While the security arrangement Israel is seeking to impose on Syria resembles, in structure, the agreements signed with Egypt under the 1979 peace treaty—dividing Sinai into zones with specific limitations on military presence—it more closely echoes the spirit of the Oslo Accords, signed between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation in Washington exactly 32 years ago.
Unlike Egypt, which regained full sovereignty over the entire Sinai Peninsula, including the small Taba enclave, this new Israeli proposal would require Syria not only to remain silent on the status of the occupied Golan Heights, but also to accept Israel’s continued control over parts of Syrian territory seized after 8 December 2024—namely Mount Hermon and Tel al-Hara—under the guise of security concerns.
For the administration that claims to have “liberated” Syrians from the Assad regime and now presumes to determine the country’s future on their behalf, even entertaining such a proposal suggests that its primary objective is to gain Israeli recognition and legitimise its authority. This would come at the price of forfeiting parts of national territory and surrendering sovereignty over others entirely. Notably, the proposed arrangement would prohibit all Syrian flights—including helicopters—across southern regions, starting from the administrative borders of Damascus. These restrictions are more severe than those imposed by the U.S.-led coalition on Iraq in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War. Even then, Iraqi helicopters were permitted to fly in no-fly zones established over the north and south of the country following the uprisings against Saddam Hussein’s regime.
The bitter irony here lies in the reality that it is the rightful party—Syria—seeking recognition from the aggressor in exchange for overlooking its occupation. This, too, mirrors Oslo. Should the deal be concluded, Damascus may well declare it an achievement, just as it did in 1967—when territory was lost, but the regime claimed a hollow victory because Israel had failed to overthrow it.
Parallels with the Oslo Accords
The similarities with Oslo extend beyond the PLO’s pursuit of recognition from Israel, even if only for partial authority over a fragmented Palestine. The Palestinian Authority accepted governance without sovereignty. It not only took on the role of securing Israel’s borders—an approach also adopted by neighbouring Arab states, including the former Assad regime—but became, in effect, a security arm of Israel. The PA cooperates with Israel to manage civilian populations, intercept arms shipments, and suppress resistance activities.
This is precisely what the Damascus authority is now being asked to do—and more. It would allow Israel unimpeded access to strike at any perceived threat from within Syrian-controlled areas. As with Oslo, the territory would be divided into zones—akin to Areas A, B, and C in the West Bank—with varying levels of Syrian control, depending on what Israel deems strategically acceptable. In practice, the Syrian administration might retain nominal control over major population centres, while Israel maintains overriding security control over the majority of southern Syria. As seen in the West Bank, such a structure paves the way for annexation—a likely scenario for southern Syrian regions adjacent to the Israeli border.
At its core, Israel’s offer to the Damascus government amounts to recognition in exchange for rule, but with authority stripped of substance. The Syrian administration may believe it has no alternative but to accept such terms to remain in power. That belief is deeply misguided. What Israel is offering is a poisoned deal—one that would fatally undermine the legitimacy of the Ahmed Sharaaa administration, reducing it to a powerless body, much like Mahmoud Abbas’s government in Ramallah.
Ultimately, true legitimacy arises from within. Remaining in power depends on the will of the people, not on recognition from an occupying force. This means there is a genuine alternative to the path currently being considered. Syria must halt these unequal negotiations immediately and instead focus on building a national consensus for the transitional period. The priority should be unifying the domestic front, strengthening national institutions and capabilities, and negotiating from a position of strength.
Anything less would amount to replacing subjugation by a despot with subjugation by an occupier.
This article was translated and edited by The Syrian Observer. The Syrian Observer has not verified the content of this story. Responsibility for the information and views set out in this article lies entirely with the author.
