As Syria embarks on its uncertain transitional phase, the National Dialogue Conference, once heralded as a defining moment for shaping the country’s future, has been downgraded to a mere consultative platform. Originally envisioned as a decisive political gathering, the conference has instead become an exercise in controlled discourse, raising doubts about the legitimacy of the transition process and the sincerity of its architects.
From the outset, the event’s rushed preparations, ambiguous agenda, and exclusionary invitations cast a long shadow over its credibility. The question now is whether this dialogue is a genuine attempt at reconciliation and reform or a political manoeuvre designed to bestow legitimacy upon an emerging order—one that may have already been predetermined.
From Political Breakthrough to a Controlled Platform
The idea of a National Dialogue gained traction following Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’s (HTS) advance into Damascus and the convening of the Aqaba Conference, which discussed the formation of an inclusive government. The momentum for the dialogue was initially strong, with international and regional actors expressing cautious optimism about its potential to redefine Syria’s governance structure.
However, the hasty push by HTS to organize the conference without sufficient groundwork was met with significant resistance, leading to its postponement. When Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shibani later declared that the dialogue would “determine the future shape of Syria,” the statement reflected the high stakes involved. Yet, as weeks passed, the scope of the conference shrunk dramatically from a nation-shaping event to a platform for discussing HTS’s upcoming political agenda.
This shift raises fundamental questions: Why was the dialogue diluted? Who benefits from limiting its scope? And what does this mean for Syria’s political trajectory?
International Pressures and the Demise of the Opposition Coalition
One factor that significantly altered the course of the dialogue was the international community’s preference for stability over political inclusion. While European states welcomed the transitional process, their actions suggested that they prioritized security and economic normalization over an inclusive political settlement.
Simultaneously, the dissolution of the Syrian Opposition Coalition (SOC) removed a longstanding—but deeply flawed—opposition body from the political equation. Despite its inefficacies, the SOC’s presence in UN Resolution 2254 and discussions with UN Envoy Geir Pedersen gave it an institutional role. Its abrupt exit was no coincidence; sources indicate that its leader, Badr Jamous, was promised the position of Syria’s UN ambassador in return for disbanding the coalition.
With the opposition’s formal structures dismantled, Sharaa faced one less institutional hurdle, but at the cost of further weakening the political legitimacy of the transition.
Internal Fault Lines: HTS vs. the Hardline Salafi-Jihadists
While the transition has been framed as a break from the past, it remains mired in ideological conflicts within HTS itself. The movement’s Salafi-jihadist factions have resisted its political evolution, seeing democracy and governance as a betrayal of their original objectives.
Sharaa has deliberately postponed both the transition’s formal launch and the dialogue conference itself, likely to avoid a direct confrontation with these hardliners. However, the pressure to move forward intensified after Qatar—recognizing the need for a political and legal framework—stepped in to accelerate the process.
Qatar’s intervention materialized in the form of a high-profile visit by Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, bringing with him the promise of critical economic aid. The diplomatic necessity of treating Sharaa as Syria’s official head of state led to his swift appointment as transitional president, solidifying his role before the visit.
A Dialogue in Name Only?
As the conference’s credibility crumbled, so too did its perceived significance.
- The shift in rhetoric was evident in Sharaa’s speech at the Victory Conference, where he framed the dialogue as a mechanism for consultations rather than decision-making.
- The appointment of Hassan al-Dgheim as spokesperson reinforced this downgrade—Dgheim quickly stated that no binding resolutions would emerge from the dialogue.
- The committee responsible for outreach struggled to engage a broad spectrum of Syrian society, leading to further doubts about the conference’s legitimacy.
What began as an opportunity to forge a national consensus has instead become a carefully managed event with predetermined outcomes.
Challenges in Governance: A Fragile Transition
As the new government takes shape, Sharaa has indicated that he will replace several ministers, particularly in the justice sector. However, early reports suggest that dismissed ministers may simply be reassigned as deputies—a move unlikely to inspire confidence.
The inclusion of Alawite, Christian, and Druze figures, as well as female ministers, signals an attempt at broader representation. Yet, representation alone will not address Syria’s deeper structural problems.
The primary issue is not who governs but whether they can govern effectively. HTS’s ability to run the country alone is limited, and the group has already begun recalling ex-civil police and working with former military officers to fill administrative gaps.
Unresolved Fault Lines: SDF, Suweida, and the Alawites
While relations between the Syrian government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have improved, thanks to Saudi mediation, the situation in Suweida remains precarious.
Israel’s potential involvement further complicates the matter. Tel Aviv has leveraged Syria’s instability to justify expanded military operations, raising concerns that even a local resolution in Suweida might not prevent Israeli intervention under the pretext of counterterrorism.
Meanwhile, tensions between Alawites and the new government remain unresolved, particularly as HTS continues purging state employees from previous administrations.
The U.S. Position: A Calculated Distance
The recent Paris Conference reinforced the regional push for a stable transition, with European powers easing sanctions on Syria’s energy and banking sectors. However, Washington refused to endorse the conference’s final statement, citing ongoing policy deliberations.
This U.S. hesitance aligns closely with Israel’s stance, as evidenced by Congressional hearings dominated by pro-Israel voices, which focused on counterterrorism and maintaining a U.S. military presence in Syria.
The absence of a clear American policy adds further uncertainty to Syria’s transition, particularly in economic recovery efforts.
A Missed Opportunity?
Syria’s economy remains severely crippled, with no immediate prospects for reconstruction funding. The recent UNDP report warns that Syria may take 50 years to recover, unless major structural changes and international investments materialize.
Critics argue that a well-executed National Dialogue could have provided a political mandate for the transition, fostering legitimacy and stability. Instead, the rushed and disorganized nature of the event has rendered it a missed opportunity—one that could have paved the way for national reconciliation, institutional reform, and sustainable governance.
With mounting internal divisions and external geopolitical constraints, Syria’s transition remains fragile, contested, and highly uncertain.
What lies ahead is not merely a question of governance but one of survival.
Conclusion: Syria at a Crossroads
- The National Dialogue has failed to live up to its potential, raising concerns that the transition lacks a true national mandate.
- The government’s ability to deliver services and maintain order will determine its success more than the composition of its leadership.
- The international community remains divided, with Europe supporting economic relief while the U.S. and Israel maintain a more cautious approach.
- Without a functional political framework, Syria’s economic collapse and institutional stagnation will only deepen.
The transition may have begun, but its success is far from guaranteed. Whether it becomes a road to stability or another chapter of uncertainty will depend on decisive leadership, pragmatic policies, and genuine political inclusion—none of which appear assured.
Mohammad al-Abdallah is the director of the Syria Justice and Accountability Center, a Syrian-led non-profit organization documenting human rights violations in the country.
This article was translated and edited by The Syrian Observer. The Syrian Observer has not verified the content of this story. Responsibility for the information and views set out in this article lies entirely with the author.
