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Syria… The Question and the Stakes of Normalization

In an article in Al-Araby al-Jadeed, Marwan Kabalan wonders at what cost would Israel agree to Syria's conditions for normalization.
Syria… The Question and the Stakes of Normalization

While Israeli and Western media are abuzz with reports of direct and indirect Syrian-Israeli negotiations, the Syrian government, true to form, remains silent—leaving the Syrian public vulnerable to speculation, rumors, and even far-fetched scenarios. One such bizarre claim, reported by Israel’s Channel 24, suggested a potential land swap between Syria and Israel involving the Golan Heights and northern Lebanon.

This culture of opacity and disregard for public opinion is not limited to the Israel file—it permeates nearly all aspects of the Syrian state, from major economic deals to foreign relations. That includes the price Damascus may have paid to lift U.S. sanctions and be removed from the list of terrorism sponsors, as well as its reconciliation arrangements with figures from the former regime. However, normalization with Israel carries a different weight in the Syrian public consciousness. It touches on the country’s modern history, its Arab identity, and its national territory.

If not for the occasional disclosures by U.S. envoy Thomas Barrack, the Syrian public would know little about the progress of negotiations with Israel—negotiations which, according to him, are moving rapidly.

This raises a troubling question: Is the Syrian leadership treating this complex, sensitive issue with the same casualness that defines its approach to most matters? Or is the public being subjected to a systematic deception, only to find itself one day faced with a new reality it had no role in shaping?

From the fragments available, it appears that the Syrian government is currently seeking a security agreement with Israel that would secure three main demands. First, the withdrawal of Israeli forces to the lines of December 8, 2024, and a return to the 1974 Disengagement Agreement, which ended hostilities between the two countries following the 1973 October War. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced on December 11, 2024—just three days after the fall of the Assad regime—that Israel was withdrawing from the 1974 agreement, citing the collapse of the Syrian army and the absence of a counterpart to uphold the deal. Israel then used this pretext to expand its presence in Syria, occupying not only the buffer zone but also additional territory—amounting to around 600 square kilometers.

Second, Syria is demanding an end to Israeli attacks on its territory. These began in 2012 and intensified in the last two years—especially after the “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation—and reached their peak following Assad’s fall, with Israel launching one of its largest-ever aerial campaigns, reportedly destroying up to 85 percent of Syria’s remaining military capabilities.

Third, and perhaps most strikingly, Damascus is asking Israel to recognize the territorial integrity of Syria and to stop supporting various Syrian political and societal groups that seek to break away from central authority.

Why would Israel agree to any of this—and at what cost? Given the regional transformations since the “Al-Aqsa Flood,” Israel no longer seeks a mere border-security arrangement, as was the case under Assad’s rule for half a century. Nor does it feel bound by the old peace-for-land formula that shaped the Madrid Conference in 1991, or the Arab Peace Initiative of 2002 that offered normalization in exchange for a return to 1967 borders. Today, Israel operates with a historic sense of strategic confidence, adopting the Trump-era doctrine of “peace through strength”—a policy rooted in the idea of Pax Americana, which Washington embraced after the Cold War.

Moreover, Israel has long relied on a strategy of expanding its territorial control in order to compel adversaries to accept the status quo of prior conquests. After the 1967 war, for instance, Arab states effectively acquiesced to Israel’s sovereignty over the 78% of historic Palestine it had captured in 1948, and negotiations shifted to the territories seized later. In Syria’s case, this suggests that Israel is unlikely to withdraw to the lines of December 8, 2024, without Damascus first recognizing Israeli sovereignty over the areas it held prior to that date—namely, the Golan Heights as occupied since June 1967.

The fundamental question, then, is whether the new Syrian leadership understands this dynamic—and whether it is prepared to accept it. This is the central issue that must be examined in any conversation about normalization and its implications.

 

This article was translated and edited by The Syrian Observer. The Syrian Observer has not verified the content of this story. Responsibility for the information and views set out in this article lies entirely with the author.

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