Since the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024, Syria has entered a period of profound political transformation. Among the issues that have resurfaced at the heart of national debate is decentralisation, which has once again become a focal point of competing visions for the country’s future governance.
In this context, remarks by U.S. Special Envoy Tom Barak during his participation in the Doha Forum drew particular attention. Barak stated that “decentralisation has not succeeded in the Middle East and will not succeed in Syria,” a comment widely interpreted as signalling a U.S. preference for strong central authority as a means of achieving rapid stability and avoiding a repeat of the Iraqi experience.
Analysts argue that this position reflects the broader approach of President Donald Trump’s second administration, while also aligning with Turkish interests that firmly oppose any form of political autonomy for minorities.
International relations researcher Firas Alawi offered a more nuanced reading of Barak’s remarks, arguing that they were primarily directed at political decentralisation in the sense of federalism. He warned that such a model could open the door to Syria’s fragmentation, particularly given the fragility of the transitional phase and the country’s complex demographic composition.
Speaking to Ultra Syria, Alawi explained that administrative decentralisation, which already exists in limited form, could contribute to preserving Syria’s territorial unity. By contrast, he described political decentralisation as historically and economically unviable in a country marked by deep population intermixing and integrated resource networks. He added that the absence of a strong central authority during the current transition heightens the risk of internal conflict, pointing to Iraq’s failure to manage relations between the centre and the peripheries as a cautionary example.
Nevertheless, Alawi acknowledged that a narrowly defined form of political decentralisation might be conceivable, but only under the supervision of a central government that retains exclusive control over sovereign files, including the military, foreign policy, and macroeconomic decision-making.
Writer and researcher Dr Basel Marawi similarly argued that decentralisation is not a prerequisite for state success, noting that many stable and prosperous countries rely on highly centralised systems. He stressed that any decentralisation framework must be grounded first and foremost in recognition of the state’s unity, sovereignty, and monopoly over sovereign powers—conditions that, in his view, are currently absent amid the proliferation of de facto authorities lacking electoral legitimacy or national consensus.
In remarks to Ultra Syria, Marawi emphasised that Syria’s transitional phase requires a strong central government capable of unifying decision-making, particularly in times of crisis. He cited recent events on the Syrian coast, where swift central intervention was needed to contain an attempted coup, as evidence of this necessity.
Marawi warned that implementing decentralisation at this stage could result in a dysfunctional sectarian system resembling those of Iraq or Lebanon. He cautioned against quota-based arrangements cloaked in appealing rhetoric but ultimately dividing society into antagonistic components. The alternative, he argued, lies in inclusive national partnership rather than the fragmentation of authority into localised mini-states.
A broad consensus has emerged among many experts that political decentralisation is ill-suited to Syria’s current conditions, while administrative decentralisation may represent a realistic transitional option—provided it is preceded by the restoration of strong central authority capable of enforcing security and unifying state institutions. The debate remains open, however, particularly as Syria moves toward drafting a new constitution and preparing for elections.
Political researcher Abdullah al-Kheir argued that the United States has adopted a firm position against political decentralisation or federalism in Syria, asserting that Barak’s comments reflect a strategic orientation rather than a personal view. He warned that such a stance risks facilitating a return to centralised authoritarianism, noting that Washington itself has previously supported decentralisation when it served its interests, as in the case of Iraq’s Kurdistan region.
Al-Kheir contended that Syria could develop its own model of administrative and developmental decentralisation, drawing on comparatively successful experiences such as those of the United Arab Emirates and the United States, while maintaining centralised control over sovereign decision-making.
He identified several challenges facing such a model, including uneven resource distribution, the integration of the Syrian Democratic Forces, and the vulnerability of weaker regions to exploitation by extremist or external actors. To address these risks, he proposed practical measures such as establishing a national revenue-distribution fund and integrating the SDF into the national army under temporary international supervision.
Many observers see a clear tension between the American vision of rapid stabilisation through strong central authority and Syrians’ aspirations for a governance model capable of accommodating the country’s demographic and social diversity—a tension that is likely to shape Syria’s political trajectory in the months ahead.
This article was translated and edited by The Syrian Observer. The Syrian Observer has not verified the content of this story. Responsibility for the information and views set out in this article lies entirely with the author.
