The Biden administration is pursuing a policy of normalization with Bashar al-Assad and negotiating a controversial deal with Iran, according to recent reports by the “Foundation for the Defense of Democracy” highlighted by Syria TV.
Efforts to normalize relations with Assad have faced opposition from American lawmakers, and a European stance, represented by the German ambassador to Cairo, Frank Hartmann, resulted in the cancellation of a meeting between the Arab League and the European Union, intended to protest al-Assad’s return to the Arab League.
For the Biden administration, normalization with Assad aligns with its democratic policies aimed at resolving conflicts, regardless of the interests and aspirations of the affected populations. However, the administration faces challenges due to the regime’s well-documented and condemned atrocities, such as those addressed by the Caesar Act and the forthcoming anti-normalization law. These actions make it difficult to openly endorse and support the normalization process without facing criticism.
If the conditions allow for a transformation of this process into a political and practical reality, accompanied by a network of economic interests and significant political shifts, the Biden administration might openly pursue normalization. Such developments could be instrumentalized and utilized in internal conflicts and future presidential campaigns.
In addition to the normalization efforts with Assad, the Biden administration intends to release $10 billion in favour of the Iranian regime as part of a deal to secure the release of American citizens detained in Iran. This approach reflects the administration’s strategy to achieve an interim and partial agreement, as a comprehensive nuclear deal appears challenging to achieve currently.
While the normalization process with Assad predates Biden’s presidency, his administration seeks to engage with it amidst the unclear state of American politics during his tenure. Despite concerns raised by some lawmakers from both parties, the entire American position cannot be solely attributed to the discrepancies between Biden and these lawmakers. Rather, it reflects the administration’s response to the ongoing conflicts that the United States is involved in, which are closely tied to its global presence and network of interests that have been partially affected by the growing ties between the Gulf states, China, and Russia, of which the normalization with Assad is a small part.
The process of normalization with Assad, while lacking substantial implementation, serves as a formal procedure to uphold the appearance of institutions like the Arab League. However, the Biden administration aims to leverage this process to assert its influence in the region, forge economic partnerships, manage the oil market, and play a role in resolving conflicts such as the Ukrainian war, where Arab mediators are involved in seeking logical solutions.
By pursuing normalization and entering what American institutions perceive as a flawed agreement with Iran, the United States under Biden seeks to address the prevailing disorder and prevent the outbreak of a war, particularly one that Israel may be contemplating against Iran. The administration places a priority on expanding its influence in the realms of cyber and technology.
While normalization with Assad aligns with the existing disorder in the region, the perception of a flawed agreement with Iran serves the same objective. The challenge faced by Israel is that any military action it takes could jeopardize American interests in the region and impact its global strategic priorities. Avoiding wars and preventing regime change are crucial elements of the United States’ strategy in the region.
It is important to note that the American administration’s willingness to engage with these violent and dictatorial regimes comes after years of oppression inflicted upon their own populations, who have revolted against them. The objective is not to overthrow these regimes but rather to keep them in a state of disarray where the United States can create and manipulate deals.
Consequently, normalization with Assad and the perceived flawed agreement with Iran align with the existing disorder in the region. While the internal dynamics of these countries may have weakened, their symbolic significance remains potent, leading to intermittent controversies.
This suggests that Iran, willing to engage in interim agreements, seeks to maintain the continuity of its regime. The release of funds by the United States in exchange for this desired agreement serves as a strategic maneuver, acting as a temporary pain reliever to alleviate crises while gradually fueling escalation at a costly pace. This illustrates how the Biden administration manages global conflicts, with Assad and Iran viewed as pawns in the intricate web of international interests.
This article was translated and edited by The Syrian Observer. The Syrian Observer has not verified the content of this story. Responsibility for the information and views set out in this article lies entirely with the author.
