The sprawling Assad family has long cultivated its own internal narrative of “victimhood”—a story unfamiliar to most Syrians yet treated within the family as unquestionable truth. According to this narrative, the “Founder,” Hafez al-Assad, was excessively cautious about appointing relatives who shared his surname to senior posts they supposedly “deserved,” fearing that opponents would accuse him of dynastic rule. As a result, the sidelined Assads, deprived of opportunity, allegedly turned to “private enterprise”: exclusive customs clearance at the port, protection rackets, smuggling, extortion, and other forms of informal livelihood.
As for the Assads who did appear in public life, the story goes that Hafez had no choice but to rely on them because no one else could match their capabilities. The examples are well known: his brother Rifaat, commander of the Defense Companies; his nephew Adnan, commander of the rival Struggle Companies; his nephew Kamal, the perpetual head of the Lattakia Chamber of Commerce and Industry; and several others.
During the period when the father was grooming his son for succession—a topic discussed openly in Arab media but never domestically—the regime’s defenders relied on a central argument: that Bashar, the young, cultured, Western-educated doctor, a disciplined officer and an early advocate of IT, should not be denied the presidency simply because he happened to be the leader’s son. Anyone with such qualifications, they insisted, deserved the opportunity, regardless of family ties.
It is hardly surprising that some supporters of the current authority now recycle the same arguments once used by defenders of the “previous era,” whether consciously or not. Recently, we have heard claims that kinship should not disqualify someone from public responsibility, and that it is natural in Syrian society for a large family to contain many competent individuals. It would be unreasonable, they argue, to deprive a qualified person merely because a brother or father holds another prominent post. This justification surfaced after reports that prestigious positions were being handed to first-degree relatives of senior officials.
In principle, such coincidences can occur. But absolving them of favoritism requires several conditions. First, they must remain within reasonable numerical limits, not become a recognizable pattern. Second, there must be neutral, rigorous criteria for evaluating the supposed competence of appointed relatives—criteria beyond endorsements or a polished résumé. Third, such appointments must occur in a normal political environment, not in a transitional phase already fraught with debates about factional rule and entrenched networks of influence.
Here emerges the second argument: that this critical and sensitive phase cannot tolerate experimentation or leniency in matters of trust, lest “enemies of the regime” infiltrate institutions to sabotage or overthrow them. Therefore, officials prefer to work with those who have been tested—or with relatives whose loyalty is guaranteed and whose betrayal is unthinkable.
This logic, however, contradicts the stated vision of the “New Syria”: a transition to a state-based mentality incompatible with rule by trusted cronies; a rejection of sectarian quotas in favor of merit-based appointments; and cooperation with select figures from the previous regime—more accurately described as “remnants”—in controversial cases that have already sparked public debate.
The third argument draws on the prevailing Islamic atmosphere in the country today. It invokes the story of Moses and Aaron (peace be upon them), when God reassured Moses: “We will strengthen your arm through your brother.”
This article was translated and edited by The Syrian Observer. The Syrian Observer has not verified the content of this story. Responsibility for the information and views set out in this article lies entirely with the author.
