The ongoing back-and-forth between the Syrian Ministry of Defense and the leadership of the Eighth Brigade, led by Ahmad al-Awda—verging on an outright dispute—suggests a deep-rooted disagreement that has so far prevented their alignment within the framework of the newly established army. However, the reasons behind this discord are not limited to issues of disarmament, dissolution, or integration. Rather, they likely stem from broader regional and international dynamics whose exact motivations and objectives remain unclear, though they are not difficult to speculate upon.
While President Ahmad al-Sharaa has repeatedly emphasized in his statements that “most factions” are aligned without acknowledging any specific disagreements, Syrian Defense Minister Marhaf Abu Qusra disclosed to The Washington Post what al-Sharaa did not: he explicitly stated for the first time that the Eighth Brigade was among the factions that refused to join the Ministry of Defense, though he did not name any others.
A particularly striking aspect of the minister’s remarks was his claim that 100 factions had agreed to the integration agreement. This suggests that the ministry did not treat the Syrian National Army as a unified entity, despite its official affiliation with the Ministry of Defense under the “interim government” in rural Aleppo. Instead, the ministry approached the Turkish-funded army as a collection of separate factions, dealing with each one individually. It remains unclear why the Syrian National Army was not formally dissolved through the Ministry of Defense, to which it belongs, rather than navigating the complexities of individual factions.
What Abu Qusra revealed to the American newspaper was not a secret, but the official acknowledgment reinforced the depth of the dispute between the two sides. It may also have served as a veiled warning that the ministry’s patience with the Eighth Brigade is running thin. “Around 100 armed factions in Syria have agreed to come under the umbrella of the Ministry of Defense, while some factions, including the Eighth Brigade, have refused,” the minister told The Washington Post.
The brigade’s leadership was quick to respond. In a video statement released on Monday, the brigade’s deputy commander, Nassim Abu Arra, denied allegations that his faction had refused to join the Ministry of Defense. “The people of the south were the first to call for the establishment of a national defense ministry that operates under disciplined, professional military principles,” Abu Arra asserted. However, he stressed that the Ministry of Defense must optimize the expertise of both officers and former rebels while ensuring the fair representation of all Syrian communities, without exclusion or marginalization.
In an apparent effort to highlight discrepancies between the defense minister’s position and that of the president, Abu Arra referenced al-Sharaa’s previous statements regarding coordination between the Military Operations Department and southern factions over recent years. He emphasized the significant role these factions played in toppling the previous regime.
The Eighth Brigade’s Unique Standing
Since its formation in 2018 following a settlement with the former regime, the Eighth Brigade, under Ahmad al-Awda’s leadership, has held a distinct and exceptional status. It emerged from the remnants of the opposition faction Shabab al-Sunna, which had been backed by Jordan and the UAE before being incorporated into the Fifth Corps—a Russian-founded unit comprising factions that had accepted the settlement agreement. This arrangement granted al-Awda considerable influence, earning him the reputation of being “Russia’s man in the south.”
Later, the Eighth Brigade detached itself from the Fifth Corps and, by late 2021, came under the jurisdiction of the Military Intelligence Division, led by Brigadier General Luay al-Ali. However, this formal affiliation did not prevent the brigade’s leadership from pursuing an independent approach, asserting a degree of autonomy. This was particularly evident in its rejection of Iranian militias and Hezbollah forces in the south, even threatening on multiple occasions to expel them. Another indication of this autonomy was al-Awda’s visit to Turkey in the fall of 2023.
During the Deterrence of Aggression campaign, which ultimately led to the fall of the Assad regime, the Eighth Brigade, alongside the Central Committees Force and several other factions in Daraa, formed the Southern Operations Room. This coalition was the first to enter Damascus on the morning of December 8—one day before Ahmad al-Sharaa’s arrival in the capital. Despite this, al-Awda showed no desire to contest power; instead, he quietly withdrew—not at al-Sharaa’s request—returning to his stronghold in Busra al-Sham and the surrounding eastern countryside of Daraa.
On December 13, al-Awda visited the Presidential Palace to congratulate al-Sharaa, further reinforcing the notion that no rivalry existed between them. He also did not object to security operations carried out by the Military Operations Department in areas such as al-Sanamayn and Zamrin, nor did he oppose the appointment of new security and military officials in the southern province. To date, no official statement from the brigade’s leadership has indicated any refusal to dissolve the faction or to fall under the Ministry of Defense’s command—a stance recently reaffirmed by Nassim Abu Arra.
The Core of the Dispute: Power, Influence, and Geopolitics
Why, then, does the Ministry of Defense continue to spar with the Eighth Brigade’s leadership over its integration into the new army?
The disagreement appears to stem from two primary factors: First, the Ministry’s overlooked consideration of the Brigade’s unique status. For years, the Eighth Brigade has enjoyed a special position due to its multiple regional affiliations. Some speculate that the brigade functions as a contingency force—one that certain countries could activate if developments in Syria fail to align with their strategic interests. This perspective aligns with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s remarks at a press conference, where he noted that the new authorities in Syria were facing “problems” and that internal dialogue was not proceeding smoothly. While Lavrov did not explicitly reference the south, his statement suggests that Russia still holds a stake in the Syrian equation and is closely monitoring the situation.
Secondly, Al-Awda may have expected the Ministry of Defense to acknowledge his early arrival in Damascus and his subsequent trouble-free withdrawal by granting him a prominent leadership position in the ministry or maintaining his influence over Daraa—albeit under the ministry’s umbrella rather than as an independent faction. However, the first wave of appointments and promotions within the Ministry of Defense indicated otherwise; al-Awda was not recognized as one of the key architects of the regime’s downfall.
Some argue that external alliances and the pursuit of power are two sides of the same coin. Granting al-Awda unchecked authority in Daraa would, by extension, provide his foreign backers with a significant foothold in Syria—a prospect that deeply concerns both the Ministry of Defense and the General Command. Their greatest fear is facing a future Syrian equivalent of Khalifa Haftar—one who could emerge as a formidable challenger to the central government.
This article was translated and edited by The Syrian Observer. The Syrian Observer has not verified the content of this story. Responsibility for the information and views set out in this article lies entirely with the author.
