The political implications of the ceasefire agreement between Syria and Israel have raised profound questions about the extent of the shift in the map of understandings in southern Syria, amid active participation by regional and international parties in an unprecedented agreement in terms of the involved actors and the issues it encompasses.
Announced through U.S. mediation and with Jordanian support, the agreement went beyond the traditional framework of mere field de-escalation, indirectly granting Tel Aviv a seat at the table discussing what is fundamentally an internal Syrian matter. This has sparked widespread criticism regarding the infringement on Syrian national sovereignty and the blurring of lines between military and political tracks.
The trilateral talks yesterday between the foreign ministers of Syria and Jordan and the U.S. Special Envoy for Syria focused on urgent implementation steps, including the deployment of Syrian security forces in Suweida, the release of detainees, and the provision of humanitarian aid—alongside support for community reconciliation. This reflects an effort to end the escalating security tensions in the province.
In a televised address, Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa warned against attempts by certain local figures to exploit the situation to push separatist agendas backed by external support. He stressed that despite the state’s commitment to providing services and support to Suweida since the country’s liberation, some armed groups are seeking to reignite conflict.
Jordan’s Pivotal Role in Containing the Crisis
Against this complex backdrop, Jordan has emerged as a key player seeking to contain the crisis, especially given Suweida’s direct border proximity to the kingdom. While observers note that the agreement could mark a shift in the rules of engagement, the central question remains: Who will define the boundaries of the next phase, given the intertwining of security and political issues, and regional with local dynamics?
Former Jordanian Information Minister Samih al-Maaytah stated that Jordan fully recognizes the scale of the crisis in Syria, noting that Syria is in a sensitive phase, striving to restore stability, pursue real economic development post-sanctions, and address internal challenges.
In an interview with Syria TV, Maaytah explained that Jordan had initially sought to keep Suweida’s affairs strictly internal, aiming for a Syrian-Syrian consensus. However, developments and certain agendas pushed the issue toward a different path, allowing Israel to enter the equation—despite the matter being purely Syrian in origin.
He added that Israel has a regional project aimed at dividing Syria by exploiting security vulnerabilities and imposing agreements on its own terms. Jordan, aware of this approach, worked early to contain it, ensuring a fair solution while preserving the Syrian state’s authority—in line with the Arab stance supporting Syria as a homeland for all Syrians.
Maaytah stressed that while Suweida’s events are internal, Jordan collaborated with regional actors, chiefly the U.S. and Turkey, to facilitate the agreement, hoping it translates into tangible and sustainable progress.
He emphasized that the crisis in Suweida directly impacts Jordan due to its border proximity, noting that any security breakdown or armed influx could threaten Jordanian stability. Thus, Jordan’s efforts are driven by two goals: supporting Syria’s stability and safeguarding its own security.
Jordan remains committed to any solution ensuring the agreement’s implementation, working with guarantors to sustain it and prevent a return to chaos. Maaytah called for serious engagement from all parties to avoid renewed collapse.
The U.S. Role in the Agreement
Hazem al-Ghabra, former advisor at the U.S. State Department, stated that Washington is closely monitoring developments in Syria, emphasizing its interest in the success of Syria’s new trajectory and avoiding internal unrest or tensions with neighbors—especially after the recent escalation in the south.
Ghabra noted that the rapid field escalation and direct Israeli intervention necessitated urgent diplomatic engagement, praising Turkish and Jordanian roles in de-escalation. However, he cautioned that these efforts mark not the end but the beginning of a new phase requiring deeper work.
Washington has begun internal discussions on future relations with Syria, including lifting sanctions, but Ghabra argued that liberation from the Assad regime alone is insufficient. The real battle, he said, is freeing “the Syrian mind” from the regime’s legacy, citing persistent incitement to violence on social media and recent crackdowns on peaceful protests.
He criticized the new Syrian government’s rushed steps, stating that March’s national dialogue conference was inadequate for moving past the previous era’s darkness. He called for serious planning to rebuild Syrian relations, stressing that while the U.S. is ready to assist, the primary role must remain purely Syrian, led by the new state.
Ghabra also emphasized the need to address minority concerns, warning that failure to establish a new social equation could lead to more severe crises.
A Dangerous Slide
Political analyst Dr. Mahmoud Hamza described Suweida’s developments as a dangerous shift in Syria’s landscape, following public calls for direct Israeli intervention. He alleged that Israel’s recent strikes on Damascus aimed to appease Hikmat al-Hijri, whom he accused of pushing unrealistic and treasonous agendas.
Hamza claimed Hijri’s actions leave no doubt about his foreign allegiances, accusing him of betraying Syrians by instigating violence in Suweida with backing from armed remnants of the old regime and drug traffickers.
He condemned crimes against tribes, including women and children, as uncharacteristic of Suweida’s people unless perpetrators were under extremist or drug influence. Hamza stressed distinguishing between “militia criminality” and locals, just as one must separate coastal regime remnants from Alawite civilians.
Hijri’s calls for Israeli intervention, Hamza argued, were not humanitarian but sought military protection—a blatant betrayal, especially when directed at Netanyahu’s government, complicit in daily Palestinian and Arab deaths.
He affirmed that only President Sharaa or government officials have the authority to negotiate on Syria’s behalf, while local figures like Hijri lack such legitimacy.
How Regional Is the Agreement?
Maaytah stated that southern Syria’s situation is no longer purely local but has become a distinctly regional issue, especially after Israel’s direct involvement—not just through military strikes but also strategic proposals like demilitarized zones in southern Syria.
Israel, he noted, is now a de facto partner in the equation, exerting direct pressure in any Suweida-related agreement. Without being part of understandings, Israel would continue striking Syrian territory under the pretext of countering government moves.
The recent internationally brokered agreement—with Turkish, U.S., and Jordanian involvement—aims for field de-escalation, including troop withdrawals and detainee exchanges. However, Maaytah called it a “procedural agreement,” merely a prelude to a broader deal on southern Syria.
Israel’s role has clearly expanded—from observer to active participant, backing local forces in Suweida and striking in their defense. Thus, Syria is now compelled to engage in minimal political or security understandings with it.
This article was translated and edited by The Syrian Observer. The Syrian Observer has not verified the content of this story. Responsibility for the information and views set out in this article lies entirely with the author.
