In analysing the current Syrian and broader Middle Eastern context, it becomes essential to examine the structural difference between the notion of the “state” and the condition of an “alternative authority” that emerges in its absence. A state consists of governmental institutions and administrative bodies responsible for managing public affairs, upholding constitutional law, and implementing civil agreements that bind citizens into a unified republic.
An “alternative authority”, by contrast, refers to entities that assert power and control—military, financial, ideological, popular, or geostrategic—in place of a functioning state. These bodies operate as de facto governments in areas where state institutions have collapsed or retreated, managing affairs without necessarily possessing the expertise, legitimacy, or institutional frameworks required for statehood.
Critically, such alternative authorities do not seek to build a genuine state. Their existence depends on the absence of the state, and any serious move towards state-building would render them obsolete. As such, they often entrench their power through mechanisms of repression, sectarianism, intimidation, and institutional decay, cultivating a political and societal environment in which their presence appears both necessary and unchallengeable.
The Paradox of Alternative Authority
When an alternative authority entrenches itself, it does so not as a transitional arrangement but as a permanent condition. It mimics the appearance of statehood without adopting its foundational principles or responsibilities. This phenomenon is precisely what we have observed with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in Syria in recent years. Since 2018, following the collapse of regime structures in Idlib province, HTS has operated as an alternative authority, filling the vacuum left by the Assad regime’s retreat.
According to available evidence, the international powers involved in the Syrian conflict facilitated the creation of a governing body—the Commission—to manage the Idlib region and prevent mass displacement towards Turkey and beyond. Rather than establishing a new or transitional state, this structure became a prototype of entrenched authority based on control rather than governance, employing tools of coercion, ideology, and patronage to administer a fragmented population.
This model of rule, rooted in the absence of the state rather than the building of one, soon expanded. By late 2024, the powers shaping Syria’s future greenlit the replication of the Idlib model across the country. HTS entered Damascus, and its leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, took the reins of the central government. What followed was the nationwide application of the “alternative authority” model: a calculated effort to institutionalise statelessness as the new normal.
The “No-State” Reality
Rather than marking the beginning of state reconstruction, this shift entrenched a new form of authoritarian permanence—one not intended to evolve into statehood, but to sustain a system where the emergence of a genuine Syrian state is indefinitely deferred. The strategic decision appears aimed not at establishing a viable republic, but at preserving the conditions that preclude one.
This is evidenced by the choice of governing party. If the goal had been to build a democratic, pluralistic state, the international backers of Syria’s transition would not have selected HTS—a group whose only administrative experience stems from its monopolistic rule over Idlib. As President Ahmed al-Sharaa himself stated on several occasions, including his recent addresses in New York and Idlib, his administration intends to use Idlib’s governance model as the blueprint for Syria’s future.
In essence, Syria is being “Idlibified”—a process that systematises the principles of alternative authority and suppresses the emergence of statehood. While some Syrians initially celebrated the fall of Assad with hope and euphoria, many have yet to reckon with the implications of this new reality: the substitution of the state with a fixed, enduring non-state condition, legitimised by external actors and enforced internally through ideological conformity and repression.
From Syria to the Region
This model is not unique to Syria. It is part of a broader regional reconfiguration. Western and Arab powers increasingly treat alternative authorities as permanent governing bodies, regardless of their failure to lay the groundwork for state-building. This is underpinned by a longstanding Orientalist view—that the peoples of the region are unfit for republican governance and are instead suited to tribal or clan-based rule, characterised by loyalty rather than law.
As recently articulated by US envoy Tom Barrack, Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine are seen not as potential states but as territories best managed through decentralised, obedient authorities. In this view, Israel stands as the sole legitimate state in the region, while its neighbours are administered through fluctuating non-state actors that serve geopolitical objectives rather than national aspirations.
This perspective is currently being tested in Palestine. With Gaza effectively obliterated and Hamas removed from the equation, attention turns to the West Bank, where efforts appear underway to transform the Palestinian Authority into another “alternative authority”—a self-governing body that replaces the dream of a Palestinian state with a convenient administrative arrangement.
Lebanon may be next. The future of Hezbollah, once a dominant alternative authority, hangs in the balance as its regional sponsors negotiate whether to dissolve or reintegrate it into a broader non-state governance structure.
The New Middle East Order
What is unfolding in Syria may thus be a harbinger of a larger geopolitical order: one in which statehood is reserved for Israel alone, while its neighbours are locked into cycles of decentralised authority, designed for control rather than representation. The “alternative authority” becomes not a transitional phase but a permanent political framework—redefining sovereignty, citizenship, and legitimacy across the region.
In this context, the role of HTS and similar actors is not accidental—they are essential cogs in a machine designed to replace governance with dominance, and civil order with calculated chaos. As the experiment continues, the Syrian case may prove to be merely the beginning of a broader transformation—one that turns the very idea of the “state” into a relic of the past.
This article was translated and edited by The Syrian Observer. The Syrian Observer has not verified the content of this story. Responsibility for the information and views set out in this article lies entirely with the author.
