The assassination of Hezbollah’s Secretary-General, Hassan Nasrallah, stands as one of the most significant events of the past decade. Nasrallah, along with Hezbollah, extended influence far beyond Lebanese borders, playing pivotal roles in various conflicts throughout the region, with Syria being one of the key stages since the outbreak of the Syrian revolution. To comprehend the complex dynamics between Hezbollah and the Syrian regime, it is essential to trace their evolving relationship from the era of Hafez al-Assad to that of his son, Bashar.
Overview
As the Syrian conflict began to subside, attention shifted towards the political forces that ensured Bashar al-Assad’s continued grip on power, notably Iran and its loyal ally, Hezbollah. Both parties played decisive roles in securing Assad’s survival, fostering the belief that the Syrian regime would never diverge significantly from Iran’s political agenda.
Nevertheless, historical events reveal a more intricate relationship. Despite Assad’s apparent distancing from Iran during battles like Tufan al-Aqsa, the complex ties between Syria, Iran, and Hezbollah persist. These relationships are marked by mutual strategic interests but also by underlying tensions and conflicting ambitions.
Throughout various phases of their partnership, Syria and Hezbollah often harboured deep mistrust toward one another, driven by diverging objectives. Their alignment was shaped more by political expediency than by a genuine convergence of interests.
Thus, the relationship between Syria and Hezbollah is emblematic of the broader Syrian-Iranian alliance. For nearly four decades, the connection between “Assad’s” Syria and Hezbollah has mirrored the dynamics between Damascus and Tehran, characterized by periods of cooperation punctuated by bouts of tension when either side perceived the other as encroaching on its sphere of influence.
Evolving Dynamics
During the Lebanese Civil War in the 1980s, Syria and Hezbollah found themselves on opposing sides of certain conflicts. Hezbollah, backed by Iran, frequently clashed with Assad Sr.’s allies and objectives. Following the war’s conclusion in the early 1990s, Hezbollah pragmatically accepted Syrian dominance in Lebanon, balancing Syrian and Iranian interests while ensuring its own survival.
Despite occasional cooperation, Syria and Hezbollah’s relationship was marred by suspicion. Hezbollah and Iran were wary that a successful Syrian-Israeli peace agreement could undermine their positions in Lebanon, while Syria remained dismissive of these concerns, viewing Hezbollah primarily as a tool in its strategic calculus against Israel.
According to Muhannad Hage Ali, deputy director of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, while Bashar al-Assad welcomed Hezbollah’s involvement in Syria in 2012, it was not without reservations. Iran and Hezbollah had independently established spheres of influence in Damascus, particularly among the Shiite minority and elements within the Sunni and Alawite communities, which the regime viewed as an infringement on its sovereignty.
Hage Ali further explains that the Assad regime recognized Hezbollah and Iran were primarily acting to protect their own interests in Syria and Lebanon. However, the situation changed significantly after Russia’s military intervention in 2015. The entry of Russian forces provided the Syrian regime with a new sense of autonomy, allowing it to reassert its control over Hezbollah and Iranian operations within its borders.
The likely trajectory of the relationship between Syria and Hezbollah is a return to the status quo that existed before the war, with both parties maintaining their strategic alliance while continuing to navigate the complex power dynamics that define their partnership. The possibility of a significant shift in their relations remains slim, as their interests are deeply intertwined but also fraught with competing ambitions.
Three decades of a complex relationship
For three decades prior to Hezbollah’s establishment in Syria, the party’s relationship with the regime reflected the shifting dynamics of the Damascus-Tehran alliance. In the 1980s, as Iran sought to export its “Islamic Revolution,” Syria’s ties with Hezbollah began to develop. However, the agendas of the regime and Hezbollah often clashed, leading to occasional confrontations. Despite these tensions, by the end of the Lebanese civil war in 1990, Hezbollah accepted Syria’s dominant role in Lebanon and realigned its efforts to combat Israel’s occupation of southern Lebanon, in line with Damascus’s strategic goals.
By 2005, when Syrian forces withdrew from Lebanon, Hezbollah had solidified its position as a protector of Syrian interests within the country. It played a crucial role in neutralizing the Syrian regime’s Lebanese opponents, all while enhancing its own influence. This marked a significant turning point in Hezbollah’s relationship with the regime, where the party was no longer a subordinate ally but an increasingly autonomous actor with considerable power, especially within Lebanon’s Shiite community. Hezbollah’s rising military capabilities granted it greater freedom in decision-making, though it continued to maintain its alliance with Damascus.
One clear demonstration of Hezbollah’s evolving role came during the 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel. During the 34-day conflict, the Syrian regime openly supported Hezbollah for the first time by supplying it with weapons, including 220 mm and 302 mm rockets, despite its earlier hesitation. This underscored a key principle in the Damascus-Hezbollah relationship: the survival and strength of one party often hinged on ensuring the other was not weakened.
The Syrian Revolution: A Test of Strategic Alliance
The outbreak of the Syrian revolution in 2011 placed unprecedented strain on the Assad regime, leading it to become increasingly reliant on Hezbollah and Iran for its survival. As the regime faced isolation on the regional and international stage, Hezbollah and Iran intervened militarily in 2012, tipping the balance of power in Assad’s favour. However, Hezbollah’s involvement was not solely focused on rebuilding the regime’s forces. Instead, it played a central role in establishing parallel institutions and militias, much like those it had built in Lebanon. This move gave Hezbollah a greater ideological, military, and political foothold in Syria.
According to Hajj Ali, Hezbollah and Iran viewed the Syrian conflict as an opportunity to extend their influence in the region by training non-Syrian militias loyal to Iran. By the end of 2013, these militias, such as Quwat al-Rida in Homs, became more visible, openly displaying Hezbollah’s imagery and Nasrallah’s likeness. This increased visibility highlighted the growing tension between Hezbollah and the Syrian regime, as the latter sought to contain Hezbollah’s influence by reasserting state authority over its allied militias.
From Revolution to Fracture: A Shifting Alliance
As the revolution progressed, friction between Hezbollah and the Syrian regime became more evident, especially as Assad aligned himself more closely with Russia. Moscow’s influence imposed constraints on Hezbollah’s operations, particularly in southern Syria near the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, where Russian-Israeli coordination set limits on Hezbollah’s presence.
In 2022, these underlying tensions surfaced in Lebanon’s parliamentary elections, where Hezbollah’s maneuvers resulted in the defeat of Damascus’s traditional allies, including figures like Talal Arslan and Wiam Wahhab. This signaled a message to Syria that Hezbollah was asserting its independence in Lebanon and limiting Damascus’s influence in the country.
As the Assad regime began mending ties with Arab states, especially the UAE, Hezbollah expressed its discontent, though it did so discreetly. The party’s concerns grew as reports circulated about potential Emirati-mediated contacts between Assad and Israel, raising questions within Hezbollah’s ranks about the future of their alliance.
Gaza and Southern Syria: Strains on a United Front
The recent “Aqsa Flood” operation further tested the relationship between Hezbollah and the Syrian regime. Assad’s reluctance to join the conflict or allow Iranian-backed groups to participate prompted frustration within Hezbollah’s ranks, despite Nasrallah’s public justifications. This hesitation by the regime underscored the growing divergences between the two, as Hezbollah continues to navigate its role in a shifting regional landscape while grappling with the complexities of its alliance with Damascus.
This article was translated and edited by The Syrian Observer. The Syrian Observer has not verified the content of this story. Responsibility for the information and views set out in this article lies entirely with the author.
