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How American Pressure and Regional Shifts Forced the SDF–Damascus Deal

The American shift coincided with a rapid Syrian military advance east of Aleppo beginning on 6 January
The American shift coincided with a rapid Syrian military advance east of Aleppo beginning on 6 January

Tom Barrack exits Brooklyn Federal Court on Tuesday, Sept. 20, 2022, in New York. Potential jurors in the criminal trial of Donald Trump's inaugural committee chair Tom Barrack have been quizzed by the judge on a tricky topic: What do they think of the former president? (AP Photo/Brittainy Newman)

London-based Al-Majalla has obtained the full account of the negotiations that produced the 30 January 2026 agreement between the Syrian government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), including earlier draft integration frameworks and proposed constitutional amendments.

After weeks of escalating military pressure in northern and northeastern Syria, the two sides announced what they described as a “comprehensive agreement” that consolidates a ceasefire and launches a phased integration of SDF military and administrative structures into the Syrian state.

The deal formalizes the 18 January understanding and provides for the deployment of Interior Ministry security units to al-Hasakah and Qamishli, the formation of a military division drawn from SDF brigades, and the withdrawal of forces from contact lines.

Yet the agreement was not shaped by battlefield dynamics alone. It followed direct and increasingly forceful American intervention.

 

A Shift in Washington’s Position

For years, the SDF relied on its partnership with the United States in the fight against ISIS. That partnership entered a new phase after Damascus secured broad international backing in late 2025 and formally joined the international coalition against ISIS.

On 20 January, U.S. envoy Tom Barrack made Washington’s position unmistakable: the rationale for the American partnership with the SDF had “run its course,” and the most viable path forward was “full integration” into the Syrian state.

Behind closed doors, the message was even more blunt.

During a 17 January meeting in Erbil with Kurdish leaders, Barrack reportedly told SDF commander Mazloum Abdi that Washington would not risk confrontation with Turkey or Israel on the SDF’s behalf. According to officials familiar with the talks, he stated clearly that the United States “will not fire a single bullet for you.”

That declaration marked a decisive turning point.

Military Pressure and Political Concessions

The American shift coincided with a rapid Syrian military advance east of Aleppo beginning on 6 January. Government forces pushed toward the Euphrates and then toward al-Hasakah, while tribal elements in predominantly Arab areas distanced themselves from the SDF.

Within two weeks, the military balance had shifted dramatically.

As battlefield setbacks mounted, negotiations accelerated. On 18 January, the Syrian presidency announced an agreement outlining sweeping concessions from the SDF: the transfer of Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa, restoration of state control over border crossings and oil fields, and individual integration of SDF personnel into the Ministries of Defense and Interior following security vetting.

The SDF also committed to removing non-Syrian PKK fighters from Syrian territory.

In the days that followed, intense shuttle diplomacy unfolded involving the United States, France, and Turkey. Direct phone calls between U.S. President Donald Trump and Syrian President Ahmad al-Shar‘a helped stabilize the ceasefire and finalize the framework.

On 30 January, the “comprehensive agreement” was formally announced.

What the Final Agreement Includes

The 30 January accord differs significantly from earlier SDF proposals.

A draft integration plan dated 4 January envisioned the incorporation of three full divisions and two specialized brigades into the Ministry of Defense, along with detailed procedures for appointing commanders, vetting personnel in stages, and maintaining distinct formations within the Syrian army.

The final agreement is more limited in scope:

  • Formation of one division composed of three SDF brigades
  • Creation of an additional brigade in Ayn al-Arab (Kobani) attached to Aleppo command
  • Deployment of Interior Ministry forces into al-Hasakah and Qamishli
  • Gradual integration of the Autonomous Administration’s civil institutions into state structures

The agreement also affirms Kurdish civil and educational rights and references Presidential Decree No. 13, signed by President al-Shar‘a on 16 January, which recognized Kurdish language instruction and restored citizenship to thousands of stateless Kurds.

However, broader constitutional demands proposed by the SDF—including explicit recognition of ethnic components, expanded decentralization, and a bicameral parliament—were not formally adopted.

The Broader Strategic Context

The negotiations unfolded against a shifting regional backdrop.

By late 2025, Damascus had secured sanctions relief, re-established ties with major powers, and joined the international coalition against ISIS. At the same time, Turkey reiterated its opposition to any autonomous Kurdish political entity on its southern border, while Washington prioritized de-escalation and state consolidation over militia-based arrangements.

American policy increasingly favored central state authority over armed non-state actors, aligning with broader regional efforts to curb militia governance in conflict zones.

For Damascus, integrating the SDF was framed as a step toward restoring sovereignty and consolidating military command. For Washington, it signaled the end of a wartime partnership and the beginning of a new phase defined by institutional reintegration rather than proxy reliance.

Unresolved Questions

Despite international endorsements from the United States, France, and Britain, key uncertainties remain:

  • Will integration proceed smoothly through security vetting and command restructuring?
  • Can Kurdish civil guarantees be translated into binding constitutional protections?
  • Will the ceasefire endure under domestic and regional pressures?

The 30 January agreement represents the most comprehensive attempt to resolve the SDF file since the fall of the previous regime. Whether it becomes a durable political settlement or another temporary arrangement shaped by shifting power dynamics will depend on implementation in the months ahead.

For now, one message from Washington reshaped the trajectory of the negotiations: the United States would not fight this battle for the SDF.

 

This article was translated and edited by The Syrian Observer. The Syrian Observer has not verified the content of this story. Responsibility for the information and views set out in this article lies entirely with the author.

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