The successive visits of senior Iranian officials to Damascus reflect Tehran’s concern over Bashar al-Assad’s stance on regional developments, particularly his relationship with the Iranian-led “resistance axis” against Israel. These visits come against the backdrop of Assad’s lukewarm reactions to the wars in Gaza and Lebanon and his attempts to distance himself from these conflicts.
Meetings between Ali Larijani, advisor to Supreme Leader Khamenei, and Mohammad Reza Ashtiani, Iran’s Minister of Defense, with Assad’s regime appear to have reassured Tehran of Assad’s continued allegiance to the Axis and his reliance on Iranian support. Tehran has sought to assure Assad that these developments do not pose an existential threat to his regime and has reiterated its commitment to providing economic support. After backing Assad through years of conflict and preventing his downfall, Iran seems intent on maintaining the status quo.
While the specifics of Iran’s offers remain unclear, logical conclusions suggest Tehran’s priority is preserving its influence in Syria. At the same time, Assad’s regime is cautiously maneuvering to avoid negative repercussions that might undermine its survival and stability. The regime also appears keen to strengthen ties with Gulf states as a means of securing economic aid, fostering international engagement, and seeking sanctions relief. However, Assad understands that his close ties with Iran and Hezbollah remain significant obstacles to these ambitions, even as they are encouraged by another key ally, Russia.
Mutual Pressure
Iran’s efforts raise the question: can it strike a balance that maintains its relationship with Assad without exposing him to serious risks? On one hand, Israel openly threatens the regime; on the other, Arab nations demand curbs on Iranian influence in Syria as a prerequisite for normalization.
Assad’s strategy seems to revolve around leveraging his perceived indispensability. He seeks rewards from all sides: economic aid or debt relief from Iran, investments and political reintegration from Arab states, and perhaps even clandestine deals with Israel and the incoming U.S. administration. These agreements could involve distancing Syria from the “resistance axis” in exchange for a recalibrated relationship and gradual sanctions relief.
Syria’s Balancing Act: Assad’s Diplomatic Dance Between Tehran’s Influence and Regional Pressures
A recent Washington Post article revealed that the United States and Israel are exploring cooperation with Assad to curb Iran’s influence in Syria and prevent weapons transfers to Hezbollah via Syrian territory. According to U.S. and Israeli officials, Assad might collaborate given his growing discontent with Iran’s presence in Damascus. The Biden administration, in turn, appears open to granting Assad concessions if he halts arms flows to Hezbollah, aligning with a “step-by-step” approach.
Although the exact policies of the newly elected U.S. administration remain unclear, history suggests that American strategies in Syria are typically shaped by Israeli interests. Israel may argue that Assad, a known entity, is preferable to the uncertainty of a new regime. Under Assad, Syria has devolved into a weakened and fragmented state, posing no real threat to Israel. As such, Israel is likely to advocate for keeping Assad in power, provided the issues of Iranian arms transfers and military influence in Syria—particularly near the Golan Heights—are addressed.
A Fragile Balancing Act
It is important to note that interventions by Iran, its militias, and Russia to prop up Assad were likely facilitated, at least indirectly, by Israel and the U.S. The goal was to prevent Assad’s collapse while ensuring that no decisive victory emerged, thereby perpetuating the conflict and maintaining Syria in its current state of fragmentation and weakness.
Today, Bashar al-Assad faces unprecedented challenges. He must navigate serious Israeli threats to topple his regime if he remains aligned with Iran, especially under an increasingly hardline Israeli government seeking to redraw the region’s power dynamics. Simultaneously, he risks Iranian retaliation if he chooses to sever ties with Tehran amid evident strain in their relationship.
The key question remains: will Assad once again succeed in balancing these competing pressures to maintain his grip on power, even at the expense of Syria’s sovereignty, its people, and its dignity? Or will one of the players decide that Assad’s regime is no longer reliable and seek to remove him?
The more likely outcome is that Assad will find a compromise that appeases Israel by reducing Iran’s influence in Syria and cooperating to block Hezbollah’s arms supply lines. At the same time, he will maintain just enough of a relationship with Iran to avoid provoking it. Exploiting a tacit consensus among the U.S., Russia, Turkey, and Arab states, Assad may manage to extend his regime’s survival while awaiting the next phase of developments in Syria and the broader region.
This article was translated and edited by The Syrian Observer. The Syrian Observer has not verified the content of this story. Responsibility for the information and views set out in this article lies entirely with the author.
