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A Syrian Electoral Thought Experiment: Who Would Syrians Elect as President Tomorrow?

With 188 total participants in a poll conducted by Wael Sawah, Ayman Asfari emerged as the clear front-runner, securing 118 votes—over 62% of the total.
A Syrian Electoral Thought Experiment: Who Would Syrians Elect as President Tomorrow?

At first glance, Syria’s current political landscape suggests that Ahmed al-Sharaa—the de facto president—would likely emerge victorious in any presidential election held under current conditions. This assumption is not unfounded, and I do not dispute its logic. However, I do diverge from some analysts regarding the percentage of support Sharaa might garner in a genuinely free, fair, and internationally supervised election—one that gives Syrians, both at home and abroad, a real voice.

Discussing such a scenario may seem a luxury, even a futile intellectual exercise, given the political reality in Syria. No real elections are on the horizon. Sharaa, to the best of my knowledge, has granted himself the longest transitional term any Syrian leader has ever claimed, securing at least five more years in power. Logic suggests he will use that time to entrench his authority and draft a constitution tailored to his continued rule.

And yet, I felt compelled to explore whether Sharaa truly represents the candidate of choice across Syria’s diverse political and regional landscape. As a mental exercise, I invited my Facebook friends to take part in a simulated presidential election, fully aware that most of them share a somewhat similar intellectual and political orientation, if not an identical one.

The Sample

Approximately 200 friends responded to my call. While I couldn’t accurately determine the full demographic breakdown, due to incomplete data on the ethnic or religious backgrounds of many respondents, I was able to classify around 140 participants whose identities I personally know. They reflected the following distribution:

  • Sunni Muslims: 70%
  • Christians: 12%
  • Alawites: 10%
  • Kurds: 7%
  • Druze: 2%

Although these figures do not mirror Syria’s actual demographic composition—Christians, for example, were overrepresented, while Kurds were underrepresented—they still offer a reasonably diverse sample that includes most major religious and ethnic communities.

The Candidates

I proposed a list of seven figures, carefully selected to include individuals with political credibility, public recognition, and diverse ideological and communal backgrounds. They were:

  1. Ahmed al-Sharaa (formerly Abu Mohammad al-Jolani): A former jihadist turned ruler, now consolidating power with authoritarian precision, recycling old regime methods under a new face.
  2. Riyad Hijab: A Sunni former prime minister who defected early in the revolution, later led opposition delegations in Geneva, and remains a symbolic yet polarising figure in exile.
  3. Ayman Asfari: A British-Syrian businessman and philanthropist, known for his support of civil society initiatives and a moderate, technocratic vision for Syria’s future.
  4. Jamal Suleiman: A respected Alawite actor and cultural figure who transitioned into moderate opposition politics with a focus on peaceful political transition and unity.
  5. Fidaa al-Hourani: A physician and political activist from a storied opposition family, she was the first woman elected to lead the Damascus Declaration coalition.
  6. Ilham Ahmed: A prominent Kurdish leader and advocate of decentralised governance, women’s rights, and pluralism, with a strong international profile.
  7. Jihad Makdissi: A Christian former diplomat who left the Assad regime early in the war and has since advocated for a negotiated, inclusive political transition.

Key Observations from the First Round

The results were revealing. With 188 total participants, Ayman Asfari emerged as the clear front-runner, securing 118 votes, over 62% of the total. This resounding victory meant there was no need to apply the ranked-choice, or “instant runoff,” voting system initially proposed.

Asfari’s success underscores his broad appeal: a Sunni identity aligned with Syria’s demographic majority, paired with a secular, pragmatic worldview and a strong track record in philanthropy and civil society. His candidacy appears to represent a yearning for a new kind of leadership—neither ideologically extreme nor tainted by past failures.

The remaining votes were relatively evenly distributed:

  • Ilham Ahmed and Ahmed al-Sharaa tied for second place with 16 votes each, reflecting divergent support bases—ethnic minority progressives versus hardline Islamists or authoritarian sympathisers.
  • Fidaa al-Hourani followed closely with 15 votes, suggesting moderate appeal among civic-minded voters.
  • Riyad Hijab and Jamal Suleiman received 12 and 8 votes, respectively—signals of limited but consistent support.
  • Jihad Makdissi received no votes, despite significant Christian representation in the sample, suggesting that identity politics played a lesser role than political orientation.

Unexpectedly, a few respondents voted for figures not on the list, such as the disappeared opposition leader Abdulaziz al-Khayyer, former Marxist turned liberal Aslan Abd al-Karim, and secular writer Khatib Badla—indicating a layer of symbolic or protest voting.

Deeper Implications

From this exercise, several significant trends emerge:

  1. A Clear Preference for Moderate, Civil Leadership
    Asfari’s dominance reflects a desire for centrist, non-ideological leadership that blends religious identity with modern civic values. The respondents leaned toward technocracy, professionalism, and international engagement over populism or revolutionary credentials.
  2. Growing Acceptance of Diversity—Within Limits
    The strong performance of Ilham Ahmed and Fidaa al-Hourani indicates a meaningful, though still bounded, openness to women and minority leaders, particularly among politically engaged circles.
  3. Rejection of Extremism and Old Regimes Alike
    Both Sharaa and Hijab—symbols of either ideological rigidity or failed opposition—performed poorly. Respondents appeared wary of figures associated with authoritarianism, whether Islamist or Baathist in origin.
  4. Symbolic Over Identity-Based Politics
    Makdissi’s failure to attract votes despite his Christian background and the modest support for Suleiman despite his Alawite identity suggest a voter base more interested in ideas and records than communal affiliation.
  5. A Tentative Embrace of Women in Leadership
    Hourani’s strong showing, especially in the second round of preferences, highlights a growing comfort with female leadership among progressive and centrist voters.
  6. Vibrancy of Political Imagination
    The few write-in candidates, though statistically irrelevant, reflected a yearning for moral clarity, integrity, or alternative political visions not captured by conventional figures.

Final Reflections

Though limited in scale and shaped by the biases of the author’s personal network, this simulated election offers a compelling window into a potential political consciousness in the making—one that privileges inclusivity, moderation, and civic competence over sectarian loyalty or ideological fervour.

More importantly, it shows a readiness among Syrians, at least a thoughtful, politically aware segment, to engage with more equitable electoral systems, such as ranked-choice voting, that value depth of preference over zero-sum outcomes.

This mental exercise, while not a substitute for a national poll, offers a rare glimpse into how Syrians might begin to imagine a new political future—one defined not by the remnants of dictatorship or the ruins of armed opposition, but by a reinvigorated commitment to dialogue, diversity, and democratic possibility

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