefit and strategic interest, have paved the way for sanction relief—including the removal of Al-Shara and Interior Minister Anas Khattab from terrorism watchlists—and partial easing of Western restrictions.
Key among these developments was the introduction of “General License 24”, which exempted select economic activities from sanctions through mid-2025, as well as the formal repeal of the Caesar Act in 2025. The cumulative effect has been to legitimise Syria’s new government internationally, transforming its position from pariah to partner—culminating in Damascus’s entry into the global coalition against ISIS.
The post-liberation period also saw an influx of investment and reconstruction deals. Major contracts in energy and infrastructure were signed with Arab and Western partners. Among them, a deal between the Syrian Oil Company and Saudi Arabia aimed to boost oil and gas output by 25%, signalling both economic cooperation and Riyadh’s strategic interest in regional stability.
The presence of U.S. Special Envoy Thomas Barak at the signing of agreements involving Qatari, Turkish, and American firms to build power stations in Syria further underlined Washington’s tacit approval of Damascus’s reintegration into global economic structures.
A Paradigm Shift: From Display to Domestic Interest
Commenting on this shift, strategic and economic analyst Hussam Al-Ayesh told Syrian Revolution: “Foreign policy is no longer a performance. It is a mechanism for managing domestic interests. When we conduct our international relations based on internal economic, financial, and commercial priorities, we preserve our sovereign decision-making.”
Al-Ayesh argued that developed states leverage internal capabilities to enhance external influence, and in doing so, secure better economic outcomes, stability, and improved quality of life for citizens. He stressed the role of “economic diplomacy” in this approach—using negotiation, investment, and strategic partnerships to attract the supply chains essential for Syria’s reconstruction and societal recovery.
He also referenced Syria’s approach to “smart protection”—policies aimed at safeguarding national industries while encouraging investment and localisation of production. This strategy seeks to balance self-reliance with openness, shielding local enterprises while integrating Syria into the global market.
Crucially, Al-Ayesh maintained that Syria’s current international engagements largely favour its own interests, even if partners also derive benefit. The result is a form of “strategic autonomy”—not in isolationist terms, but as a framework that allows Syria to engage all axes (East, West, North, and South) in pursuit of domestic priorities.
Who Defines the New Syria?
Knowledge production about Syria in 2025 remains deeply political, shaped by the agendas of donor-backed think tanks and the polarising environment. Much of the prevailing discourse revolves around “transitional governance” and “state-building”, often filtered through conditions imposed by foreign powers.
In addressing how to formulate Syria’s future political and economic theory, Al-Ayesh called for a shift to “positive neutrality”—an economic model where Syria welcomes cooperation from all directions, so long as it serves national interests. He emphasised “geo-economics” as a central framework: using trade, investment, and energy diplomacy to achieve broader geopolitical aims.
This new model, he argued, reflects a “flexible partnership” approach, where Syria sets its own rules internally and engages externally based on intersecting, pragmatic interests. National security and economic recovery are the guiding priorities.
Ultimately, the decisions shaping Syria’s future are being written from within. This internal anchoring provides the foundation for political legitimacy, economic recovery, and security. Syria is now entering a new phase—one where foreign policy is crafted in Damascus, implemented globally, and driven by the urgent goal of securing a better future for its citizens. This is not a policy of exclusion, but one of inclusion—whether with Jordan, Turkey, the Gulf states, or international powers—in the shared pursuit of stability, reconstruction, and prosperity.
This article was translated and edited by The Syrian Observer. The Syrian Observer has not verified the content of this story. Responsibility for the information and views set out in this article lies entirely with the author.
