Sharaa’s Gamble Pays Off: Behind the Scenes of the Syrian Government-SDF Agreement

In a move as unexpected as the entry of Syrian revolutionaries into Damascus on December 8, 2024, President Ahmad al-Sharaa was seen shaking hands with the commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) inside the People’s Palace on Monday evening. The occasion marked the signing of an eight-point agreement aimed at integrating the civilian and military institutions of northeastern Syria into the Syrian state, while guaranteeing Kurdish rights and reaffirming the unity of Syrian territory.

Since assuming leadership and later the presidency, Sharaa had wagered on resolving the SDF issue through peaceful means, despite internal and external pressures urging a swift resolution, even through military confrontation. In early February, he stated in an interview with Syria TV that the SDF had expressed willingness to place its weapons under state control, though he acknowledged lingering disagreements, keeping details confidential due to the presence of parties opposed to the success of negotiations.

Many observers and Syrian political analysts, however, doubted the viability of continued dialogue, especially given escalating tensions between the SDF and the Syrian National Army, along with increasing Turkish threats. Skepticism deepened after SDF commander Mazloum Abdi rejected Abdullah Öcalan’s call to disarm, insisting that it applied solely to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and not to his forces in Syria. Just days before the agreement, Abdi stirred controversy by welcoming Israeli support in safeguarding what he described as the “achievements” of northeastern Syria. This coincided with growing speculation about the “David Corridor”—a proposed route stretching from southern Syria through Daraa, Sweida, Al-Tanf, and Deir ez-Zor, reaching Iraq’s Kurdistan region. The project was publicly discussed by Boaz Bismuth, the head of the Israeli Knesset’s National Security Committee.

Against this backdrop, it seemed that any prospects for a political settlement had been buried, and Syria was on the brink of a violent conflict that could draw in regional powers. Yet, in defiance of expectations, President Sharaa succeeded in securing a political breakthrough that prevented the country from descending into further fragmentation.

A Last-Minute Agreement: Why Now?

The agreement between President Sharaa and Mazloum Abdi was not a spur-of-the-moment decision. According to sources cited by Syria TV, negotiations had been underway since February 20, with direct American mediation.

U.S. intervention was prompted by growing military indications that President Donald Trump’s administration was seriously considering withdrawing American forces from Syria in the near future. To prevent a security vacuum in the event of such a withdrawal, Washington accelerated efforts to broker a deal between the Syrian government and the SDF.

The sources revealed that Abdi arrived in Damascus on February 20 aboard an American aircraft, where he was received with notable diplomatic courtesies. During the negotiations, President Sharaa firmly rejected any form of power-sharing arrangement but expressed Syria’s willingness to enshrine Kurdish linguistic and cultural rights within the national constitution.

Despite the clear trajectory of the negotiations, Abdi hesitated in the final days leading up to the agreement. His last-minute reluctance raised questions about his true intentions:

• Was he seeking to derail the agreement by escalating tensions and courting Israeli intervention?
• Or was he merely leveraging the moment to extract additional concessions by threatening to collapse the deal?

What Does the Agreement Include?

According to the Syrian Presidency, the agreement comprises eight key provisions:

1. Guaranteeing the political representation and participation of all Syrians in state institutions based on competence, regardless of religious or ethnic background.
2. Recognizing the Kurdish community as an integral part of Syria and ensuring its constitutional and citizenship rights.
3. Declaring a nationwide ceasefire and committing to ending armed conflicts.
4. Integrating all civilian and military institutions of northeastern Syria into the Syrian state, including border crossings, airports, and oil and gas fields.
5. Ensuring the safe return of all displaced Syrians to their homes, with the necessary security guarantees.
6. Supporting the Syrian state in countering threats to its security and territorial unity.
7. Rejecting any calls for partition, sectarian incitement, or attempts to sow discord among Syrian communities.
8. Implementing the agreement by the end of the year through specialized executive committees.

A Fragile Accord: Unresolved Challenges

While the agreement outlines a broad framework for cooperation, its lack of clarity regarding the mechanisms for merging SDF forces and civilian institutions suggests it was hastily drafted in response to urgent political and security concerns rather than being the product of a fully matured consensus. This assessment aligns with exclusive information obtained by Syria TV from sources within the SDF.

The sources indicated that the United States had pressured both parties to finalize the deal quickly in order to prevent Iran and its proxies from exploiting the instability, as well as to deny groups like ISIS or Iranian-backed militias an opportunity to consolidate power in the region.

However, numerous issues remain unresolved and could take up to two years to fully address. The agreement mandates the formation of eight committees to oversee its implementation and resolve outstanding matters, including:

• The mechanism of SDF integration into the Syrian state structure.
• The future of the Autonomous Administration and its institutions.
• The role of the SDF’s internal security force (Asayish).
• The management and distribution of oil and gas resources.
• The reactivation of Syrian state institutions in the northeast.
• The handling of ISIS detainees and camps.

For now, no Syrian government forces will be deployed into northeastern Syria. Discussions are ongoing about the potential deployment of Syrian Defense Ministry units along the Turkish border, though no final agreement has been reached on this matter.

Additionally, the SDF will retain control over ISIS prisoners and the camps housing their families while continuing security operations against ISIS cells in coordination with the international coalition.

Stripping the SDF of Its Last Card: A Regional Realignment

The agreement between President Sharaa and Mazloum Abdi is more than just a domestic political arrangement—it reflects a broader regional and international recalibration aimed at preventing chaos in Syria, particularly as the U.S. moves closer to withdrawing its troops.

This shifting reality has prompted Turkey to accelerate efforts to form a regional coalition, both to combat extremist groups and to undermine the SDF by cutting off American support—effectively removing its last political bargaining chip: the fight against ISIS.

On March 6, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan stated that Turkey was working to develop a regional security framework to replace the American presence in Syria. He reaffirmed Ankara’s stance against the continued existence of the SDF, dismissing U.S. claims that the group was necessary to prevent an ISIS resurgence. He even hinted that Turkish forces might assume control over ISIS camps and detention centers currently run by the SDF.

As a culmination of Turkish diplomatic efforts, the “Amman Summit” convened last Saturday, bringing together officials from Syria, Turkey, Iraq, Lebanon, and Jordan to discuss counterterrorism cooperation, arms smuggling, and regional security threats. The summit—attended by foreign and defense ministers, military chiefs, and intelligence heads—highlighted the growing push for a regional alternative to the U.S. role in Syria.

The Sharaa Doctrine: A Shifting Political Strategy

Since his entry into the political-military arena, President Sharaa has demonstrated a fluid strategic approach, adapting his alliances and tactics based on shifting realities. His ability to read both military and political landscapes has allowed him to make calculated decisions, alternating between confrontation and negotiation as circumstances dictate.

This latest agreement, brokered under intense regional and international scrutiny, may prove to be his boldest gamble yet. Whether it succeeds in stabilizing Syria—or simply delays the next crisis—remains to be seen.