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What Failed at Moscow II? The Opposition, Russia, or the Political Solution?


The opposition failed, while Jaafari's arrogance and lack of respect foiled Moscow's desire to provide a domesticated opposition that can persuade the Syrian people it would deliver their salvation
What Failed at Moscow II? The Opposition, Russia, or the Political Solution?


The 
Moscow consultative forum concluded with a failure closer to a scandal, as the head of the regime’s delegation mocked his counterparts who agreed on the terms of the shameful document as read by their Russian mediator.


None of the attendants disapproved of the document, but some stated their approval conditioned upon confidence-building measures, which was postponed due to a lack of time, according to Bashar al-Jaafari, the Russian mediator and Qadri Jamil – or as a result of Jaafari's procrastination, according to other views. The excuse is uglier than the guilt. On the assumption that Jaafari agreed to these measures – which participants of this forum must explain to us – then years of legitimate resistance in Syria will suddenly be considered terrorism carried out by Arab, international and regional parties in order to shed the Syrian blood.


What about the tens of thousands who were killed under torture by Assad’s security forces, or the hundreds of thousands who died beneath the rubble of buildings destroyed by his explosive barrels or his long-range missiles? Which of the regime’s institutions will now have their sanctions lifted after these dissidents signed the document, and are the regime's repressive security institutions included? Will they include the economic institutions of Makhlouf al-Assad, or the funds necessary to finance and supply the aircrafts that drop the barrels of death daily upon the Syrian people? The document did not specify which institutions, of course.


The signatories of this document did not reveal how to accomplish a Syrian-Syrian solution without international or regional interference between the tyrant’s regime and the forces and parties who believe in a political solution. Will this be done through the awakening of conscience among the ruling mafia, which will consequently relinquish their power to carry out a democratic process that respects the peoples’ will to decide?


As for the gentlemen of the opposition who wish to support the army and the armed forces in the fight against terrorism, do they mean the same army and security forces which arrested AbdulAziz al-Khair, Saleh an-Nabawani, Khalil Matouk, Rajaa Nasser, Samar Kokash and tens of thousands of other Syrian women, children and men; or do they mean those forces which killed our youth under torture and destroyed our cities and villages under the banner of "Assad or We Burn the Country"? What have you left for Geneva III when you ask the international community to adopt your agreement in Moscow as the basis for a comprehensive political solution?


In the end, those who believe they were cheated by Jaafari should admit that they were naive to presume Moscow may actually constitute a prelude to resolving the Syrian dilemma.


The opposition who travelled to Moscow failed, while Jaafari's arrogance and lack of respect foiled Moscow's desire to provide a domesticated opposition that can persuade the Syrian people it would deliver their salvation while maintaining a weak and obedient regime, ready to meet their demands in the coming decades.


As for the political solution to save Syria from terrorism and extremism on the one hand, and tyranny and criminality on the other, it has not yet failed as an option, after everyone became aware that the least expensive solution is also the best solution for the creation of a stable and secure Syria. A stable Syria is a regional and international interest – away from Iranian hegemony seen through the endless criminality of the regime, and away from Syria's fall to the hands of ISIS and Al-Qaeda to become a hotbed of terrorism.
 But this political solution has conditions that should be met in order to be achieved; the first of which is a full – or at least a balanced – international and regional consensus that sends a tough message to the tyrant of Damascus. A message of two choices: a political solution that gives Syrians (in all their diversity and without exception) the legitimate right to freely determine their fate away from the regime and its criminal forces, or an option similar to the fate of Moammar Gaddafi in Libya – an option following an international, Arab and regional resolution to save Syria from falling into the arms of ISIS and Al-Qaeda.


I do not see the possibility of a viable political solution without strict international and Arab will. I believe this will may become a prelude to convince the international community and its actors of the effectiveness of this solution.

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