The Druze community in Syria now faces a severe trial that threatens its very existence and destiny. This ordeal has arisen from the convergence of three intertwined and contradictory factors. The first is the emergence of a new authority in Damascus, one with a jihadist-Salafi background that embraces narrow sectarian orientations. Its political and administrative decisions reflect this bias: a presidential and centralised system, appointments to sovereign and security posts based on loyalty rather than competence, and from a single colour. Power is concentrated in the hands of the transitional president, signalling an authoritarian trajectory.
The second factor is the stance of the Druze spiritual leadership, particularly Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri, and a large segment of the community’s cultural and political elite. Their orientations diverge sharply, even diametrically, from those of the new authority. The third factor is the geopolitical contest among regional and international powers over influence in Syria. This struggle has crystallised into two broad currents: one calling for stability through the preservation of Syria’s territorial unity, a single state, a single authority, and a single army, supported by Arab states, Turkey, and the United States; the other seeking to transform Syria into a fragile entity built on sectarian apportionment, easily manipulated in its choices and decisions, a vision espoused by Israel and currents within Iran and its Iraqi militias.
From Political Dispute to Armed Confrontation
The Druze leadership’s demand for pluralism and participation first sparked political debate, before sliding into bloody confrontations that left hundreds dead, thousands wounded, and inflicted heavy losses on Druze and Bedouin property alike. Waves of displacement followed, with villagers fleeing to the provincial centre and Bedouin expelled from their lands. Security forces and Bedouin auxiliaries abducted dozens of Druze, including women, and transported them outside the province. The clashes subsided only after Israel intervened militarily on behalf of the Druze, under pressure from Sheikh Muwaffaq Tarif, the spiritual head of the Druze in Palestine.
Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri, together with civilian and military figures, capitalised on the bloodshed and destruction to stoke hostility against Damascus. He moved from demanding administrative decentralisation within a pluralist system to calling for autonomy, and ultimately to advocating the establishment of an independent Druze entity. This demand was accompanied by appeals for international protection, specifically from Israel. His followers raised Israeli flags during protests, invoked the biblical name “Mount Bashan” for Jabal al-Arab, and even paraded images of Benjamin Netanyahu through the streets of Suweida.
The ceasefire brokered by the United States between the new Syrian authority and Israel did not resolve the conflict. It merely altered its form, transforming it into lines of confrontation, checkpoints, and intermittent skirmishes. Damascus imposed a siege on the province, closing the road to Suweida and cutting off food, medicine, fuel, and electricity, in an attempt to force Sheikh al-Hijri into submission. Under international pressure, the government relented, allowing UN convoys to deliver flour and fuel, and reopening the road, yet it refused political negotiations with Druze loyalists to al-Hijri, restricting talks to security matters under the supervision of General Ahmad al-Dalati, accused of overseeing the earlier massacre. This deepened the rupture. Al-Hijri’s forces looted Bedouin homes, took hundreds hostage, and barred government officials from entering Suweida, including the Syrian National Committee investigating the events. They demanded instead an international inquiry, which duly visited Suweida twice and met displaced communities in Daraa, Damascus, and its countryside.
Al-Hijri’s loyalists began institutionalising secession. They formed a unified military force under the name “National Guard,” followed by a supreme legal committee, local administration councils, an education committee, and even organised a referendum on separation, inviting Druze across the province to sign a petition endorsing independence.
A Deepening Impasse
By advancing demands for autonomy and eventual secession, and rejecting the roadmap agreed upon by Damascus, Jordan, and US envoy Tom Barrack, Sheikh al-Hijri placed himself and his community before perilous choices. Either suicidal confrontation with the new Syrian authority and its Bedouin auxiliaries, inviting further Israeli intervention and resulting in casualties and devastation, while entrenching a profound psychological rift between Arab Sunnis and Druze; or internal division within the Druze themselves, for there is no consensus on secession or Israeli protection. This was reflected in the “Jabal al-Arab Declaration” issued on 14 November 2025 by political and cultural figures in Suweida, and in the emergence of opposition within the community. The National Guard arrested dissenters, including Sheikh Raed al-Mutni, who was tortured, humiliated, and killed, his beard and moustache shaven in a filmed spectacle. Others such as Asim Abu Fakhr, Gandhi Abu Fakhr, Maher Fallhout—also killed under torture—Hussam Zidan, Zidan Zidan, and Alam al-Din Zidan were detained. Pro-Hijri loyalists seized the Suweida24 news site and expelled its professional, neutral staff.
These arrests and killings revealed the depth of psychological and political tension among the Druze, to the point of torture, humiliation, and murder. Ironically, the same acts of insult and shaving of moustaches once used by Druze activists to denounce government abuses were now perpetrated by al-Hijri’s forces against their own. Disturbingly, intellectuals loyal to al-Hijri defended the killings, claiming they were executions for treason decreed by a field court.
The stalemate persisted, with media battles and political estrangement between Damascus and the separatist leadership in Suweida, even as regional and international attention waned. This indifference frustrated many Druze, who questioned al-Hijri’s obstinacy in clinging to demands that lacked external support and faced a near-unanimous regional and international consensus on preserving Syria’s territorial unity. Even Israel and Sheikh Muwaffaq Tarif opposed secession. Meanwhile, the harsh rupture inflicted severe suffering on ordinary Druze, undermining their livelihoods, stability, and education.
The impasse grew more entrenched as Damascus pursued its policies without regard for Syria’s social fabric, ignoring political objections and the destructive consequences of unresolved conflict. Al-Hijri, for his part, adopted a strategy of escalation, raising the ceiling of his demands whenever he sensed indifference from Damascus or lack of external backing. His position was further weakened by the crimes committed by the National Guard against his opponents, which eroded his narrative of government brutality. In truth, all actors in Syria’s fractured landscape—the new authority in Damascus, the Autonomous Administration in the northeast, the Syrian Democratic Forces, the Internal Security Forces, al-Hijri and his Guard, and the National Army factions—practice repression and killing while claiming to seek justice and equality. The bitter irony is that advocates of decentralisation, from the SDF to al-Hijri, are as authoritarian as Damascus, turning decentralisation into miniature centralisms, and condemning citizens to lives no less oppressive than under centralised regimes.
Toward a Path of Resolution
The suffocating deadlock in Suweida has cast a shadow over Syria’s national scene, constraining the new authority’s reach and freezing its forces along what resemble borders between two states. It has paralysed Damascus’s ability to respond decisively to provocations, lest it trigger another Israeli intervention, and prevented it from achieving its goal of reasserting control over the province. This weakened its image among supporters and diminished its leverage in negotiations with the SDF, which exploited the rift between Damascus, Alawite notables, and al-Hijri’s Druze loyalists to demand their inclusion at the negotiating table. The stalemate also tarnished al-Hijri’s standing among his followers, who saw their aspirations dissolve into uncertainty, and among Druze at large, who endured shortages of food, medicine, and fuel, deteriorating services, and mounting anxiety. The killings of Sheikh al-Mutni and Fallhout raised fears of internecine strife.
The gravity of the situation calls for a reassessment of positions and a resumption of dialogue to break the paralysis and restore trust. Al-Hijri could begin by accepting the return of the Bedouin to their homes and former lives, thereby embodying his professed commitment to pluralism and participation. Damascus, in turn, could meet him halfway by adopting a decentralised formula that alleviates Druze concerns over identity and dignity, while sending a reassuring message to other communities—Alawites, Christians, Ismailis, Kurds, and Assyrian Syriacs—that common ground can indeed be found.
This article was translated and edited by The Syrian Observer. The Syrian Observer has not verified the content of this story. Responsibility for the information and views set out in this article lies entirely with the author.
