The recent wave of government employee dismissals in Syria is not merely an administrative adjustment or a routine bureaucratic measure; it is a seismic shift in the Syrian public’s perception of the state’s role and responsibilities. Regardless of whether these dismissals are justified or whether they target redundant employees, the impact of such a move challenges long-standing assumptions about government jobs and the social contract between citizens and the state.
For decades, government employment in Syria has been deeply intertwined with social stability, nepotism, and political allegiance. A former official once boasted about his achievements upon being dismissed: “I secured jobs for at least one person from every family in my extended network. Now, they have a voice, a source of income, and access to government services at every level.” This anecdote reflects a widespread mentality that saw government employment as an entitlement and a means of securing influence rather than a matter of efficiency or merit.
With reports indicating that up to half a million employees have been or will be dismissed, different stakeholders view the situation from starkly different perspectives. The government justifies the move as an administrative reform aimed at eliminating inefficiencies, reducing the state’s financial burden, and ensuring that only competent personnel remain. Affected employees and their families, however, perceive it as a catastrophic loss of livelihood and a betrayal of the state’s long-standing promise of job security. Meanwhile, their former colleagues express relief at having retained their jobs but lament the increased workload imposed upon them. The opposition seizes the opportunity to highlight the government’s failures, while regime loyalists frame the move as a necessary correction of the corruption and excesses of the past.
The entrenched belief in state employment as a fundamental right is not exclusive to Syria. Upon arriving in the Netherlands, many Syrian immigrants were stunned to discover that the state did not offer jobs but rather functioned as a regulatory body overseeing essential services such as taxation, utilities, healthcare, education, and infrastructure. The concept of permanent government employment was nearly nonexistent; jobs were assigned based on necessity, and even government functions were largely outsourced to the private sector. Over time, these Syrians came to understand that a state does not necessarily have to provide employment to be considered functional.
“The state educated you!”
This realization forces a deeper reckoning with the Syrian people’s perception of their relationship with the state. Historically, many Syrians viewed the government not merely as an administrative entity but as a provider of solutions, regardless of legality or feasibility. A common plea to officials was: “You are the state—solve this problem!” This mindset contributed to an entrenched culture of bureaucratic maneuvering, where legal loopholes and political connections dictated administrative decisions rather than clear governance principles.
The blurring of lines between the state, government, and ruling authority further cemented these perceptions. In Baathist Syria, political affiliation was not simply a choice but a necessity for career advancement and security. Dissent was framed not as a political stance but as an act of betrayal against the state itself. Many opposition figures who emerged during the 2011 revolution were accused of ingratitude: “The state educated you, employed you, and protected you—how can you stand against it now?”
This ideological fusion of state and party, government and authority, has left Syrians struggling to conceptualize a state that does not directly control their livelihoods. The challenge ahead is not only for the government to redefine its role but for citizens to reconceptualize their own place within it. Are they subjects, passively receiving benefits, or are they active citizens responsible for contributing to a functional society?
The debate over government employment is symptomatic of broader structural issues. Many Syrians still equate state presence with direct intervention in their lives. Government-subsidized essentials such as tea, sugar, and butter were seen not as economic policies but as tangible proof of the state’s omnipresence. Government hospitals and clinics were colloquially referred to as “Abu Balash” (“Mr. Free”), reinforcing the idea that state resources were communal rather than systematically allocated.
The recent dismissals could serve as a wake-up call, pushing Syrians to reconsider the nature of their relationship with the state. If successful, this shift could foster a culture of entrepreneurship and self-reliance rather than dependency on public sector jobs. However, the transition must be managed carefully. Unchecked privatization without proper governance could lead to new forms of economic exploitation, replacing state-controlled employment with corporate servitude.
Ultimately, the move to downsize Syria’s bloated public sector is a necessary step, but it must be accompanied by policies that ensure the protection of the most vulnerable. Dismissing employees without creating viable economic alternatives risks deepening poverty and social unrest. A productive and engaged citizenry requires not just a smaller government but a system that empowers individuals through opportunity rather than patronage.
For generations, Syrians have believed that holding a government position, no matter how menial ensured social relevance and security. The challenge now is to build a society where the state’s role is to facilitate, not dictate, economic life. The road ahead will require a profound shift in both governance and public consciousness—one that redefines the Syrian citizen as a stakeholder rather than a subject and the state as a framework for progress rather than a provider of entitlements.
This article was translated and edited by The Syrian Observer. The Syrian Observer has not verified the content of this story. Responsibility for the information and views set out in this article lies entirely with the author.
