It has now become clear that what is happening in Mosul and the other cities in the north-west of Iraq are a revolution against the policies of Iraqi Prime Minister, Nouri al-Maliki that rejected national dialogue, the imposition of a fait accompli by force, after dividing Iraq according to sect and ethnicity.
Following the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime, Maliki dealt with some parties as victorious and with others defeated, giving the losers two choices: comply or die.
As was the case in Syria in the past three years, Maliki is still the primarily responsible for aborting the process of rebuilding Iraq politically and nationally, insisting on clinging to power and depicting the rebels of Anbar and the north-west of Iraq as terrorists. He matched the rebels with ISIS, despite the fact that many of its leaders confirmed their rejection of ISIS ideology and activities which, as was the case in Syria before, distorts the image of the Iraqi revolution, and stabs the revolution in the back.
The fact is that Maliki turns ISIS to a legendary organization in its power, simply to justify himself for escaping from a review of his policies, and respond positively to the demands of the popular revolution.
He acts like Bashar Assad did himself, justifying a war of genocide against his own people to cover for the appeal to foreign militias, mostly belonging to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, the de facto ruler in Tehran.
This is what is happening today in Iraq, too, in order to justify the intervention of the Revolutionary Guards directly, and cover up the sectarian recruitment, and to appeal to Western countries to support a regime that exacerbates the division of Iraq and its people. We can hardly find today anyone who now believes in a chance for Iraq's survival.
The trade in terrorism was mastered by the Iranian and Syrian regimes, and today Maliki's sectarian regime entered the race. The trade in terrorism works in three directions:
Firstly, the threat of direct terrorism against this opponent or that. This requires the formation of terrorist organizations directly, or penetrating existing ones, supporting them in order to use them at the right moment for extortion, threat or deterrence.
Second, the trade in fighting terrorism or participation in its so-called control, to earn points from major powers who have made the war against terrorism the first issue of global politics for decades, and the only war that the West accepts to fight.
Thirdly, finding an excuse in terrorism to promote external interference and profit from the global war against it. It is more likely that whoever plays with terrorism is the same as those who benefit from fighting it. This was, and still is, the source of power for Assad's father, and a tool to blackmail the surrounding countries and the world. Convincing the West of this theory was the main source of Assad strength and support, and convincing the West of its effective role in fighting terrorism is still the only bet for his son to restore some of his international legitimacy and to end his terrible fall, after waging a war of genocide against his own people.
For this, and for the first time during three years, Asad found it useful to bomb ISIS on the Syrian-Iraqi border, hoping to lure offers from Americans to stop their hostility towards him and recruit him in the declared war against terrorism in the region.
This, too, is what Tehran dreams of to overcome its deep disagreements with his American opponents and to open a window for an opportunity for positive cooperation that makes it easier to achieve its other goals with regard to Western-Iranian negotiations. They believe, rightly, that whoever is worthy of the privilege of participating in the war against terrorism, which is their only hope to return to the international community and get out of their sustainable isolation, should be professional in this war, and at least partially in control of its tools and tracks.
Translated and edited by The Syrian Observer