In the wake of Bashar al-Assad’s fall in December 2024, a new chapter is unfolding for Syrian Alawite communities in the diaspora. For decades, these communities were seen as tethered to the Assad regime—either as its beneficiaries or its hostages. Today, a different narrative is beginning to take shape: one of redefinition, political awakening, and a search for independent voice and representation, all while navigating suspicions and deep-rooted sectarian legacies.
A Search for Identity After Assad
The fall of the regime has spurred political and social realignment across Syrian expatriate communities, especially among Alawites. Once associated, willingly or otherwise, with Assad’s rule, many Alawites are now seeking to reclaim their identity outside the shadow of authoritarianism. New civic bodies have emerged across Europe and North America to give voice to this evolving identity—though not without controversy.
One of the most visible of these is the Union of Syrian Alawites in Europe, founded in Berlin in March 2025. The Union describes itself as a secular, inclusive civil society organization open to anyone who upholds the values of human rights and equality—not just Alawites. But at its core, it is a response to a growing fear among Alawites of marginalization or retribution in a post-Assad Syria.
In mid-May, a delegation from the Union met with members of the German Bundestag to present a detailed report documenting violations against Alawite civilians—particularly in coastal regions like Latakia and Tartous. These attacks, they argue, were triggered by retaliatory violence following clashes between remnants of pro-Assad militias and the new authorities. According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, more than 1,300 Alawite civilians were killed in the reprisals.
The Union called on the German government to support safe asylum pathways for Alawites facing threats in Syria and to grant the community formal political representation in exile. It also demanded independent investigations into the crimes committed against Alawites—some of which have not been independently verified.
Despite these efforts, the Union’s structure remains opaque. Little is known about its leadership beyond spokesperson Nina al-Amin, whose public statements have drawn both sympathy and criticism. Some activists have accused her of exaggeration and sensationalism, particularly regarding unverified claims of sexual slavery and trafficking. Others have questioned the Union’s funding sources and membership criteria, raising concerns about transparency and independence.
France: Legal Challenges and Political Activism
In France, Alawite activism has taken on a more overtly political tone. The Franco-Alawite Collective, established in Paris in early 2025, has been outspoken in its opposition to the Syrian transitional government led by Ahmad al-Sharaa. In April, the group filed a formal legal complaint in Paris accusing Sharaa and members of his cabinet of crimes against humanity, including ethnic cleansing against Alawite civilians.
The Collective organized protests during Sharaa’s visit to France, urging French authorities to withhold recognition of the transitional government. However, their protest sparked backlash—not only for its explicit sectarian framing but also for its refusal to display the Syrian revolutionary flag, which the group labelled a symbol of colonial legacy.
Critics were further alarmed by the presence of controversial figures at the protests, some of whom were known Assad loyalists or had ties to the former regime’s embassies. Poet Adonis’s participation added fuel to the fire, with some accusing the movement of whitewashing the crimes of the Assad era while instrumentalizing Alawite victimhood.
These actions raised broader concerns among Syrian opposition circles, who fear that such initiatives could revive divisive sectarian rhetoric under the guise of legal advocacy and minority rights.
United States: Advocacy Within the Beltway
Across the Atlantic, the Alawite Association of the United States (AAUS), founded in 2025, has carved out a different space—one defined by advocacy and lobbying. The organization describes itself as committed to defending Alawite dignity and promoting justice for all Syrians, while actively engaging with U.S. institutions to influence foreign policy.
One of AAUS’s most notable interventions came in the form of opposition to lifting U.S. sanctions on Syria. The association warned that such a move could undermine pressure on actors responsible for crimes against minorities, including Alawites. In an April statement, activist Maysa Qabbani stressed the need for extending sanctions to cover perpetrators of attacks on Alawite civilians.
AAUS held meetings at the U.S. State Department and participated in the Syrian American Democracy Conference on Capitol Hill. However, a planned event inside the Capitol building was abruptly canceled after a congressman raised concerns about the association’s alleged links to the former regime. While the association denied these accusations and held alternative meetings the next day, the incident highlighted the delicate tightrope such groups must walk—balancing legitimacy, advocacy, and past associations.
Between Victimhood and Responsibility
The emergence of these Alawite-led organizations reflects a broader reckoning within the community—one that grapples with how to acknowledge past complicity, affirm present suffering, and chart a credible future. Yet their paths diverge in form and focus: the Berlin Union emphasizes civil inclusion and humanitarian protection; the Paris Collective takes a confrontational legal route; and the Washington-based AAUS leans into strategic advocacy.
Still, none of these efforts are immune to scrutiny. Questions persist about their independence, funding, and whether they represent genuine grassroots movements or are, as critics suggest, attempts to rehabilitate elements of the old regime under new labels.
At the heart of this unfolding story is a deeper dilemma: how can a community that was once seen as part of the ruling apparatus now claim space as a persecuted minority? The answer may depend not only on the integrity of these emerging institutions, but also on whether they can move beyond sectarian framing and contribute to a pluralistic and democratic vision for Syria.
For now, the road to recognition—both internal and external—remains fraught with complexity, but perhaps also with possibility.
This article was translated and edited by The Syrian Observer. The Syrian Observer has not verified the content of this story. Responsibility for the information and views set out in this article lies entirely with the author.
