The Syrian transitional government’s rapid move towards negotiations with Israel, particularly in the aftermath of events in Suwayda, is generating deep unease among broad segments of Syrian society. This anxiety is intensified by the lack of transparency from Damascus regarding the scope and substance of these talks, especially amid reports of a potential high-level meeting between Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu next month in New York.
While it may be tempting to dismiss the more sensational claims about imminent normalisation, the confirmed meetings between Syrian Foreign Minister Assaad al-Shibani and Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer mark a significant turning point. The secrecy surrounding what is described as a “security agreement,” contrasted with Israeli leaks suggesting terms that would undermine Syrian sovereignty in the south, fuels legitimate fears of a backroom deal. The urgency of U.S. Envoy Tom Barak to secure an agreement before the UN General Assembly only heightens these suspicions.
A Flawed Strategic Calculus
There is, in theory, a pragmatic case for limited security communications to curb Israeli airstrikes and contain external interference. Yet the opposite appears to be taking place. Israel has managed to insert itself as a mediator in Syria’s internal conflicts, most notably through its role—via U.S. mediation—in brokering the Suwayda ceasefire. Far from a neutral interlocutor, Israel is positioning itself as a decisive power broker in southern Syria.
The Sharaa administration appears to believe that shoring up its domestic position requires striking external understandings with Israel. This calculation is reinforced by the encouragement of a U.S. administration keen for a foreign policy success, a Turkish government eager to secure its own influence in Syria, and Gulf states looking to permanently close the chapter on the Arab–Israeli conflict.
But this is a fundamental misreading of Israel’s intentions. The Netanyahu government is not seeking partnership; it is exploiting Syria’s weakness to dictate terms. Israel’s objectives are clear: a return to the 1974 Forces Separation Agreement, implicit recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights, demilitarisation of southern Syria, and restrictions on the Syrian army’s advanced missile and air defence capabilities. Such conditions would hollow out Syrian sovereignty and create a vacuum to be filled by Israeli-aligned militias.
A Crisis of Legitimacy and Historical Parallels
The transitional government in Damascus lacks both popular legitimacy and an electoral mandate to make concessions of this magnitude. Unlike Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy—who enjoys a strong democratic mandate yet continues to resist U.S. pressure to cede territory—the Syrian administration is unelected. Entering into existential negotiations without national consensus is reckless and dangerous.
To frame matters of sovereignty and territory as “outside-the-box thinking” risks tearing further at Syria’s already fractured social fabric. A large portion of the Sunni majority, whom this government claims to represent, will not accept the surrender of sovereignty for the sake of political survival. What judgment would history render on a government that sacrifices land to preserve power? How would such an act differ from the Baathist regime’s abdications in 1967?
If such an agreement were to be signed, it would be done without the consent of the Syrian people. It must therefore be said clearly: a government without a mandate has no authority to trade away sovereignty, and it cannot do so in our name.
This article was translated and edited by The Syrian Observer. The Syrian Observer has not verified the content of this story. Responsibility for the information and views set out in this article lies entirely with the author.
