The Assad regime’s reliance on reserve service has been both essential and problematic, especially since the beginning of the Syrian conflict in 2011. For many Syrians, reserve service has been marked by uncertainty, with individuals often retained for long periods without knowing when they would be discharged.
The Turkish-Russian ceasefire agreement in March 2020 and the subsequent pause in major military operations provided the Assad regime an opportunity to initiate reforms in the military and security sectors, including significant changes to the reserve service system to address these persistent issues. Between mid-2023 and mid-2024, several administrative orders were issued by the regime’s army to end the retention of various categories of reserve soldiers. This marked the beginning of a broader plan aimed at transforming the Syrian military into what was described as a “professional, advanced, qualitative army,” as articulated by the Director General of the “Army and Armed Forces.”
This plan has been part of a larger strategy that has been unfolding since the appointment of a new Minister of Defense in April 2022. The Assad regime recognized the limitations of a conscript-based army, particularly after years of conflict, and thus sought to build a more professional army grounded in volunteer service. One of the initial steps in this transformation was the reduction of the duration of reserve service, with the eventual goal of redefining compulsory military service altogether.
The regime introduced five and ten-year recruitment contracts, offering competitive salaries and other incentives, including exemptions from compulsory service after five years. A structured discharge plan was also put in place, organized into three stages with a maximum duration of 24 months. By 2025, the regime expects to discharge approximately 152,000 soldiers from reserve service. This plan includes provisions for volunteer soldiers, such as a five-year exemption from reserve service after discharge, the option to serve one year of reserve duty either continuously or intermittently, and a complete exemption from reserve service for those who complete ten-year contracts.
The significance of this plan is multifaceted. On the one hand, it indicates the regime’s substantial human resources, as evidenced by the large number of soldiers anticipated to be discharged. This contradicts earlier reports that suggested a severe manpower shortage in the regime’s forces. On the other hand, it represents a strategic shift towards a volunteer-based military force, addressing the inefficiencies of a conscripted army.
Cash allowances
In conjunction with these changes, the Assad regime has also made numerous legal amendments to the Military Service Law, originally established by Legislative Decree 30 of 2007. These amendments have been crucial in addressing unforeseen gaps in the law and expanding the regime’s interests. For instance, in 2020, Legislative Decree 31 was introduced, allowing Syrian expatriates to pay a $5,000 cash allowance for exemption from reserve service, thus generating much-needed foreign currency for the Ministry of Defense. Further amendments in 2022 refined the criteria for disability exemptions and clarified the conditions for only children or similar cases. In 2023, the regime introduced age-based exemptions, allowing individuals aged 40—and later reduced to 38—to pay a $4,800 cash allowance to avoid reserve service. By 2024, additional provisions were made for those with partial disabilities, enabling them to pay a reduced cash allowance for exemption, aligning with broader legislative efforts to support persons with disabilities.
These legal amendments serve multiple purposes. They provide the regime with a steady stream of revenue through cash allowances paid for exemptions, and they expand the number of individuals eligible for these exemptions, thereby potentially reducing the regime’s military burden. The regime continues to adapt its legal framework to changing circumstances, ensuring that its interests are prioritized.
The motivations behind the reserve service plan are complex and multifaceted. One key objective is to relieve community pressure within regime-controlled areas, especially in the wake of significant migration driven by reserve service requirements. Additionally, the regime aims to maintain troop levels by attracting new recruits and replacing discharged soldiers with volunteers through flexible and competitive recruitment contracts. Another significant goal is to absorb militia members into the official military, thereby depleting militia resources while maintaining control over these forces. Finally, the plan also serves the regime’s financial interests by allowing individuals to avoid reserve service through cash payments, generating revenue for the Ministry of Defense.
The Assad regime’s approach to the reserve service file reflects careful and deliberate management, balancing military and social considerations. The evolution of reserve service from a vital source of manpower to a revenue stream underscores the regime’s focus on securing its interests, regardless of the broader impact on Syrian society. This shift highlights the intricate dynamics that drive the regime’s reserve service plan and its broader military strategies.
This article was translated and edited by The Syrian Observer. The Syrian Observer has not verified the content of this story. Responsibility for the information and views set out in this article lies entirely with the author.
