In a sharply worded article published in mid-April 2025, Nizar Barini launched a trenchant critique of Western efforts to pressure Syria’s transitional government into joining the U.S.-led International Coalition to Combat Terrorism. At first glance, Barini’s argument reads like a conventional rejection of foreign meddling. But beneath the rhetoric lies a set of profound concerns that resonate with Syria’s broader political transformation: the fear of entrenched fragmentation, the struggle over who defines legitimacy, and the suspicion that external powers are seeking to engineer Syria’s future through selective partnerships and coercive leverage.
Barini’s commentary sets the stage for understanding the emerging political spectrum in Syria—not merely along ideological or partisan lines, but through deeper tensions between centralisation and federalism, Islamist and secular legitimacy, elite decision-making and grassroots engagement. Together with recent writings by other Syrian pundits and the consequential March 2025 deal between the SDF and the Damascus government, a picture emerges of a country not only rebuilding its institutions but actively renegotiating the meaning of its statehood.
The Sovereignty Question: Between Unity and Managed Fragmentation
Barini’s central fear is that Western powers, under the guise of counterterrorism cooperation, are seeking to legitimise the dual-authority reality that emerged after 2011, where the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) hold de facto control over vast parts of northeastern Syria. He argues that U.S. and French insistence on Syrian inclusion in the anti-ISIS coalition is less about shared military goals and more about imposing a model of governance that undermines the unitary state, replacing it with a fragmented, externally managed political geography.
His critique reflects a larger anxiety about sovereignty and legitimacy in post-conflict Syria: who defines what a “legitimate” Syrian army is? Who decides whether Rojava’s autonomy is a national achievement or a Trojan horse? In Barini’s view, the international standard being promoted—complete with requirements for “military professionalism,” “institutional integrity,” and the presence of “non-ideological elements”—is more about reshaping Syria from without than rebuilding it from within.
Ironically, just weeks before his article appeared, the March 10 agreement between the SDF and the Sharaa government signaled a new chapter in this same contest. Brokered quietly with the knowledge of Washington, the agreement set a one-year timeline for the integration of SDF fighters into the national army. But the underlying tension remained: Rojava seeks a federal Syria that enshrines its autonomy, while Damascus demands unification under central authority. The deal, then, is not a resolution but a negotiated pause in a deeper structural struggle—one that echoes Barini’s concern that unity, if mediated by external actors, may come at the cost of genuine sovereignty.
The Leadership Debate: Identity, Legitimacy, and Realpolitik
As for Mahmoud Alloush, he approaches the political spectrum from a different angle: the role of leadership identity in shaping Syria’s external relations. In his article Is Al-Shara’ an Obstacle to the New Syria?, Alloush examines the Western and Israeli discomfort with President Ahmed al-Sharaa, whose Islamist roots and past jihadi associations make him a problematic figure in diplomatic circles. Yet Alloush contends that this discomfort, while real, is not decisive. Western powers, he argues, are ultimately governed by interests—not ideologies.
Sharaa is seen as a stabilising figure in a chaotic transition, someone who filled the post-Assad vacuum when no other credible authority could. His leadership is tolerated not because it aligns with Western preferences, but because it guarantees continuity and order in the short term. Alloush makes the crucial point that Western policy in Syria is shaped far more by geopolitical calculations—on issues such as Kurdish autonomy, relations with Turkey, and the containment of Iranian influence—than by ideological purity.
In this light, al-Sharaa is not the cause of Syria’s diplomatic complications but a symbol of the contradictions inherent in its transitional moment. He embodies a hybrid form of legitimacy: rooted in Islamic identity, but increasingly pragmatic in governance. His government’s negotiations with the SDF further reinforce this reading: the former jihadi commander now finds himself navigating federalism, military integration, and power-sharing—all tools of political realism, not dogma.
The Return of the Political: From Fear to Participation
If Barini maps the geopolitical stakes and Alloush examines the leadership question, Manhal Aroob turns our attention to the transformation of political life from below. In And the Syrians Returned to Practice Politics Openly!, Aroob describes the shift from authoritarian paralysis to vibrant, if chaotic, political engagement. After decades in which politics meant surveillance, arrest, and exile, Syrians are now debating government policies, dissecting ministers’ CVs, and criticising state performance in public and online.
This marks a foundational shift in the culture of political participation. For the first time in generations, Syrians see politics not as a crime but as a civic duty. The street is reclaiming its voice, and with it comes the potential for democratic accountability. Aroob’s piece reminds us that sovereignty and legitimacy are not only issues of statecraft—they are also negotiated in everyday life, in homes, cafés, and social media threads.
Her analysis underscores a third axis of Syria’s new political spectrum: the tension between elite-driven governance and grassroots democratic aspiration. As Syrians engage with politics as stakeholders, they are no longer satisfied with symbolic representation or opaque decision-making. The challenge is whether this new participatory impulse can be institutionalised before it is co-opted or crushed by entrenched interests.
Conclusion: Between Binaries and Beyond
Taken together, the writings of Barini, Alloush, and Aroob—when placed alongside the SDF–Damascus agreement—map out a multidimensional political spectrum in Syria, shaped by three central and unresolved questions:
- Who holds legitimate authority—the central state, regional actors, or foreign-backed coalitions?
- What kind of leadership can represent Syria—secular, Islamist, pragmatic, or post-ideological?
- How should Syrians participate in political life—as passive subjects of elite pacts or as active citizens shaping their collective future?
These are not merely theoretical questions; they are being tested in real time, as Syrians navigate the aftermath of collapse and the slow, painful process of reconstruction. The spectrum is no longer defined by traditional binaries—regime vs. opposition, Islamists vs. secularists—but by a complex interplay of sovereignty, identity, and participation.
The road ahead remains treacherous. The balance between unity and federalism, between legitimacy and inclusion, between stability and openness, has yet to be struck. But the very existence of this spectrum—its debates, contradictions, and collisions—is a sign that Syria, after years of enforced silence, has once again entered the domain of politics. And that, perhaps, is its most hopeful development yet.
