The Syrian regime’s head appears to be attempting a cautious shift away from the “axis of resistance” and his longstanding dependency on Iran, seeking to align instead with the “axis of Arab moderation.” This repositioning arises from Russian and Arab pressures amid escalating tensions between the “axis of resistance” and Israel. In doing so, Bashar al-Assad aims to avoid becoming an Israeli target—a concern reportedly highlighted by Vladimir Putin—and to buy time to rebuild his crumbling political structure under favorable conditions. Nevertheless, Assad remains constrained, neither fully able to abandon his previous alignment nor fully commit to the new.
Several signs suggest Assad’s calculated distancing from the “axis of resistance” and the “unity of the squares.” These include a reduction in drug and weapon smuggling into Jordan, a demand from Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, as well as silence on Israeli strikes within Syria. While Assad’s role in regional conflicts, such as Gaza and Lebanon, remains passive—limited to facilitating Iranian logistical support, which Israel aggressively targets within Syria—an outright departure from his previous alliances remains complex.
Evident signs of Assad’s shift toward the “axis of moderation” emerged after the Manama summit in May 2024, marked by the reopening of the Abu al-Zindin crossing, Saudi Arabia’s reopening of its Damascus embassy, and promises of partial reconstruction aid. Furthermore, remarks by UN envoy Geir Pedersen about humanitarian efforts and early recovery, coupled with President Biden’s decision to withhold his signature from anti-Assad normalization legislation, have paved the way for Italian-led efforts to restore European-Syrian relations.
The complexity of the regional situation is best understood through two focal points. First, Israel’s growing reliance on the United States under both current and future administrations, including Donald Trump’s anticipated leadership. This reliance has afforded the U.S. control over the ongoing war, coinciding with Assad’s gradual shift and the breakdown of the “unity of the squares.” Concurrently, the U.S. provides Israel with extensive military, financial, and political support as Israel escalates its offensives against Gaza, Hezbollah, Iran, and Iranian-backed forces across Syria, Iraq, and Yemen.
While facilitating these actions, the U.S. delays the war’s resolution, shields Netanyahu from international repercussions, and discreetly advances its goal of dismantling the “axis of resistance” led by Iran. This approach enables the U.S. to ostensibly distance itself from the consequences of Israel’s offensive, mitigating the political and humanitarian costs within both the global and domestic spheres.
The second focal point is the absence of any viable basis for political negotiation, given the stark imbalance of power between Israel and its allies on one side, and Iran and its allies, including China and Russia, on the other. This imbalance renders discussions impractical on several fronts, including Iran’s nuclear ambitions, Palestinian issues, Lebanon’s adherence to UN Resolution 1701, and Syria’s ongoing Israeli confrontations. With no unified or advantageous position, Assad, Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran lack a collective bargaining platform, as military defeat precludes a favorable negotiation, and ideological stances alone cannot withstand advanced technologies.
Thus, U.S. strategy leverages Israeli military might to target Iranian infrastructure following missile strikes on Israel and an alleged assassination attempt on Netanyahu by Iranian proxies, a claim acknowledged by Hezbollah’s media relations head, Mohammad Afif. Yet, these actions have not impacted Iran’s nuclear program or its energy resources, focusing instead on ballistic missile sites and launch points. Such maneuvers risk destabilizing Iran domestically, potentially influencing Khamenei’s succession.
The United States, though appearing weak in its inability to end the conflict, might instead be enacting an aggressive policy to fortify Israel and further debilitate Iran. For Assad, analysis suggests a gradual sidelining, possibly to facilitate an eventual agreement with Israel, leveraging current dynamics for his strategic realignment.
Analysts suggest that the Biden administration’s approach may appear scattered and passive, lacking both a long-term strategy and a framework for ending the current conflict. However, this interpretation could miss deeper intentions in Washington’s strategy. There may be figures in the administration who view this moment as a historic opportunity to reshape global and Middle Eastern power dynamics.
Responsiveness
While the U.S. often seems reactive—particularly in its support of Israel against Iran and its affiliates—it might also be pursuing a deliberate, proactive course, using the ongoing conflicts as leverage. This approach has precedent, as seen in U.S. actions since September 11, 2001, where initial responses led to broader strategic realignments. The real focus may not be on managing each crisis but on capitalizing on their outcomes to create favorable opportunities in the region.
In fact, when it comes to Israel’s security, the Biden administration, much like its predecessor, exhibits a determined, unyielding stance. While maintaining pressure on Iran, it allows Israel to dismantle Iran’s network of influence and curb its regional ambitions. In supporting Israeli defense efforts, the U.S. can choose to call for a ceasefire when strategically advantageous. This suggests that Washington’s stance may be more consistent and calculated than it seems.
Following the October 7, 2023 attack by Hamas, the U.S. granted Israel considerable latitude to dismantle Hamas’s influence, manage other regional players, and prevent an expanded conflict. Israel concentrated on Hamas and engaged Hezbollah in limited skirmishes, while Iran’s rhetoric alternated between provocation and appeals for peace. This suggests an underlying U.S. strategy aligning Israeli objectives with international and new American leadership support.
In this shifting context, Assad’s repositioning raises questions. He may attempt to evade personal targeting by adjusting his alliances, but rebuilding his collapsed regime hinges on two critical factors: the outcome of the Russian-Ukrainian war, due to Russian support, and Iran’s anticipated withdrawal from Syria. Iran’s military presence in Syria has proven increasingly costly and vulnerable to attacks, and with growing pressures, Iran may decide Syria is no longer a viable ally against Israel.
Thus, Assad’s continued normalization depends on his responsiveness to his sponsors’ policies and his adherence to two crucial obligations: a commitment to peace with Israel and progress toward a political resolution aligned with UN Security Council Resolution 2254.
This article was translated and edited by The Syrian Observer. The Syrian Observer has not verified the content of this story. Responsibility for the information and views set out in this article lies entirely with the author.
