Homs held a symbolic significance for Syrians, considered by many as the crucible of the 2011 uprising. In its nascent stages, the city attempted to unite its diverse population in revolution. Initially, Sunnis participated en masse, followed by smaller numbers of Christians and Alawites. This burgeoning unity alarmed the regime, which strategically deployed its media apparatus to exacerbate sectarian divisions. The narrative propagated was that the revolution was a Sunni endeavour, with Alawites and Christians siding with the government. In reality, state-sponsored repression, killings, intimidation, and the physical division of neighbourhoods through checkpoints silenced Sunni-majority areas and most Christians. Some Alawites, however, defied this narrative and maintained contact with the revolutionary neighbourhoods. The regime responded by deploying Alawite shabiha (militia) to besiege and harass these dissenters, even driving them from their homes. Other Alawites were intimidated into silence. To further inflame sectarian tensions, the regime orchestrated massacres in various Homs neighbourhoods, such as Karm al-Zeitoun and al-Houla, carried out by shabiha—a small minority of sectarian extremists and often criminals, who were not representative of the broader Alawite community. Videos of these atrocities were intentionally leaked, serving the dual purpose of terrorizing Alawites into submission and portraying them as collectively responsible, thereby forcing their silence and driving young Alawite men into a “holy war” against Sunnis. The message resonated with Sunni revolutionaries: this was a war waged by Alawites against them. This perception was further fueled by certain Sunni sectarian factions, including some opposition figures abroad. This was precisely the regime’s objective. Despite this manipulation, significant segments of the revolutionary movement understood that the Assad family and its intelligence apparatus were the true architects of this sectarian strife, recognizing that not all Alawites were killers, and that the perpetrators were a distinct group. Alawites, caught between fear of regime retribution for dissent and fear of rebel reprisals should the regime fall, largely remained silent regarding the regime’s abuses. It is crucial to distinguish between those who were silenced by fear and those who actively participated in the violence and sectarianization.
Escalation of violence
Following the regime’s ouster less than two months prior, forces of the new administration entered Homs. Initially, there were no reprisals, a pattern mirrored in other liberated areas, beginning with Aleppo. This relative calm, despite widespread fear of retribution, fostered a sense of cautious optimism. Many Alawites had fled the city prior to the new administration’s arrival, but the majority returned within days, driven by fear and uncertainty. The first month was relatively quiet. However, as the new administration began its sweep and search operations in Homs and surrounding villages with Alawite and Shiite majorities, reports of violations began to surface. These included sectarian insults directed at Alawites and Shiites, beatings with clubs after gatherings of men in public squares, property damage, theft of money and valuables, and the mistreatment of women. The new administration downplayed these incidents, attributing them to small, isolated groups of locals whose families had suffered losses in 2011, or to undisciplined factions within the National Army known for such behaviour. Non-Sunni neighbourhoods and Alawite and Shiite villages offered little resistance. Most officers and security personnel sought accommodations with the new administration’s security centres in Homs. Many lower-ranking officers and soldiers were detained in Homs and Hama prisons, while high-ranking officials fled the country. Those detained are being released gradually, but the process is opaque, with no information provided about the investigations, potential trials, or legal basis for detention, and without access to legal counsel.
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In recent days, a disturbing escalation of violence has occurred in villages west of Homs, in contrast to the relative calm in the city and its eastern villages. In Fahil, 15 people were killed and approximately 43 forcibly disappeared. Other villages have also seen killings, with 13 deaths reported in one instance. Kidnappings and killings are occurring in various parts of Syria and are not exclusive to Alawites. The new administration, predictably, dismisses these incidents as isolated acts by rogue elements or individuals seeking revenge for family losses during the revolution. However, these attacks have targeted not only individuals associated with the former regime but also young people who were children in 2011, academics, and women.
Understanding the events in Homs, and their potential replication in other cities like Baniyas and Lattakia—sites of sectarian massacres and killings in 2011—requires understanding the context. The chaotic transition of power, without a formal handover, created instability. While widespread military confrontations have been avoided, the absence of a clear process has allowed for localized violence. The new administration’s failure to publicly identify and prosecute those responsible for atrocities in Homs and elsewhere, coupled with the flight of high-ranking officials and known perpetrators, has fostered a climate of impunity and fueled retaliatory violence.
Exclusion?
The widespread violations, killings, massacres, and repression that began in 2011 necessitate the immediate establishment of a specialized transitional justice body. This body should be composed of Syrian experts, drawing on international best practices, and tasked with meticulously documenting abuses, pursuing prosecutions, ensuring accountability, providing reparations and compensation to victims, establishing memorials, and promoting remembrance. This is the path to fostering peace between communities within Homs and across Syria, leading to genuine societal reconciliation. Delaying transitional justice only perpetuates cycles of retaliatory violence and undermines efforts to establish a stable and just society. This delay also creates a fertile ground for policies that disregard the needs of the Syrian people, such as the exclusion of diverse political forces and civil society actors from governance, the monopolization of power by figures affiliated with the new administration, and the inclusion of individuals lacking social or political legitimacy. These missteps, combined with the delayed pursuit of justice, risk inviting external intervention, exploiting internal tensions, and potentially plunging Syria into further chaos, possibly including sectarian and factional conflict, or clashes between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the new administration.
Across Syria, communities are actively seeking pathways to peace. Various independent actors are organizing seminars and discussions focusing on transitional justice and reconciliation. The new administration should embrace these efforts, recognizing that they contribute to strengthening its own legitimacy, preempting external pressure related to human rights abuses and the protection of minorities, and fostering a more stable future for Syria.
This article was translated and edited by The Syrian Observer. The Syrian Observer has not verified the content of this story. Responsibility for the information and views set out in this article lies entirely with the author.
