The “Syrian crisis” persists across military and security landscapes in five governorates, where international and regional influences intersect with the Syrian regime, yet viable solutions remain elusive for the populace to settle or return to their homeland.
There appears to be little inclination from the United States to facilitate a suitable regional convergence, particularly given its control over northeastern Syria, which does not imply intentions to topple the state and its regime. Instead, through the Caesar Act, Washington inevitably obstructs any Russian initiatives for resolution or future Iranian influence in leveraging the Gaza war. This stance comes amidst strained U.S.-Russia relations over the Ukraine war and its ripple effects across Europe, alongside ongoing tensions in Palestine and the sharply divided Eastern Mediterranean, and emerging geopolitical challenges involving China.
The U.S. administration aims for Iran to shoulder losses rather than profits, a strategy perceived at the expense of the broader Palestinian and Arab population’s suffering.
Mutual servitude
The speech of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei should not be misconstrued as denying involvement in the al-Aqsa flood operation, which he views as a collaboration aimed at preventing a broader war that Netanyahu seeks to embroil the U.S. and Iran in—a scenario neither Tehran nor Washington desires. Khamenei argues the operation was necessary to strengthen Iran’s position in future regional negotiations and to counter any international moves toward a two-state solution, a stance shared by Netanyahu and the Iranian regime.
Iran seeks to leverage the Gaza war for its strategic advantage, aligning with broader regional developments, while Washington also maneuvers in this complex arena. According to Suzanne Maloney, Vice President of the Brookings Institution’s Foreign Policy Program, Iran sees an opportunity to weaken Israel, diminish U.S. influence in the Middle East, and reshape the region to its advantage (“Foreign Affairs”).
During his inaugural visit to Beirut, Acting Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Bagheri Kani emphasized the pivotal role of Iran-Lebanon relations in regional stability, framing resistance as fundamental to maintaining this stability. Iran’s pursuit of exporting its revolution remains a constitutional priority, with the Revolutionary Guard tasked to advance this agenda amidst ongoing crises and chaos.
Iran’s vision of stability entails regional dominance through a security framework it manages unilaterally, dismissing external balancing powers. Tehran perceives the collapse of the international modern order and anticipates its own leadership in a postmodern world, asserting that Iran alone can navigate this future.
Iran aims to solidify its regional influence before the Syrian regime potentially distances itself. Bashar al-Assad’s regime, currently navigating limited international, Arab, and regional support, focuses on survival and awaits favourable shifts in the balance of power. Despite its return to the Arab League fold at the 2023 Jeddah Summit, Assad’s regime has not implemented reforms or adhered to resolutions like Security Council 2254, nor has it prioritized combating drug trafficking or facilitating refugee returns, as agreed upon in Amman and Cairo meetings of the Arab Ministerial Liaison Committee on the Syrian crisis.
Double Fury
Bashar al-Assad has recently attempted to portray himself as initiating reforms, such as combating corruption, sidelining supposedly “balanced” party leaders, implementing high-level security changes, and expressing readiness to distance himself from Iranian influence and align with the Arab world. These actions underscore the weakened and paralyzed state of his regime, unable to embrace its Arab neighbours, engage with political opposition for peaceful resolutions, stem Captagon trafficking into the Gulf and Jordan, or acknowledge UN Resolution 2254.
The limited international and Arab allowances granted to Assad’s regime aim to curb Iranian encroachment into Syrian decision-making circles, a sphere Assad has sought to navigate. However, Iran’s robust response and military influence over Syrian decisions highlight Assad’s inability to reciprocate recent Arab overtures. Whether attending Arab summits in silence, thereby angering Iran over his failure to condemn Arab League resolutions regarding UAE islands, or visiting Tehran to offer condolences following the deaths of its president and foreign minister, Assad faces heightened Arab resentment. Consequently, he hesitates to repatriate displaced Syrians from neighbouring countries, preferring to use them as leverage in negotiations with Western nations and Europe to secure recognition for his regime’s legitimacy, which remains in question.
Assad’s regime lacks legitimacy and harbours a persistent inferiority complex, particularly towards Western powers. The ongoing allowances for Assad’s regime on the international and Arab fronts are primarily designed to contain Iranian influence within Syrian decision-making circles—an objective Assad has attempted to navigate. However, Iran’s forceful response and military influence over Syrian decisions underscore Assad’s inability to reciprocate recent Arab gestures. Whether attending Arab summits in silence, thus angering Iran by failing to condemn Arab League resolutions on UAE islands, or visiting Tehran to offer condolences following the deaths of its president and foreign minister, Assad faces increased Arab and Iranian criticism. As a result, he is reluctant to repatriate displaced Syrians from neighbouring countries, preferring to use them as a bargaining chip in negotiations with Western countries and Europe to secure recognition of his legitimacy.
This article was translated and edited by The Syrian Observer. The Syrian Observer has not verified the content of this story. Responsibility for the information and views set out in this article lies entirely with the author.
