A significant number of Syrians are closely following the news of raids and pursuits taking place in the coastal region and Homs. Opinions and narratives surrounding these events are sharply divided. Some argue that these operations target remnants of the former regime’s criminals—though not without individual excesses—while others see them as systematic attacks driven by sectarian motives. Many gauge the intensity of Sunni-Alawite tensions in the country based on the frequency of these incidents.
However, as dramatic, violent, and destabilizing as these events may appear, they represent merely the tip of the iceberg—one that reveals a far deeper civil fracture, fostered by decades of Assad’s rule and brought to the surface by the revolution and subsequent liberation. Today, the Alawite community is marked by profound undercurrents that warrant serious examination, rather than focusing solely on the surface-level manifestations. Yet, before delving into these defining factors—now elevated to the level of strategic concerns—it is important to clarify that this discussion pertains to the prevailing public sentiment within the community and does not necessarily apply to every individual Alawite.
A Clash of Narratives
At the heart of the issue lies a stark divergence between the Alawite perspective and the revolutionary public’s narrative, which has become the official account of recent Syrian history. Whether out of ignorance or willful denial, a widespread and complicit illusion persists among Alawites—that Bashar al-Assad misled them into believing the revolution was an external conspiracy against Syria, one with internal sectarian dimensions. Thus, he deployed the army—where Alawites form the backbone—into what appeared to be a legitimate battle. From this viewpoint, officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers were merely fulfilling what they saw as a patriotic duty, one that was fully supported by their surrounding community.
According to this logic, accountability should extend only to those who exceeded military orders and committed indiscriminate massacres—most often members of the National Defense Forces or other auxiliary factions. In general, Alawites hold little regard for these paramilitary forces, associating them with chaos, corruption, and lawlessness—excesses that sometimes affected their own communities as well. In contrast, they continue to view officers with respect, especially those perceived as “poor”—a colloquial term carrying positive connotations. This distinction also explains the reluctance to hold officers accountable for “regular” battlefield actions, while resentment is primarily directed at wealthy, financially corrupt officers, regardless of their sect.
A more simplistic counter-narrative asserts that the conflict was a “civil war” in which all parties committed violations, including crimes against the Alawites themselves. From this perspective, the only viable solution is either a blanket amnesty for all or the simultaneous prosecution of perpetrators from all sides.
A second critical factor is the profound shock experienced by Alawites following the regime’s abrupt and rapid downfall. While the notion of an “Assadist sect” holds some truth, it is undeniable that Alawites occupied privileged positions under the previous regime—a reality they both acknowledged and benefited from, as did other Syrians who lived under it. The sudden reversal of this status—especially after Bashar al-Assad declared “victory” just a few years ago and began receiving gestures of normalization from Arab, regional, and international actors—was a seismic event. Then came the ultimate betrayal: Assad’s flight, abandoning his supporters in a state of shock and humiliation, leaving them to negotiate their survival at the very reconciliation centers they once controlled. It is unrealistic to expect such a dramatic shift to pass smoothly.
Economic Catastrophe and Structural Collapse
Beyond psychological and political upheaval, the majority of Alawites suffered direct and severe economic devastation due to a series of measures taken by the current ruling authority. Chief among these was the abrupt dissolution of the military—without pensions or severance pay for its personnel. While this decision was welcomed by those who had been subjected to mandatory conscription, it was catastrophic for tens of thousands of officers and non-commissioned officers who relied on the institution for their livelihoods—whether through regular salaries, extortion, or systemic corruption.
If Alawites formed a disproportionately high percentage of military personnel, their presence was even more pronounced in the security services, particularly as these agencies became increasingly sectarianized during the revolution—through both defections and selective recruitment. Auxiliary forces, which had absorbed a substantial segment of the Alawite labor force (alongside non-Alawites), vanished overnight, without the need for official disbandment. Similarly, the security office of the notorious Fourth Division—which had issued thousands of permits for smuggling, extortion at checkpoints, and other illicit enterprises—ceased to exist.
The economic fallout extended beyond the military and security sectors. Alawites who had secured favored positions in key civilian industries were also severely impacted. This included Baath Party apparatchiks, employees in customs, ports, airports, and border crossings—fields where sectarian favoritism was present, albeit not absolute. The education and media sectors, which had attracted a considerable number of Alawite women, also suffered. The stereotypical image of the “teacher as an officer’s wife” had long been ingrained, later joined by her younger sister or daughter as a journalist.
These economic hardships have been exacerbated by the current government’s policy of drastically reducing public sector employment, with planned cuts ranging from one-third to one-half of the workforce. Those affected include patronage hires who had been on payrolls without actually working, individuals employed through special recruitment programs for demobilized soldiers during the revolution, families of fallen regime fighters, and employees on discretionary contracts. The disproportionate impact on Alawites is evident in the protests staged by those dismissed, as they gather outside their institutions in defiance of termination notices or forced unpaid leave, which is often a prelude to permanent dismissal.
Further compounding the crisis, military retirees who served after 2011 have seen their pensions suspended. Meanwhile, unidentified entities have begun evicting former military personnel from state-provided housing—particularly in the suburbs of Damascus, where these settlements, once untouchable, had long been a source of local resentment. With the balance of power now shifting, long-suppressed grievances are surfacing, and former neighbors are seizing the opportunity to reclaim space.
These factors collectively place the majority of Alawites—who had long relied on the state as their primary employer, whether through the military or civilian bureaucracy—in a dire economic position. Their monthly financial cycles, once dictated by the steady rhythm of state salaries, have collapsed. As hunger looms and livelihoods disintegrate, the repercussions for the community, and for Syria as a whole, remain uncertain.
This article was translated and edited by The Syrian Observer. The Syrian Observer has not verified the content of this story. Responsibility for the information and views set out in this article lies entirely with the author.
