On 17 September 2025, Syria’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced a landmark tripartite agreement between Damascus, Amman, and Washington, unveiling a “roadmap” aimed at addressing the escalating crisis in Suweida province. Touted by the Syrian government as a pathway to restoring security, stability, and national reconciliation, the deal emerges amid mounting tensions in the Druze-majority region. Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shibani hailed it as a “clear vision” for protecting civilians and rebuilding trust between the state and local communities, with backing from Jordan and the United States. Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi underscored its potential to enhance regional stability, while U.S. envoy Thomas Barak reaffirmed Washington’s commitment to fostering tolerance and security.
Yet as the agreement’s ink dries, a pivotal question persists: can this roadmap bridge Suweida’s deep-rooted divisions and counter mounting external pressures—or will it falter under the weight of local scepticism and geopolitical manoeuvring?
Background: A Province at the Crossroads
Suweida, Syria’s southernmost governorate, is demographically distinct—home to a Druze majority, alongside Christian minorities and pockets of Sunni Arabs. This diversity renders it a microcosm of Syria’s pluralistic yet fragmented society. In recent months, the province has been beset by severe security and economic challenges, compounded by alleged Israeli interventions that have stirred separatist sentiment and armed local militias to obstruct reconciliation with Damascus.
The Syrian government’s response has been multifaceted. Initial efforts at economic and institutional integration gave way to a military incursion in mid-July 2025—an action that deepened local resentment. This fraught backdrop sets the stage for the new roadmap, which builds upon talks held in Amman in July and August. The agreement seeks to formalise a ceasefire, restore essential services, and affirm Suweida’s indivisible place within Syria, explicitly rejecting autonomy or secessionist narratives.
The tripartite framework reflects broader regional stakes. Jordan regards stability in southern Syria as integral to its own national security, while the U.S. is leveraging its influence to restrain Israeli actions and promote inclusive governance.
Core Elements of the Roadmap
According to the Syrian Foreign Ministry, the roadmap rests on foundational principles, actionable steps, and oversight mechanisms. Central to its ethos is a commitment to Syria’s unity: Suweida is described as “an integral part” of the nation, with its residents entitled to equal rights and bound by equal responsibilities.
The roadmap’s key pillars include:
- Legal and Investigative Measures: An independent international committee will investigate recent violence, with Damascus pledging to prosecute violations against civilians and property. This initiative seeks to deliver justice while countering accusations of state impunity.
- Humanitarian and Service Restoration: Continued delivery of aid through the United Nations and partner states is planned, alongside Jordanian and U.S. support to fund critical infrastructure and healthcare services.
- Security and Mobility Arrangements: Interior Ministry forces will be deployed along the Suweida–Damascus highway to secure trade routes. Civilian fighters will withdraw from administrative boundaries, and displaced villagers will return under the supervision of trained police units.
- Detainee Releases and Reconstruction: In coordination with the International Red Cross, the agreement provides for prisoner exchanges and family reunifications. Damascus will lead the reconstruction of affected villages, with funding from all three partners.
- National Unity and Reconciliation: A national narrative of diversity and equality will be promoted, with legislation introduced against hate speech. Jordan will facilitate dialogues between Suweida communities and Bedouin tribes to promote grassroots reconciliation.
- Administrative Reforms: A local police force comprising all sects will be established under Suweida native Sulaiman Abdul Baqi, who was recently appointed security director. Civil institutions will be reactivated, and a provincial council comprising professionals, academics, and community elders will guide reconciliation efforts.
- Crisis Management and External Interference: The phased release of detainees, improved aid coordination, and a firm rejection of foreign interference—implicitly directed at Israel—are key aspects. U.S.-brokered security arrangements with Israel reaffirm Syria’s sovereignty over its southern territories.
Oversight will be provided by a joint Syria–Jordan–U.S. mechanism, respecting Damascus’s sovereignty and involving the UN in monitoring implementation. The roadmap is sequenced and pragmatic, prioritising de-escalation through ceasefires and aid before advancing to deeper reforms such as local governance and policing—marking a shift from past reliance on unilateral military solutions.
Challenges: Local Rejection and External Shadows
Despite its scope, the roadmap has encountered immediate opposition. The “Supreme Legal Committee” in Suweida, aligned with prominent Druze cleric Hikmat al-Hijri, issued a vehement rejection. The committee labelled the roadmap “riddled with contradictions” and a covert mechanism for imposing “guardianship” over the province. It criticised the national judiciary’s ability to guarantee fair accountability and dismissed local councils and joint forces as divisive constructs. Most provocatively, it asserted Suweida’s right to self-determination—including full independence—and called for international oversight that bypasses Damascus. The committee also warned against tying local security to “external ambitions.”
These objections underscore deep internal rifts. Political analyst Hassan al-Dughaym estimates that 90 to 95 per cent of Suweida’s population supports reintegration. However, vocal hardliners are amplifying separatist rhetoric, potentially impeding progress. Dughaym characterises this dissent as the posturing of “de facto authorities,” advocating a gradual and culturally sensitive implementation of the roadmap.
Externally, Israel’s alleged support for armed militias complicates matters. Meanwhile, Jordan’s mediation—bolstered by its tribal ties with Druze and Bedouin communities—offers a stabilising force. Ayman Safadi reaffirmed Amman’s commitment to Syria’s unity, though success may depend on U.S. pressure to restrain Israeli adventurism. Analyst Amin al-Mashagba, a former Jordanian minister, also cited 90 to 95 per cent local backing for the status quo, positioning the roadmap as a safeguard against “Israeli-supported” fragmentation. Still, without swift, tangible progress—such as detainee releases and aid distribution—scepticism could deepen, emboldening spoilers.
Prospects for Success: A Delicate Balance
As Dughaym observes, successful implementation depends on coordinated efforts among Syria, Jordan, the U.S., and the UN. Priorities include deconfliction, securing transport routes, humanitarian access, and re-establishing institutions. Initial signals—such as the appointment of Abdul Baqi—suggest an inclusive approach that may weaken separatist narratives by empowering local actors.
Jordan’s influence, described by Mashagba as a “strong card,” stems from its social ties and alignment with U.S. diplomacy, which could also help contain Israeli activities through new security arrangements. Optimistically, the roadmap’s emphasis on equity, justice, and oversight offers a pathway towards healing and may serve as a template for post-conflict pluralism in Syria.
However, pessimism lingers. If rejections gain traction—fuelled by unresolved grievances or external sabotage—the roadmap may entrench divisions and extend instability. Though initial indicators, including support from Turkey and Arab states, suggest regional momentum, ultimate success will require flexibility from Damascus and sustained international commitment.
Overcoming Divisions?
The Suweida roadmap represents a rare multilateral initiative in Syria’s protracted conflict, blending accountability with reconciliation in an effort to reclaim a drifting province. It directly addresses local trust deficits through representation and humanitarian relief, while enlisting Jordanian and U.S. support to contain external threats—chiefly, Israeli interference.
Yet the outright rejection by the Hijri-affiliated committee highlights the enduring gulf between centralised solutions and grassroots aspirations for autonomy. Observers estimate that up to 95 per cent of locals support the plan, but this potential will only materialise if implementation is transparent, inclusive, and responsive.
The roadmap may not instantly heal Suweida’s fractures. Rather, it offers a scaffold for gradual repair—dependent on genuine accountability and the political will to accommodate diversity. In a region where unity remains both urgent and elusive, this tripartite pact could redefine southern Syria’s trajectory—or become another footnote in the long history of unrealised peace efforts.
Hijri rejects
In a rapid and unequivocal response, Suweida’s Supreme Legal Committee has rejected the “roadmap” unveiled by the Syrian, Jordanian, and U.S. foreign ministries aimed at resolving the province’s crisis. The committee, formed on 6 August 2025 by Druze spiritual leaders and comprising six judges and three lawyers, issued a statement via its media office denouncing the plan as contradictory, evasive, and a threat to local cohesion.
The statement cited key objections: reliance on Syria’s judiciary, which the committee deems politicised and unfit for fair accountability; internal contradictions in the roadmap; attempts to divide the community; and a denial of past state abuses. It concluded with a firm call for international rejection of any solution imposed by force, asserting Suweida’s right to self-determination.
Legal and Judicial Disputes
Central to the committee’s critique is the roadmap’s call for accountability under Syrian law, which it claims invalidates the promised international investigation. A Suweida-based legal expert, speaking anonymously to Al-Hal Net, argued that while the UN’s Independent International Commission of Inquiry can document violations, it lacks judicial power. Syria’s non-membership in the International Criminal Court complicates any referral to international justice, leaving few avenues beyond Syrian courts—which the committee views as mere instruments of state impunity.
The committee also accused Damascus of attempting to present itself as a neutral facilitator while being complicit in violence against civilians. Proposals to form joint councils and police forces were dismissed as efforts to install unrepresentative figures and weaken Suweida’s societal fabric. Citing decades of marginalisation and recent atrocities, the committee reiterated Suweida’s right to chart its own future—potentially including independence.
Mixed Local Reactions
Local opinions remain divided. Speaking to al-Hal Rima Fleihan, head of the Syrian Women’s Lobby, called the roadmap a potential “rescue solution” if accompanied by genuine decentralisation, UN oversight, service restoration, and inclusive dialogue. Meanwhile, Sorbonne professor Khaldoun al-Nabwani viewed the roadmap as promising, stressing the importance of transparent implementation.
Simultaneously, reports emerged that Syria’s transitional government had withdrawn heavy weaponry from the south in line with a clause of an unconfirmed Syria–Israel agreement. Yet these de-escalation efforts have not eased local suffering. Suweida continues to face severe hardship: unpaid salaries, power outages, fuel shortages, and disrupted education. The Damascus–Suweida road remains dangerous—on Tuesday, security forces detained a bus driver and assistant at al-Matouna checkpoint without explanation, prompting the only operating transport company to suspend services.
As diplomatic efforts falter and local rejection hardens, Suweida’s population remains trapped between international roadmaps and aspirations for justice, dignity, and autonomy.
This article was translated and edited by The Syrian Observer. The Syrian Observer has not verified the content of this story. Responsibility for the information and views set out in this article lies entirely with the author.
