Two weeks ago, I penned an article in Daraj questioning the position assumed by al-Sharaa and arguing that he owes Syrians a direct and unfiltered address. I wrote:
“We—the people—want to hear from the de facto ruler of Syria, directly and unfiltered, in a speech meant solely for Syrians—not the Turks, not the West, not the Arabs, and not the Islamists. We seek a message that speaks to both mind and heart, free from embellishment or distortion. We want to understand al-Sharaa’s true vision for Syria’s future—his stance on freedom, democracy, the rule of law, public liberties, equal citizenship, the role of women, and beyond. We want to know what he means by a ‘national conference,’ what conditions govern participation, why drafting a constitution and holding elections will take years, whether these elections will be internationally supervised, how he intends to implement transitional justice, and how he plans to rebuild the economy so that Syria may rise—like a phoenix—from the ashes.”
In a manner of speaking, al-Sharaa fulfilled both demands. He appointed himself president and, for the first time since the regime’s collapse and Assad’s humiliating escape, spoke directly to the Syrian people. Whether his ascension was meticulously planned or an impromptu decision remains unclear. Most likely, it was necessitated by the failure to convene a comprehensive national conference and the impending expiration of the interim government’s mandate. It is also likely that he will assemble a legislative council tailored to his vision and task al-Bashir with forming a new transitional government.
In at least one respect, al-Sharaa’s speech echoed that of the deposed president on March 30, 2011—both were brief, both left crucial questions unanswered, and neither satisfied the public’s need for clarity. Yet they diverged in important ways. I listened to al-Sharaa’s speech twice and read it carefully, ensuring that neither admiration nor prejudice influenced my judgment. I found it measured—moderate, even—exceeding my expectations in some respects.
Where He Got It Right
There were aspects I appreciated. He did not claim victory solely for himself or his faction but acknowledged the struggles of all Syrians. He used inclusive language, recognizing both Syrian women and men as equal stakeholders. His reference to himself as a “servant of the people” was striking—an expression that would have been unthinkable from an Assad heir. I also welcomed his mention of transitional justice, which implies accountability without impunity, yet rejects the pursuit of vengeance.
Three Points of Contention
However, there are three critical aspects of his speech with which I take issue.
- The Absence of ‘Democracy’
Al-Sharaa conspicuously avoided the word democracy, instead favoring the term shura (consultation). This was no oversight. Rather, it reflects a doctrinal alignment that rejects the principle of self-governance and instead relies on a vague, unregulated concept.
The Qur’an references shura in only two verses:
- “And those who have responded to their Lord and established prayer, and their affairs are determined by consultation among them, and from what We have provided them, they spend.” (42:38)
- “It was by the mercy of God that you dealt with them gently. Had you been stern and hard-hearted, they would have dispersed from around you. So pardon them, seek forgiveness for them, and consult them in matters. But once you have made a decision, put your trust in God. Truly, God loves those who trust in Him.” (3:159)
A closer reading reveals that neither verse embodies the essence of democracy. The first verse pertains to religious and social matters rather than governance. The surrounding context makes this clear, as the preceding verse speaks of avoiding sins and practicing forgiveness, while the following verse references seeking justice when wronged. Using this verse to argue that the Qur’anic text supports shura as a system of governance is, at best, a stretch.
The second verse does touch on political matters. Ibn Kathir notes that the Prophet consulted his followers and sometimes acted on their advice. However, the verse establishes shura as a one-way street—where the ruler may seek counsel, but the people do not offer it unless invited. It is not a means of selecting leadership, nor is it binding, as evidenced by the immediate follow-up: “Once you have made a decision, put your trust in God.”
- The National Dialogue Conference: A Mischaracterization
I also take issue with al-Sharaa’s depiction of the National Dialogue Conference. He described it as a platform for deliberation, consultation, and political exchange. While this is true, it is an incomplete portrayal. The conference is not merely a forum for discussion; it is a sovereign body tasked with laying the constitutional and political foundations for Syria’s future.
Its function is not advisory (shura?), but rather foundational. It is meant to establish the separation of powers and define the structure of governance. Al-Sharaa’s omission of this fundamental role is not incidental—it aligns with his underlying strategy: “We will listen to you, but once we decide, we will put our trust in God.”
- The Exclusionary Nature of the Victory Narrative
While al-Sharaa acknowledged various contributors to the uprising—from Hamza al-Khatib to the factions that entered Damascus—he ultimately confined the Victory Conference to the latter group alone. This choice suggests that the new leader intends to shape Syria’s future based solely on his vision and that of his allies, rather than genuinely including all Syrians—men and women, inside and outside the country—who aspire to a future built on freedom and dignity without exclusion or marginalization.
Where Are the Democratic Forces?
Al-Sharaa moves forward with confidence, backed primarily by his Sunni Islamist base, as well as support from Turkey, Arab states, and a significant segment of the West. Thus, despite his rhetorical nods to inclusivity, he has little reason to heed voices outside his core constituency. And why should he? When no credible opposition exists to challenge him, he has no obligation to accommodate their views.
By opposition, I do not mean activism confined to Facebook or WhatsApp debates—these are futile. I mean a real, organized political opposition that represents tangible social forces.
The plight of Syria’s secular democrats is best encapsulated in Abdullah al-Qasimi’s term “a vocal phenomenon.” He argued that Arab discourse is saturated with grand rhetoric and ambitious slogans but lacks the practical mechanisms to translate ideas into reality. Though he was not specifically addressing secular intellectuals, his critique applies seamlessly. Syrian secularists are quick to denounce failures, yet they fail to offer viable alternatives. A Syrian proverb captures this predicament: “If you don’t attend the birth of your goat, don’t be surprised when it gives you a puppy.”
The Role of Nonmovements
So, what future remains for Syria’s secular democratic forces? In the absence of an organized movement, they may have no choice but to embrace what Iranian political theorist Asef Bayat terms nonmovement—informal, uncoordinated acts of defiance by ordinary people that gradually reshape society.
In Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East, Bayat challenges conventional notions of political activism, arguing that real change often arises not from structured revolutions or elite politics, but from everyday struggles. His concept of the quiet encroachment of the ordinary illustrates how incremental, decentralized defiance can gradually erode authoritarian control.
If Syria’s secular democratic forces cannot coalesce into a unified movement, then perhaps the only path forward is an unstructured yet persistent nonmovement—led by those who refuse to be subsumed by a monolithic regime.
