It has become clear that the appointments of officials in the Syrian government, which have materialized over the past six months, favor affiliates of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), followed by former employees of the “Salvation Government” in Idlib, who may originally be members of HTS, though their membership isn’t publicly announced.
However, other segments must also supplement these appointments. This is to avoid the appearance of blatant monopolization, to fulfill needs from other groups, to satisfy certain sectarian components or local equations, and finally, due to personal considerations.
Among these sources of official employment is a lineage that, by birth and personal origin, traces back to the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria. This is evident from observing some of the names appointed to mid-level positions, especially in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Although these individuals are not numerous, analyzing the context that brought them into power helps understand the Syrian Islamic landscape and the nature of the country’s new governance, exceeding their intrinsic importance and the exclusive effectiveness of their positions, which are significant in any case.
The term “sons of the Brotherhood” refers to the offspring of a few thousand members of the group who had the opportunity to escape the country during the events of the 1980s, while their colleagues were killed, executed, or imprisoned for many notorious long years.
These individuals, who survived by chance or fate, left with the hope of a quick return, without a clear horizon or future plans. With the group’s definitive defeat in Hama in 1982 and the succession of frustrating years, they found themselves having to manage their private lives abroad; pursuing or resuming their studies, marrying or bringing in their nascent families – as most of them were in their twenties and thirties – and seeking stable employment.
Just as their fates varied, so did the countries where they settled. Some remained in Jordan, which was often the first refuge, or in Iraq, the second haven, or in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, the preferred third home for many. Others found their way to European or American immigration. This created a wide range of countries, even including Afghanistan, out of a desire to continue the path of “jihad,” and Yemen when no other option was available. These individuals maintained complex and varied relationships with the group, ranging from active organizational work, as much as possible, to withdrawal while remaining in the emotional and personal sphere, out of love or sharp criticism.
Within their care, a more complex generation of young men and women grew up. Their members resembled each other due to the unifying influence of the ideological space of their homes and their social relationships, and due to a feeling of alienation in lands they did not choose, away from a country they did not know, and suffering with travel and residency documents.
Most of these individuals did not join the group, whose membership boundaries had blurred, because their fathers’ generation did not want to fully inherit the security persecution, hoping that they would have the opportunity to visit the country, get to know their extended family, and have the chance to study in Syrian universities if the situation abroad became complicated. This is what happened to many with the Assad regime’s easing of its totalitarian eradication measures against the Brotherhood and others.
As for intellectual, political, and daily life aspects, the sons followed two diverging post-Brotherhood paths. On one hand, the group, which had previously engaged, willingly or unwillingly, in military action, was open to the media and symbolic space of the Afghan jihad, especially with the rise of armed Islamic movements at the expense of traditional reformist Brotherhood. Few among the sons were unaffected by watching a jihadist production or by the captivating personality of Osama bin Laden, without necessarily adopting this approach practically. On the other hand, the fathers, most of whom had accumulated wealth, directed their children to study promising specializations, such as information technology, business administration, and political relations, at Western or semi-Western universities in Arab countries. This gave the new generation the opportunity to master languages and open up to the world, leading them to a kind of “lite” civilizational Islam, but also without fully committing to this line. Thus, in many of the sons, contradictory but coexisting influences converged, enveloped by a refinement that arose from religious upbringing not far from the dissimulation of exiles.
On the other side was Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a third and revised edition of Jabhat al-Nusra, which was previously linked to both the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Qaeda organizations. Its leadership was also comprised of a generation born in the 1980s, who came from non-religious social backgrounds, as is now clear from the information available about the families of prominent figures such as Ahmed al-Sharaa, As’ad al-Shaybani, and Anas Khattab, for example.
Through their own path, these individuals and their comrades arrived at a similar blend to that which formed in the personalities of the Brotherhood’s sons: a jihadi memory that paralleled the imagination of the former, and a desire to open up to the world, use its tools, and engage in its relationships, which the expatriates seemed to possess. It became essential to leverage their skills to compensate for the lack of local expertise that had not been able to pursue prestigious education.
In a broader context, ideological shifts were bringing the two sides closer. Abroad, Sheikh Muhammad Surur Zain al-Abidin from Daraa had synthesized the Brotherhood’s aspirations for societal change with a Salafi foundation, in a movement famous by his name and academically known as “Activist Salafism” and media-wise as the “Awakening.” The sons of the Brotherhood were influenced by it due to their university and mosque connections, especially in the Gulf states or in Islamic centers connected to their religious institutions worldwide. Internally, the leadership of HTS, seeking a way to descend from the peak of “Jihadi Salafism,” found itself automatically on the plateau of the aforementioned Brotherhood Salafism, as a sudden turn might break the group’s neck, as evidenced by its methodological turmoil after the excessive urbanization it showed since the “Deterring Aggression” battle.
But does this mean an opening up by HTS, which seemingly dissolved itself at the end of last January, to the group banned in the country since the early 1960s? It does not seem that anything of the sort is happening or is about to happen. The authorities still insist on treating the Brotherhood as a party subject to activity prohibition until political life is restored one day. And the group still views what is happening with silent suspicion, even though some of its members, perhaps at higher organizational levels, have given their sons permission to contribute to the new experience, until God’s decree is fulfilled.
This article was translated and edited by The Syrian Observer. The Syrian Observer has not verified the content of this story. Responsibility for the information and views set out in this article lies entirely with the author.
