Within a single year, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) has undergone one of the most dramatic status reversals in contemporary counterterrorism politics. Through its control of Syria’s transitional administration, the group has shifted from a designated terrorist organization to an internationally engaged security partner—a transformation that reshapes both its global standing and its domestic authority.
A Partnership Maintained Despite Deadly Incidents
The new administration’s first year of cooperation with the international coalition was marked by two major crises. In late 2025, a member of the transitional forces opened fire on a coalition delegation, killing several American soldiers. Officials framed the attack as the act of an ISIS-aligned extremist acting alone, and the coalition accepted this explanation while continuing coordination. As the document notes, “the US side overlooked the fact that the shooter belonged to the transitional administration’s ranks”.
A second crisis emerged in early 2026, when thousands of ISIS detainees escaped from facilities newly taken over from the Syrian Democratic Forces. Allegations surfaced that personnel from the defense and interior ministries facilitated the escape. The US responded by transferring detainees to Iraq, treating the issue as a technical failure rather than a structural problem within the new authority.
International Reclassification
These incidents did not derail a broader international shift. After the fall of the Assad regime, the US rescinded its reward for HTS leader Ahmad al-Sharaa in December 2024. HTS was removed from the US terrorist list in July 2025, followed by UN Security Council decisions in late 2025 and early 2026 delisting HTS figures and entities. Syria then joined the international coalition against ISIS as its 90th member, integrating its representatives into intelligence and operational coordination.
This repositioning grants HTS the privileges of recognized actors: diplomatic engagement, participation in security planning, and the ability to frame incidents through official narratives. As the document states, “a designated terrorist entity receives no such space—it is treated as a legitimate target for military operations or sanctions”.
Terrorism as a Political Tool in Syria
Since 2011, terrorism designation in Syria has functioned less as a description of violent acts and more as a mechanism for structuring the political field. The Assad regime used it to criminalize dissent and justify exceptional courts. What changed after 2024 is not the logic of classification but the actor wielding it. HTS, once the target of this label, now applies it to rivals—from ISIS affiliates to Kurdish forces—reflecting a transfer rather than a dismantling of classificatory power.
Internationally, priorities have shifted toward containing ISIS above all else. This has allowed HTS to gain legitimacy without undergoing ideological rupture or accountability for its own history. The deaths of American soldiers and the mass detainee escape were treated as isolated failures, not indicators of deeper jihadist influence within state structures.
At home, the transitional administration abolished the Counterterrorism Court and referred new cases to ordinary criminal courts. Syria’s 1949 Penal Code criminalizes violent acts but lacks a standalone terrorism category. This move appears designed to minimize the legal prominence of “terrorism” while normalizing forms of violence historically associated with HTS. Veteran HTS members now occupy senior judicial, military, and security positions, further blurring the line between past militancy and present governance.
Reappropriating the Category
The new administration continues to deploy the term “terrorism,” but now as a tool of statecraft rather than a label imposed upon it. The document notes that “classification logic has not been abolished—its monopoly has merely transferred from one authority to another”. Terrorism in contemporary Syria thus functions less as an inherent quality of violence and more as a relational position within domestic and international networks.
HTS’s journey from terror list to counterterror partner reflects a profound reordering of political priorities. International actors have chosen to integrate rather than isolate the group, valuing its role in containing ISIS over its ideological past. Domestically, the transitional administration has restructured legal frameworks while preserving the political utility of terrorism as a classificatory tool. The result is a Syrian paradox: the same label once used to exclude HTS now facilitates its integration—without altering its essential function as an instrument of power.
This article was translated and edited by The Syrian Observer. The Syrian Observer has not verified the content of this story. Responsibility for the information and views set out in this article lies entirely with the author.
