In just 12 days, and with minimal fighting, Bashar al-Assad fled Syria, leaving behind a crumbling regime. His army stood exposed, having lost the support of Iranian militias on the ground following intense Israeli strikes in Syria since Operation Al-Aqsa Flood in Palestine. Hezbollah in Lebanon was weakened, and Russia, overwhelmed by its involvement in the Ukraine war, withdrew its military and political backing. Under the leadership of Abu Muhammad al-Joulani—now known as Ahmad al-Sharaa—Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and other factions seized the moment, advancing on Aleppo, which fell without resistance. This rapid collapse exposed the fragility of the regime’s military, leading Assad’s allies—Iran, Russia, Hezbollah, and Iraq—to withdraw their support.
Al-Joulani presented a competent image in managing Aleppo, demonstrating an acute understanding of the city’s social fabric. However, he soon discovered that the road to Hama, Homs, and Damascus lay open before him. Now, he faces immense challenges in consolidating control and managing the country.
Al-Joulani’s ability to fill the power vacuum hinged on two factors. The first was external: logistical support from Ukraine, including drone training for his fighters; assistance from Turkey, which likely involved coordination with the United States; and potential backing from other players. The second factor was the internal structure of HTS, a Salafist and former al-Qaeda-linked organization. HTS’s experience governing Idlib since 2019 highlights its high degree of independence and organizational capacity—qualities lacking in the National Army factions in northern Syria, which are directly influenced by Turkish decisions. Turkey did not mobilize these factions to fill the void left by Assad. The Free Syrian Army (FSA) factions, operating under the name “Freedom Dawn,” focused their limited operations on seizing areas controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Aleppo and its countryside, including Tal Rifaat.
These developments occurred without any international or regional consensus, particularly given al-Joulani’s classification as a terrorist. Despite this, coordination between Turkey and HTS, along with U.S. backing, appears evident.
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The international community is approaching Syria’s current situation as it did during Assad’s reign: allowing events to unfold as long as they do not threaten the interests of intervening powers. Al-Joulani now governs a significant portion of Syria under the watchful eyes of global powers. Turkey’s primary concern remains securing its border with Syria. Meanwhile, Iran has been sidelined in this phase, and Russia, with its influence waning following Assad’s downfall, clings to its military bases as its sole foothold in Syria.
Israel, on the other hand, seized the opportunity to strengthen its position. It occupied the buffer zone in Mount Hermon, declared the 1974 disengagement agreement nullified, and bombed remaining Syrian military assets and airfields to prevent their capture by Islamist groups that might turn their focus toward liberating Jerusalem amid the chaos. This marked the final blow to the possibility of rebuilding a national Syrian army—a process Assad himself undermined by directing the military against opposition towns and cities.
For Washington, leaving Syria in a state of controlled chaos remains its preferred policy in the region, provided this chaos does not spill beyond borders or threaten Israel’s security. The U.S. has achieved its objective of dismantling the Iranian axis of resistance and ensuring Syria’s detachment from it in the foreseeable future. American officials have clarified that their relationship with the SDF is part of the international coalition’s strategy to prevent the resurgence of ISIS. They may even pursue an agreement between the authority in Damascus and the SDF, as the two sides have previously cooperated in facilitating the movement of goods and oil through northern border crossings. Syrians celebrated the withdrawal of Assad’s forces and the end of his regime’s rule. The Syrian uprising had posed a significant threat to the regime as early as 2013, with the Free Syrian Army advancing to the outskirts of Abbasiyin Square in Damascus. However, the intervention of Iranian militias to support Assad, starting in Qusayr, followed by Russia’s official involvement in 2015, significantly shifted the tide. Adding to this were the disarray of militarized factions, the dominance of Islamist groups—buoyed by external funding, weaponry, and superior organizational skills—and their focus on liberating cities rather than engaging in guerrilla warfare. The regime’s brutal counteroffensives, marked by the destruction of cities, the displacement of their inhabitants, and the arrest, killing, and forced exile of activists in opposition-held areas, effectively extinguished the role of the people in the revolution. The exceptions were Sweida, where protests persisted for over a year, and demonstrations in Idlib against al-Joulani’s government and its security apparatus.
Citizenship
In his recent interview with CNN and subsequent speeches, al-Joulani offered glimpses of the state he envisions—one rooted in Islamist ideology, albeit with an acknowledgment of Syria’s sectarian diversity. His traditionalist perspective, which views society through the lens of sectarian and communal structures rather than citizenship, is poised to institutionalize sectarianism in the state. While some argue that his governance in this new phase could be more inclusive than his rule in Idlib, his actions suggest otherwise. He has appointed the Salvation Government, which has operated in Idlib, as a temporary governing body for three months to manage the transitional period. This decision excludes key opposition factions, the Syrian Democratic Council east of the Euphrates, and representatives from Daraa, Sweida, and the northern regions. Instead, he has relied on select ministers from the former regime to aid his administration in assuming power.
This exclusionary approach during the transitional period is a critical misstep, reflecting al-Joulani’s lack of trust in anyone outside the Salvation Government to oversee this phase. It is also clear that Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and its religious authorities will dominate discussions about the Syrian state’s identity—an issue that demands broad and inclusive debate. Notably, the head of al-Joulani’s interim government displayed the green revolutionary flag alongside the HTS flag, but on the ground, in the streets of Damascus and other cities, the HTS flag is prominently displayed, while the green flag appears sporadically on civilian vehicles and among activists. This contradiction reveals unresolved tensions within HTS itself. The visibility of the HTS flag undermines al-Joulani’s declared intention to dissolve the organization and end the factional nature of Syrian governance. The overall picture suggests that, while al-Joulani has navigated and overcome numerous internal disputes in Idlib—consolidating power by sidelining al-Qaeda elements and relying on Syrian fighters—he remains unwilling or unable to entrust anyone beyond HTS fighters and the Salvation Government to solidify his rule in Damascus at this stage.
In recent interviews, al-Joulani avoided addressing Syria’s stance toward Israel or commenting on the recent Israeli incursions into Syrian territory. He also refrained from discussing democracy or the participation of the Syrian people in governance. The absence of the people’s role in shaping this critical juncture is striking. Instead, Syrians are preoccupied with uncovering the fate of their loved ones who disappeared in the former regime’s detention centers, which have now been opened. They are focused on returning to their homes, reuniting with family members after years of separation, securing daily necessities, and anxiously awaiting al-Joulani’s next moves amid the rapid pace of events and the overwhelming challenges facing the nation.
This article was translated and edited by The Syrian Observer. The Syrian Observer has not verified the content of this story. Responsibility for the information and views set out in this article lies entirely with the author.
