The fall of Assad’s regime has not produced a unified vision for Syria’s future. Instead, two broad constituencies dominate public discourse. On one side are those who identify with “Assad’s Syria,” clinging to institutional continuity, residual privileges, and the social and economic networks that once sustained them. Their anxieties revolve around economic insecurity, loss of social status, and the fear that transitional justice will become a tool of revenge. On the other side are advocates of “Legitimate Syria,” who demand a clean break from the past, rooted in transitional justice, civilian governance, and accountability. They fear that old elites will simply recycle themselves into positions of power, hollowing out the promise of reform.
This duality is not abstract. It is anchored in lived political memory: loyalists recall the privileges and protections of the old order, while victims remember repression, imprisonment, and unfulfilled justice. The transitional government must navigate these competing fears, building trust without aligning exclusively with either camp.
Security Vacuums and Fragile Institutions
The transition has been marred by violence, explosions, and armed clashes that expose the fragility of unified security control. Former armed factions continue to assert territorial and political dominance, raising urgent questions about the state’s monopoly on force. Civilian-led security policies governed by clear legal standards are desperately needed, yet the government has often expanded the scope for violations instead.
Institutionally, the government has dissolved major organs of the state, including military and security services, without distinguishing between perpetrators of abuses and ordinary personnel. This has deepened the security vacuum and eroded public confidence. Civil society has proposed roadmaps for transitional justice and reconstruction, but these initiatives collide with shrinking political space and a lack of will at the highest levels.
Voices of Critique
Jalal al-Hamd of Justice for Life argues that the transitional government primarily represents the interests of the new regime and its allies in Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham. He warns of authoritarian relapse, citing rash decisions, vague promises, and growing restrictions on freedoms. He points to missed opportunities—such as failing to capitalize on the lifting of sanctions in coastal areas and Suwayda—that could have marked turning points in governance. For him, the government’s trajectory is worrying: it consolidates power rather than presenting a vision for recovery.
Ammar Jallo of the Harmoon Centre describes the government as fundamentally non-representative, born of factional agreement rather than popular will. Its impact on daily life has been minimal, limited mostly to commodity prices. Fuel costs may have eased, but basic services remain unmet. Sovereignty is elusive, and while freedom of expression is greater than under Assad, detentions without warrants persist. Jallo stresses that the government has prevented civil war, but beyond that, it has failed to deliver meaningful reform or social protection.
Between Fear and Hope
Both constituencies harbor real anxieties. Former loyalists fear exclusion and economic collapse. Revolutionaries fear domination by recycled elites and hollow institutions. These fears are rooted in ideological differences and factional disputes, but they are valid and must be acknowledged. Civil society, meanwhile, remains weak, fragmented, and often compromised, leaving little counterweight to government power.
A Promising Start—With Caveats
Less than a year into its formation, the transitional government cannot be judged definitively. Syria is emerging from a devastating conflict that destroyed infrastructure, fractured society, and left deep economic scars. Yet early indicators suggest the government lacks a clear strategic vision. Its promises of improved security and economic recovery remain vague, and recent appointments have deepened uncertainty. Freedoms are increasingly restricted, raising fears of authoritarianism’s return.
The Road Ahead
The transitional government stands at a crossroads. Without a consensual roadmap that reconciles justice with social equity, revives institutions while protecting liberties, and addresses both constituencies’ fears, Syria risks reproducing authoritarian patterns or fragmenting further. Preventing civil war is not enough. The government must build institutions that inspire confidence, translate promises into tangible progress, and create a framework that balances accountability with reintegration.
Only then can Syria move beyond survival toward genuine recovery.
This article was translated and edited by The Syrian Observer. The Syrian Observer has not verified the content of this story. Responsibility for the information and views set out in this article lies entirely with the author.
