The ambiguity surrounding Turkey’s stance on the battle to deter aggression in Syria, along with the absence of the Ankara-backed opposition “National Army” from a leading role on the ground, has fueled speculation about Turkey’s true role in these developments.
On the first day of the opposition forces’ advance, the Turkish Ministry of Defence spokesperson merely stated that they were monitoring developments in Idlib and taking all necessary precautions. Before the forces reached Aleppo’s outskirts, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement emphasizing the importance of maintaining peace in Idlib and neighboring areas and reaffirming Turkey’s adherence to de-escalation agreements—an implied accusation against Iran, Russia, or both as guarantors of the Syrian regime.
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In contrast to the official position, Turkish media’s response to the battle’s events was disorganized and caught off guard on the first day. Coverage was scattered, deviating from the coherent narrative typically seen in Turkish media’s handling of Syrian affairs over the years. By the second day, media outlets aligned with the government began questioning the battle’s objectives, pondering whether the target was Aleppo itself or merely its periphery, with intentions to move eastward. This confusion and lack of clarity in Turkey’s position can be attributed to the absence of explicit official statements.
Turkish society has historically viewed Aleppo as an extension of Anatolia, both geographically and culturally. Aleppo hosted the earliest formations of the Seljuk state before Anatolia, reinforcing its perceived historical significance. Many Turks believe that the Turkmen population constitutes 50-60% of Aleppo’s inhabitants, not just in the city but across the broader governorate. This belief is linked to the Ottoman-era Housing Law during the Tanzimat period in the mid-19th century, which involved the settlement of tribes and the establishment of new administrative regions, including Kahramanmaraş, Kilis, and modern-day cities like Hassa and Reyhanlı, part of Hatay province. Many Turkmen from Aleppo were resettled in these areas, which remained administratively tied to Greater Aleppo Province.
Ottoman officer Ali Fuad noted in his memoirs that Mustafa Kemal Atatürk participated in drafting the Ottoman National Pact map in 1919. This map, which included Aleppo, Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor, Kirkuk, Mosul, Sulaymaniyah, and Batumi, signalled a commitment to retain these territories at all costs. In October 2017, nationalist leader Devlet Bahçeli referred to this legacy, asserting that Turkey would not stop at its current 81 provinces, declaring Kirkuk the 82nd, Mosul the 83rd, and Aleppo and Idlib the 84th and 85th, all seen as Turkish lands.
This historical perspective fuels Turkish views of Aleppo as lost territory to be reclaimed. Sources close to the Turkish government suggest that Ankara was forced to relinquish Aleppo during the Turkish-Russian de-escalation agreement in late 2016 to protect civilians when Qassem Soleimani’s militias and Hezbollah besieged the city. This context explains Ankara’s current insistence on amending the Adana Agreement with Bashar al-Assad, allowing Turkish forces to advance 30 kilometers into Syrian territory, potentially reaching Aleppo, as a means of rectifying past concessions.
Turkey’s official position on the current battle remains ambiguous. It neither endorsed nor opposed the events, with Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan merely stating that Turkey is not directly involved in the Aleppo battle. However, it is evident that Turkey stands to gain significantly if the opposition secures Aleppo—whether in terms of negotiations, economic benefits, or refugee repatriation.
The Turkish stance will likely become clearer if Kurdish armed groups, such as the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), exploit the regime’s withdrawal to seize critical areas, as reportedly occurred at Aleppo Airport. The coming days will determine Turkey’s response to Kurdish-controlled regions like Tel Rifaat, Manbij, and Kobani, as well as its strategy in advancing eastward toward Raqqa, Hasakah, and Qamishli to counter what it views as threats to its national security. Ankara may have preemptively laid the groundwork for international backing, as evidenced by the recent visit of NATO’s new Secretary-General to Turkey shortly before the battle began. Turkey also frames its role as a means to stabilize Aleppo, revive its economy, and curb refugee flows to Europe.
However, Turkey’s biggest challenge may not lie in securing logistical support or international backing for opposition forces. Instead, it will face significant hurdles in managing Aleppo and other newly controlled areas. If Turkey imposes its authority over HTS (Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham) as it does in northern Aleppo’s countryside, questions arise about governance: Will Turkish governors rely on translators, a method that faltered in northern Aleppo? Or will Ankara leave these areas under the control of armed factions, as seen in some territories? These issues, along with Turkey’s response to potential Russian military action or renewed Kurdish moves, will define its position in the coming days.
This article was translated and edited by The Syrian Observer. The Syrian Observer has not verified the content of this story. Responsibility for the information and views set out in this article lies entirely with the author.
