Ahmed al-Sharaa’s forces achieved a rapid and decisive victory over Bashar al-Assad’s army, astonishing observers—including al-Sharaa himself and, likely, even Assad. Suddenly, al-Sharaa found himself in the offices of the fleeing president, assuming control of state affairs much as his predecessor had done. He appointed government officials, held meetings with delegates, envoys, and ministers, all while lacking any formal title. This raises an important question: What is Ahmed al-Sharaa’s position? And does he need an official status to legitimize his authority?
Historical Precedents
When Egypt’s coup leaders, under Gamal Abdel Nasser, launched their military revolution against King Farouk in July 1952, they quickly established the Revolutionary Command Council. This body was chaired by the highest-ranking Free Officer, General Mohamed Naguib. The council became the new governing authority during Egypt’s transition to a republic. It played a pivotal role in shaping the country’s political direction, consolidating power under Nasser’s leadership, and laying the foundation for a socialist state characterized by Arab nationalism.
In March 1963, the Baathists and their allies in Syria replicated Egypt’s experience. They formed their own Revolutionary Command Council, led by the highest-ranking officer, the Nasserite Lu’ai al-Atassi. The council was charged with consolidating power and enacting the Baath Party’s ideology of Arab socialism and nationalism. It implemented sweeping reforms, including land redistribution, nationalization of major industries, and the establishment of a one-party system.
The Iraqi Baath Party followed a similar trajectory. After their July 17, 1968 coup ousted Abdul Rahman Aref, they established a Revolutionary Command Council headed by Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr. This council became Iraq’s highest governing authority and quickly asserted dominance within the Baathist regime. It implemented significant reforms, such as the nationalization of oil resources, redistribution of land, and modernization of Iraq’s economy and infrastructure. The council also served as Saddam Hussein’s primary tool for consolidating power, establishing a tightly controlled authoritarian regime that endured until 2003.
Iran: Velayat-e Faqih
The Iranian revolution of February 1979 offers a different model. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini emerged as the central figure of the movement that overthrew the Shah and ended centuries of hereditary rule. Despite his immense authority, Khomeini deliberately chose not to assume a formal government position. He adhered to the principle of velayat-e faqih (guardianship of the jurist), which established clerical supremacy over the state.
As the architect of the Islamic Republic, Khomeini exercised control through religious authority, delegating executive responsibilities to government officials. This ensured that political decisions conformed to Islamic principles under his direct supervision.
Khomeini’s approach reflected his vision of a theocratic state where religious leadership superseded traditional political structures. This strategy enabled him to direct domestic reforms and foreign policies without the constraints of daily administration. His position as supreme leader solidified Iran’s revolutionary identity and its status as a uniquely Islamic state.
Al-Sharaa’s Path Forward
Drawing from these historical precedents, Ahmed al-Sharaa’s role remains ambiguous. Like the leaders before him, he could institutionalize his authority through revolutionary mechanisms or assume a unique position that aligns with his vision for Syria. Whether he adopts a formal title or exercises influence through informal channels will determine the structure and trajectory of post-Assad Syria.
Reflecting on past experiences compels us to question the position of Damascus strongman Ahmad al-Sharaa—both the role he currently occupies and the one he envisions for himself. The deliberate ambiguity surrounding al-Sharaa keeps all possibilities open. The Egyptian, Syrian, and Iraqi precedents suggest the potential for a coup-revolutionary institutionalization that could culminate in al-Sharaa’s installation as Syria’s next dictator.
The Iranian model, given al-Sharaa’s deep religious background, offers another pathway. This model might allow him to construct a system where he positions himself above traditional authorities, ensuring continuity of power. In such a scenario, a role akin to “Supreme Leader” or “Guide” would emerge, untethered to time limits or electoral accountability. Such a supra-political, supra-governmental position would not be subject to popular election and would endure until the officeholder’s death or other divine intervention.
A Third Path
However, a third path is possible, too. When Syrians rose against the corrupt, mafioso dictatorship, they were driven by a primal, non-ideological aspiration for freedom and dignity. Following the Assad regime’s collapse, the initial expressions of this uprising rekindled the old pursuit of liberty and honor. This leaves open the possibility of a democratic or semi-democratic transition, where power is transferred peacefully, the separation of powers is upheld, and the rule of law forms the bedrock of a new Syrian state.
For such a vision to materialize, Syrians who believe in the inseparability of political democracy and social civility—let’s call them civil democrats—must exert sustained pressure on the new government. They must ensure a careful, critical, but necessary balance between Syria’s religious and civil democratic factions.
It cannot be denied that Ahmad al-Sharaa rose to power on the back of an untamed Islamist movement. Regional efforts overwhelmingly worked to diminish the civil face of the Syrian revolution and amplify its Islamist one. While minimal resources were allocated to education and civic activism within the opposition, substantial funds were funneled into arming radical Islamist factions. As Abu Muhammad al-Fatih, al-Sharaa led one of the most powerful and organized of these groups. His strength relied heavily on the religiosity of his followers and fighters.
However, when al-Fatih removed his turban, he also shed some of his religious extremism. The man has demonstrated a high degree of pragmatism, sharp intellect, and an ability to adapt to objective circumstances—traits his predecessor, Assad, lacked, having been trapped in a closed circle of delusion. With his new responsibilities and growing regional and global engagement, al-Sharaa has transitioned from the narrow worldview of a conqueror to the expansive perspective required of those at the apex of power, capable of seeing issues from all angles.
From Revolution to Statehood
Al-Sharaa often asserts that the revolution has ended and that Syria has transitioned from revolution to statehood. As a statesman—no longer the leader of an armed Islamist faction—he seeks to distance himself from the ideas and practices of such groups. Abandoning his turban and religious attire, al-Sharaa replaced radical rhetoric with a more moderate and balanced discourse. He shifted from a militaristic approach to one centered on governance.
Concrete steps support this transformation. Al-Sharaa announced his intent to disband sectarian militias and integrate them into a unified national army. He pledged to protect minority rights, hosted Arab and foreign delegations to discuss regional stability, and emphasized cooperative reconstruction efforts over confrontation. Additionally, he advocated for foreign investment in critical infrastructure, such as energy grids and water systems, to foster economic recovery and job creation.
All questions about the sincerity of al-Sharaa’s new direction are valid, legitimate, and necessary. Ignoring them, however, is neither valid nor legitimate—and certainly not advisable.
Pressure from Below and Pressure from Above
Ahmed al-Sharaa’s pragmatism, realism, and “openness” are not always reflected in the attitudes of his popular and military base. A quick browse through social media reveals videos and comments from Sharaa supporters expressing dissatisfaction with his moderation and reluctance to implement “God’s law.” It’s clear that Sharaa is under significant pressure, likely from his (perhaps narrow) base of Syrians and non-Syrians. I will call this influence “pressure from below.”
This pressure may well have influenced Sharaa’s decision to appoint a Minister of Justice who personally oversaw the public execution of two women on “moral” charges, to remain silent about the rushed and unspecialized modifications to Syria’s curriculum, and even to assign non-Syrians high-ranking positions in the Syrian army.
A considerable number of Syrian Islamists have formed committees for “enjoining good and forbidding evil” and have attempted to impose the hijab on women and forcibly close bars, either through direct action or “counseling.” While the ruling forces of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) have occasionally intervened to curb such actions in Damascus, they have turned a blind eye to similar incidents elsewhere and may not do so in the future.
These groups and others want Sharaa to proclaim the new Syria an unadorned Islamist state, free of embellishments or compromises. Sharaa, however, cannot govern without their support and will inevitably have to include them in decision-making and heed their demands.
Yet, this pressure from below may push Sharaa further toward fulfilling their vision. To counterbalance this, there must be another kind of influence—one that encourages moderation and centrism. This counter-pressure must come from liberal and secular Syrians, religious minorities, advocates of civility and moderation, and a significant portion of moderate Sunnis. I will refer to this as “pressure from above.”
The pressure from below is driven by a strong ideological or opportunistic interest, making its proponents tireless in imposing their agenda on the new government. If they are not met with equally relentless pressure from above, Sharaa will almost inevitably gravitate toward his base. And let’s not deceive ourselves—Western governments will not sustain their lobbying efforts on Syria’s behalf indefinitely.
The pressure from below is bolstered by its presence inside Syria, its ideological alignment with Sharaa, and its historical role in fighting alongside him. Conversely, much of the pressure from above comes from abroad. While many members of this group have a deep emotional desire to return to Syria, they are more likely to limit their involvement to short visits with remaining relatives.
This disparity necessitates persistence, creativity, and the utilization of every available lever to offset the imbalance. Syrian organizations abroad must leverage their influence over Western governments, and Syrian capital outside the country must be mobilized as a critical tool to apply sustained and effective pressure.
Al-Sharaa’s Opportunity
In July 2016, following the failed coup attempt to overthrow Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, I wrote an article in Al-Hayat newspaper. In it, I argued that the coup’s failure was largely due to popular and political support, as well as cooperation from the Turkish opposition. At that pivotal moment, Erdogan faced two choices: to be the leader of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) or to be the leader of the nation. He could either remain a partisan figure and act as a small victor, or he could rise above the conflict and become a unifying leader, ensuring democracy’s definitive triumph over the military’s aspirations for power.
Erdogan chose the former, causing his popularity to wane and diminishing his stature as a national leader. He missed the chance to become the third great founder of modern Turkey, alongside Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and Turgut Özal, and to establish himself as the architect of 21st-century Turkey.
Today, Ahmad al-Sharaa faces a similar crossroads. He can choose to be the leader of an Islamist faction—large or small—that keeps Syria relegated to a neglected corner of the world. Or he can rise to the occasion, become the man who returns Syria to history and restores history to Syria, and establish a new republic founded on citizenship, equality, human rights, power-sharing, and the rule of law.
If al-Sharaa chooses to be Syria’s Khomeini, he will quickly lose the luster that has earned him the trust of a wide segment of Syrians, including liberals and secularists. However, if he opts to become Syria’s first elected president with a fixed term, he must actively promote the drafting of a civil constitution that will allow him to govern for a set period, after which the mantle of leadership will pass to others.
The Need for Transparency
Regardless of the path he chooses, al-Sharaa owes it to the Syrian people to speak directly to them. So far, it is clear that he tailors his messages based on his audience: he speaks one language to the Western media, another to the Arab press, and yet another to his base of supporters. But where are the Syrians in all of this?
We, the people, need to hear directly from the de facto ruler of Syria. We don’t want messages aimed at Turks, Western powers, Arabs, or Islamists. We want to hear from al-Sharaa himself—a speech to Syrians, from both his mind and heart, without filters or embellishments.
We need to understand al-Sharaa’s true vision for the future of Syria. What are his views on freedom, democracy, the rule of law, public liberties, equal citizenship, and the role of women? What does he mean by the National Conference? What are the conditions for participation? Why will it take years to draft the constitution and hold elections? Will these elections be held under international supervision? How does he plan to implement transitional justice? And how will he rebuild Syria’s economy to lift the country from its ruins, enabling it to rise like a phoenix from the ashes?
These are not unreasonable questions, nor are they too difficult for al-Sharaa to address. Syrians deserve answers, and they deserve them now.
This article was translated and edited by The Syrian Observer. The Syrian Observer has not verified the content of this story. Responsibility for the information and views set out in this article lies entirely with the author.
